Slashdot Mirror
Diebold Flops in Alaska
lukej writes "From the Anchorage Daily News, During yesterday's preliminary and ballot measure election across Alaska, Diebold built voting machines failed to 'phone home' causing a hand recount. As a party spokesperson said:
"I can say there are many systematic problems with Diebold machines that have been identified in many contexts."
Additionally, the state itself has mandated some hand counts of all electronic results, and the Democratic Party is simply suggesting voters request paper voting."
From an outsider looking in, and knowing nothing about these elections, will this potentially affect sen. Ted Stevens in any way? Is there any chance that his hold will be weakened by this, or is he too popular up there for it to be an issue? (or is he completely unaffected by this election and it is the next one that involves him?)
Warhammer forums
I am of the opinion that hand counts of paper ballot receipts (printed by the voting machine, verified by the voter, then dropped in a box at the site of the election) should always be done, regardless of whether it was a close race. Otherwise, Diebold could avoid a recount by fabricating a landslide. From the perspective of avoiding vote fraud, I can't think of a better method of running an election than forced recounts, though for convenience sake its nice to have a quick, initial electronic tally which can be verified later.
How can the system still be buggy? I mean, seariously? Haven't they had several years to complete it in now? A voting system seems to be such a simple application, even if you spiff it up with loads of extras, such as automatic reporting to a central database, security features etc etc. Have they had to invent the transistor and the binary computer all over? I know I'm a brilliant programmer (and sexy as hell too), but I would have thought that even lesser mortals would have big problems stretching the coding of a voting system out over several years, let alone leaving it full of bugs.
So how come they are able to stay in business? Is it the power of the free market?
If a format for voting has been used for years, with little inaccuracy or error, such as paper ballots, then surely they could just not adopt the new method of computerised voting? A little tradition can sometimes be a good thing, especially if it works. What's next, the papal elections are done through MSN messenger, no need to go to Vatican City anymore. (I suppose that was a bad example as Chrisitian traditions are often more about being luddites than keeping with proven methods, but you get the idea.)
http://alternet.org/blogs/video/40755/
Summary --
Computer programmer Clinton Eugene Curtis testifies under oath before the U.S. House Judiciary Members in Ohio. Stephen Pizzo writes:
A partial transcript:
Are there computer programs that can be used to secretly fix elections?
Yes.
How do you know that to be the case?
Because in October of 2000, I wrote a prototype for Congressman Tom Feeney [R-FL]...
It would rig an election?
It would flip the vote, 51-49. Whoever you wanted it to go to and whichever race you wanted to win.
And would that program that you designed, be something that elections officials... could detect?
They'd never see it.
I am constantly in awe at the failure of implementating of IT within (the) public sector (services). Governments/states spend millions on the lowest bidder, with costs often spiralling to beyond that quoted by the highest bidder initially, and it increasingly seems as if you get what you pay for.
At least in this case lives were not at risksee here, here and here.
It could be argued that selection of companies such as Diebold comes from a lack of awareness of IT by governments, and is simply a cost/saving excercise, but even so- sensible questions should be raised about all contractors- have they got a track record, how are they trialling the product, are their guarantees more than verbal...do we have a backup?
Sure DIebold cannot make excuses...but can the government either?
Makes you wonder why they bother with all the added hassle of machine voting at all, really.
== Jez ==
Do you miss Firefox? Try Pale Moon.
This is practically the same as what I proposed on my blog a while back:
A proposal for a Trustable Electronic Voting System
Seeing how the failure of electronic voting to earn our trust is a hot topic today, heres my shot at a proposal for a secure electonic voting system.
1. The voting process starts with a voter walking into a polling station and presenting his/her ID. This is verified by the officials, and possibly representatives of the candidates, and once verified, the Voter is issued a Physical Token. This Token is NOT generated on demand, and can be something like the tokens used at game arcades. Each token needs to have a globally unique serial ID, which would need be changeable. Each polling booth is issued a fixed number of voter tokens, enough for the total number of voters expected to show up at a booth. Any unused tokens need to be returned to the Election Authority.
2. The voter takes the token (remmeber that this token is not associated with his identity in any way) and walks up to the voting machine. This machine consists of a touch screen with the poll options on it. The machine activates when the voter drops the token into its slot. The user makes his/her selection, confirms it, and is issued a printed reciept of his/her choice. The machine keeps a running tally of the votes polled, but does NOT communicate the vote to any central server. This information is kept secure inside the machine itself, and the machine needs to be made physcially temper proof and temper-evident. At the end of the polling process, all the voting mashines can be collected together and an authorized elction officer can instruct the machine to reveal the poll results. All results from all machines can be tallied to get the final election result.
4. The receipt format would be a standardized one, established by the febderal election officals, including the fonts, sizes and the information content. It will have on it, printed, the day/date and identifier of the particular election and the id of the machine which issued the reciept, and in large fonts, the selection made by the voter.
5. The voter checks on the reciept to make sure the information on the reciept matches what he had punched in. If not, the vote is invalid, and he/she gets to vote again.
6. If the reciept information is valid, the voter proceeds to another machine, where he/she inserts the reciept into a slot. This second machine reads the receipt using Optical Character Recognition, and maintains its own independent tally of votes polled. It also securely holds all the receipts in a safe vault inside it. The first machine and this second machine are not linked in any way.
7. The first machine and the second machine must not be made by the same manufacturer, or by companies with substantial holding by common entities.
8. Ideally, the token and the receipt would be federal standards, and the machines themselves can be made by any number of companies. They would need to get certified by a testing body. The certification test would focus on standards compliance (including such standards as physical size, accessibility, etc).
9. A single company may make both the machines, but in any specific poll booth, machines from two indepepdent manufacturers need to be used.
At the end of the election, the polling officials return to a central location with all the unused tokens, and the sealed machines. The total number of votes polled by both the machines, and the number of tokens issued is first matched. Then both the machines are activated and the total tallies of votes taken and matched against each other. In case of mismatch, the paper reciepts are retrieved from the second machine, and counted by hand.
The crucial points are:
1. Two independent tallies of the same votes, with a trail between corresponding votes (the receipt carries the token ID, so from the machines databases, one can matc
Sigura Non Grata
How is it that the largest democracy in the world manages to get it right while these guys foul up. I imagine they didnt test this properly at all. Classic case of 'someone effed up' and didnt test the most basic function of this machine properly.
As as Canadian I am mystified by what seems to be a complete lack of outrage regarding the accuracy and transparency of electronic voting systems. You'd think with all the controversy of the last two presidential elections that Americans would sit up and take notice, but it doesn't appear to be.
We have an almost quaint system of voting here that requires only a few paid volunteers, some paper ballots and a pencil. It's quaintness is offset by its efficiency; I have never waited more than a minute or two to vote and the results are known within a few hours after the election. I believe the UK and many other European nations follow a similar system. There is no reason why a process like this would not work in the United States, save for the almost religious reverence for technology, as all the votes are counted within minutes of the polls closing, whether it be in a city as large as Toronto or as small as Dumbfuck, Saskatchewan. I know it's not as sexy as a flashing machine, but it's transparent, verifiable, and relatively fool proof.
http://www.eci.gov.in/EVM/index.htm
OR
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_voting_machine s
All that you have suggested is already in the machine.
Seems the country that has long been derided as Third-World, dirt Poor, unwashed masses can implement a technologically superior yet simple solution to maintaining Democracy amongst its unwashed masses with highest ethics.
Unless US loses its NIH syndrome, it is bound to be abused by companies like Deibold.
"Doing what i can, with what i have." ~ Burt Gummer
In a democracy, could anything be more important than making sure that votes are counted correctly
Are you off your rocker? There is something infinitely more important than elections, vote counting, or even the existence of a voting process: limits on government power. They don't need to be voted on. That's what the consitution was supposed to be for, remember?
When those limits are overruled, look what you get: the most powerful world empire that has ever existed, with military bases in over 150 countries around the world; a continuous state of war and emergency, where innocent civilians of other countries are regularly slaughtered by "accident"; mass jailing of peaceful citizens at home; violent crime rates that increase proportional to the size of government; widespread corruption among the power elite; continuous attacks on our natural right (god-given if you prefer) to freedom, privacy, and self-ownership.
Who would you rather be ruled by: a government which is strictly bound to a constitution which guarantees an upper limit on revenue and power over the people, but no elections or voting process -- or a government which is unlimited in the amount of power it may seize, yet holds elections on a regular basis?
If you value your freedom, this is a no-brainer. Of course, I'd rather be ruled by nobody at all, but we don't exactly have that choice, do we?
The Irish govenment attempted to move to electronic voting, piloting the scheme in three constituencies. As we use PR with an STV system the counting software itself was quite complex, the issue that excited the population though was that there was no paper backup and the machines were closed source. I mean really, a private company in charge of the method of selection of the government. The attempt failed and we have returned to a paper ballot, we managed to waste € 52 millioin + storage costs during this particular experiment. I'm no luddite, however the need to produce a result instantly rather than watching our political masters twisting in the agony of the fifth count(PR again) escapes me.
"Linux is for noobs"-The new MS fud strategy
The sum of this problem is taking a number, and incrementing it. You must add a pretty, easy to understand interface, and then add a paper trail system.
Here's what I want:
- I walk into a voting center.
- I am asked for ID.
- I present my state Drivers License or Federal Passport for visual inspection.
- In return I'm provided with a re-usable line-tracker token (deli waiting line slip).
- I wait in line to vote.
- I enter the voting booth, surrendering my deli slip to a large box.
- I vote.
- The machine produces three bits of paper; my reciept, my official ballot, and my exit poll token.
- I retain the reciept for my own personal records. It contains no bare words, simply a tracking number, date and time, and location.
- My Official Ballot is dropped into a lockbox of a million similar others, to be stored for eventual hand-recount. It never enters my or anyone elses hands.
- My exit poll token may be presented to exit pollsters, or I may destroy it.
- I enjoy some milk and cookies, and leave.
- Much later, at home, I am able to look up my ballot based on the ID number on my reciept. From this, I can tell where my ballot is, in what box, in what warehouse, what machine I used, what voting center, and the date and time. It may also show what machine was used to process my vote in a recount, or if a hand recount had been done.
- I am able to sleep at night, knowing that democracy will take effect.
This is really not that difficult. Not as difficult as Diebold has made it, and surely not as cloak-and-dagger.Informatus Technologicus
Ok that's a weird statement but here is the basic assertion. I have a Pure Digital single use camera so I did a little googling to see if there was a way to hack it. Turns out these cameras are actually quite complex and secure. They are engineered 8 ways to Sunday to ensure that you can't really do this. Of course there is a way, more or less but it involves building your own electrical interface, reverse engineering some digital processing technology, writing some unassembler code and picking through the bytes by hand. A $20 camera. It seems to me that if someone can build this much protection into a $20 camera then it should be possible given the massive awards, time and effort of Diebold to do this for a voting machine. Let's say for the sake of argument and normal government waste that a voting machine costs a 100x what a camera costs; $2000. I don't know but let's say. So are we concluding that for $2000 we can't find anyone to build in the protection and reliability of a plastic camera that costs 1% of a voting machine?
(1) The ballot is a misprint ...
(2) The marker runs dry.***
The town I live in switched to optical scanning of ballots a couple of decades ago when a few thousand blank ballots turned up missing on election day. To this day, no one knows if the ballots were lost, stolen, or indeed ever existed at all. It's certainly remotely possible that they were marked up and somehow used to replace a like number of real ballots although it doesn't seem very likely. Nonetheless, the folks who looked at the issue felt that the optical scanning system offered somewhat better security than the paper ballots.
Personally I think that, if paper ballots are good enough for Canada, where they work fine, I think they are good enough for the US. It's not that hard to run an honest election, and it's probably easier to run a dishonest election if the system is complicated than if it is simple.
You can't see ANYTHING from a car, You've got to get out of the goddamned contraption and walk...Edward Abbey
>how can ANYBODY say "well, the number isn't enough to change the outcome." How do you know this?
You make an extremely good point.
Wish I could remember their names, but one university team crunched the numbers and found that if you were to change just one vote in every precinct of the country you could reverse the outcome of a recent presidential election. That sounds strange until you stop and think how many precincts there must be in Florida and that the arguments were over dozens or hundreds of votes.