Slashdot Mirror
From the Trenches of Electronic Voting
Avi Rubin, an expert on electronic voting systems, worked as a judge in two elections in 2004, and he worked the chaotic Maryland primary election yesterday. His blog article about a day spent with Diebold voting machines gives impressions from the trenches of electronic voting. From the article: "The least pleasant part of the day was a nagging concern that something would go terribly wrong, and that we would have no way to recover. I believe that fully electronic systems, such as the precinct we had today, are too fragile. The smallest thing can lead to a disaster... I can't imagine basing the success of an election on something so fragile as these terrible, buggy machines... As far as I'm concerned, the 'tamper tape' does very little in the way of actual security... I hope that we got it right in my precinct, but I know that there is no way to know for sure. We cannot do recounts."
You're kidding, right? The whole purpose of our election system is so no one knows how you voted. What you're questioning is the complete opposite of the way things are (supposed to be).
Therefore, in truth, they could in some manner confirm every voters vote with the voter themself?
See above. No, you cannot confirm with a voter how they voted. It's supposed to be a secret.
I know they're not going to do it, but wouldn't that data be available, therefore recounts are possible by confirming each voters vote with the actual voter? Example: The master record says you John Doe voted for Patty Sue, is this correct?
For the third time, NO! We DO NOT record the name of a voter with a vote. All that is recorded is a vote.
However, what Avi is saying is completely correct because even when we are told they can recount the votes cast, there is no way, currently, to verify if the votes were recorded correctly when cast. For all we know there is code somewhere which takes every fourth vote for one candidate and records it for the opposite candidate.
This is why a paper trail is absolutely, positively, 100% needed if we are going to be forced to use electronic voting machines.
We will bankrupt ourselves in the vain search for absolute security. -- Dwight D. Eisenhower
The characteristics of a successful election are anonyminity and correctness. This is why electronic voting machines cannot be made like ATMs where a transaction record is kept that ties each transaction to an account and if anomalies are found, all changes can be backed out. In an election, the only thing that can be recorded is that someone voted, not who they voted for. Otherwise intimidation can be used against people willing to vote for an unpopular candidate. "Don't vote for Kerry/Edwards, WE'LL KNOW WHO DID" If that rambling makes any sense.
-LumiNousiT
(Posted anonymously because I can't remember my password to my account and the e-mail address I used is long gone)
I hope that we got it right in my precinct, but I know that there is no way to know for sure.
Then you didn't get it right. There can be no "hope" in voting records. Either it's right and verifiable, or the voting system is a failure.
Developers: We can use your help.
We have secret elections for a number of important reasons. One of the most important is that your vote can't be used against you. There are a lot of people who would like to be able to see how you voted and would buy an illegal copy of the database you propose. A crooked politician might use voting records of people whose votes he should work to suppress. An amoral employer might fire employees who didn't vote as the employer wanted. The stereotypical example is that thanks to a secret ballot, if a deeply crooked politician hired thugs to intimidate voters, the voters could vote for his opponent, then lie about who they voted for to protect themselves from the thugs. I doubt this happens in the US, but it's probably a very real concern in Iraq.
Search 2010 Gen Con events