Sys-Admins Reading the Bosses Mail?
PetManimal writes "Computerworld has an article about IT staff who have access to corner-office email. Systems administrators, database administrators, storage administrators and higher level IT super users are the types who may access sensitive executive information; one source quoted in the article says that in a company with 1,500 employees, there might typically be five to 10 administrators who have this access. As for how many abuse these priviledges, it's hard to tell, but rogue admins out for workplace revenge or personal gain can wreak havoc: '... Experts agree that the severity of these occurrences generally makes them more harmful than external attacks. One of the biggest obstacles to eliminating unauthorized access is determining how many people have it. Access lists are particularly difficult to formulate in both mature companies, where the number and power of administrators have expanded over periods of years, and small companies, where rapid growth leads to undocumented tangles of administrators who are able to maintain their access because nobody has time to assess their status.'"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BOFH
A friend in the Government once told me that after the Pollard spy scandal the Government rethought the way it handled clearances. So now there is a discreet pool of clearances. There's no reason why a company, new, mature, huge, or small shouldn't be able to institute a similar policy in terms of access.
If brevity is the soul of wit, then how does one explain Twitter?
I read this last week when my boss submitted the article to that magazine in his outgoing email.
Gotta go, he's sending an email now about outsourcing the IT department!
Do not look at laser with remaining good eye.
I realize it's a business problem when the CxO doesn't have a clue about encryption, but who's going to demand he get some education?
FWIW, the legal profession actually has directives from the Bar Associations on when it's even permitted to use e-mail, and if so when encryption is required. Sometimes it's nice to actually have authority over you.
Lacking <sarcasm> tags,
Would you be upset if your alergist (doctor) had access to your blood work? No. It is his job. Trust is a huge component of system administration, and any company, or corporation, who doesn't understand that the administrator has the keys to the system, needs to take a better look at their corporate layout.
Admins have access to everything. Or at least they should have access to virtually everything. Because who would you call if it was broken? certainly not the corner office.
Trust is necessary. You have to trust your admins. And if you have an admin that leaves under suspicious or grievious circumstances, you protect your corporations ass with a dismissal agreement.
If you don't have a chain of trust in your IT department you're fucked... even if you do spend bank on "secure internal IT infrastructure."
The rest of the article is all over the place. There's some mention of rogue admins reading executive e-mail rolled into boilerplate security talk about how X% of security risks are insider threats, and then it finishes up with a vaguely related sales pitch for RSA products, owned by... yep, EMC. The guys providing ComputerWorld with ad revenue on that sidebar.
Hopefully those scared VPs will hire consultants and purchase EMC products to "secure" their infrastructure from "rogue admins" who are probably reading their e-mail RIGHT NOW.
There are, after all, fairly straightforward ways to secure data against the admins (assuming they don't actually install spyware, which is a separate subject.) There are also ways to arrange secure key recovery so that the records can be recovered if Something Happens to the exec, but no one person can do it (say, three board members and an outside law firm.)
Lacking <sarcasm> tags,
What about the /. admins who can read our highly sensitive comments?
Comments? I'm not even sure they read the article summaries.
If you do not trust your staff, you have other problems.
In my consulting work I have worked with systems containing sensitive information. Outside the workplace and outside the context of my particular role the information was of no interest to me.
Also, maybe access but _logged_ access. And then a process where someone views the logs to look for unauthorized browsing.
The DMV does it (every once in a while some bozo is fired from the state DMV for looking up minor celebrities information), I am sure many other less involved database systems can too.
At least in small business, and probably in all business, it is completely necessary for upper IT staff to have complete access to everything. I've lost count of how many times upper level management has come to me with the 'I forgot my password, can you get my stuff back?' request. This is a normal occurrence. If we take away the privileges of IT to access upper management data, then upper management is very likely to lose that data.
As an anecdote, one of my customers (I am an IT consultant) lost the password to the video surveillance system. They immediately came to me, and were shocked and annoyed when I said 'Sorry, I wasn't involved in the installation of that system and was never informed of the passwords.' In the end, we found that a user had written down the password at one point and were able to get back in that way!
The point really should be that companies better find upper IT staff that they can TRUST! If they can't trust their IT staff, they have big problems.
Odd people are concerned that IT types *might* be reading email when so many of the C*Os give their secretaries their passwords and other sensitive information. I am convinced that my Big Boss's secretary actually runs the place.
I already read it in cmdrtaco's inbox. Seriously I bet a good number of IT people own the T-Shirt, "I read your email". We aren't kidding.
Microsoft aggravates my tourettes syndrome.
There are ways to run a business that limit the amount of information that has to be classified so that it can be relayed verbally or by sneakernet. Like not defrauding your workers or business associates is a good start, followed by not raking in huge undeserved stock options and bonuses, not downsizing and outsourcing just because it is the latest fad, and in general being competent to the point that the only people who care what's in your email are the rarer criminal element and not every damn single employee.
Ahh, driftnet on the switch monitor port. Never has there been such an artistically odd juxtaposition of shoes, porn, corporate logos, and vacation photos.
Someone had to do it.
i assure you the vast majority of slashdot comments are in fact, insensitive
Snowden and Manning are heroes.
No shit Sherlock! Did you figure that out all by yourself?!? Of course I can read their e-mail! I'm a sysadmin and I set up the frigging mail system in the first place! Duh!
What they fail to grasp is I don't have time to be going through their shit!
Conversely PHBs don't have time to learn how to admin mail systems, which is what they'd have to do in order to keep me out.
Here's a novel concept: Why don't you simply try hiring people who are trustworthy?
You're using her as bait, Master!
As the e-mail admin receiving the bounces are even more enlightening. There was a torrid love exchange in e-mail going on but they'd put an extra, invalid e-mail address in so the thread kept bouncing down to us. We tried to let them know about the problem but they were ignoring our messages.
:D
I created a t-shirt for work a couple of years back when I heard someone saying that we were reading their e-mails.
"I Read Your E-mail"
" It's Boring "
[John]
Shit better not happen!
... and probably written by clods.
Ignore this signature. By order.
At one small company I once worked at, my Windows box popped up a strange notice one day that someone else was using my IP. Since my IP was fixed (so that I could access various IP-restricted network devices) this immediately raised some red flags. We began looking for the culprit; something must've tipped off the hacker because we found ourselves locked out of our mail server. Since access to the mail server was only permitted from inside our network, we shut off our net access, hoping to block the hacker while we got back into our server.
We tracked the hacker down. It turned out it was another admin, who had gone some kind of crazy. He had three NICs in his desktop box all configured to impersonate different machines, he had re-routed the boss's email through his mailbox (and some clients' mail too), and had all kinds of other things going on. And he had sat there the whole time we were trying to ID the hacker, pretending nothing was going on, all the while trying to stay ahead of us. Strangest thing I ever saw.
Yes, he was fired. He really didn't seem to know why he'd done it (none of it made rational sense) and he'd really put his family in a bind. I think he was sick, but I'm not a psychiatrist.
People are never as simple as their stereotypes. This applies equally to Christians, Muslims, and Emacs-lovers.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Efficiency_wage_hypot hesis
Reading the parent's post made me recall this footnote from my economics classes. It's a theory that when you pay your employees well(i.e, better than the average competitor), you'll find advantages in that employee's performance. If you're in a good job and know you're being treated like you're a good employee, the theory is that this serves to discourage you from being a bad employee since you're risking the loss of a good thing.
There's other reasons involved in this theory too though. If your compensation is that of a good employee, you're expected to be worthy of it, and your conscience may urge you to live up to such expectations.
Of course, there's diminishing returns from doing this, but the point is...
If an employee is important enough to possibly damage a company with negligence or malice, maybe that employee should be treated a little better to encourage them to put more effort in to avoid such things from happening. Economically, the additional compensation should reflect the chance of the damage times the cost of the damage if it were to occur, but it's not something easily measured.
Let me think, when all this email started getting popular in the mid 1990's wasn't the advice to treat it as postcard....
ie it could be read during transmission buy the post-office worker (sys-admin)....
just a gentle reminder.
Yes, the title for an article about an admin reading the e-mail of a single boss would be:
English: "Sys-Admins Reading the Boss' Mail?"
Slashdot: "Sys-Admins Reading the Bosses Mail?"
For an admin reading the e-mail of more than one boss, the title would be:
English: "Sys-Admins Reading the Bosses' Mail?"
Slashdot: "Sys-Admins Reading the Bosseses Mail?"