Help Black Box Voting Examine ES&S Software

Gottesser writes, "Bev Harris of Black Box Voting has asked for the help of the Slashdot community. She would like people to take a look at ES&S's central tabulator software and start reporting on their impressions of it. This is a past release of the software but it is similar to the applications in production. Sorry, no source code." Read on for Bev's request and pointers to the code repositories. Update 23:38 GMT by SM Bev has confirmed that blackbox1.org is indeed owned by BlackBoxVoting making both a comment in the discussion and a post on the front page of blackboxvoting.org to help assuage reader fear/doubt.

From Bev:

"ES&S 'Unity' central tabulator software.

Software stash: three zip files --
http://www.blackbox1.org/ems.zip
http://www.blackbox1.org/un5.zip
http://www.blackbox1.org/Unity.zip

User Manuals for ES&S software can be found here:
http://www.bbvforum s.org/forums/messages/2197/2864.html

This is the ES&S central tabulator software, the ES&S counterpart to the Diebold GEMS central tabulator software. No source code, sorry, and no software for the precinct machines. This is reportedly one generation back, but from what I'm told has significant similarities to the new stuff. I would appreciate it if you can provide me with feedback on your impressions after looking at it. You may want to Slashdot it or whatever.

Best,

Bev Harris
Founder
Black Box Voting

Comments

Legality

[mattwarden]

Um, before I download this software onto my computer, would Beth like to comment on (a) how she got it, and (b) to what extent it is legal for her to be housing it on her server?

Re:I won't ask...

[Anonymous Coward]

I wonder if the story is legitimate. The domain is "blackbox1.org"... but shouldn't it be "blackboxvoting.org"? Is this story a scam?

I don't see any mention of this on the real blackboxvoting.org site, and blackbox1.org was just registered anonymously a month ago through "Domains by Proxy".

Could this be an attempt to infect thousands of Slashdot users with a trojan? Seems odd to have these binary downloads from an unknown server, with no official attestation... even the user who submitted the story, Gottesser, was created recently and has no real info in the profile.

Re:Don't bother -- excellent point for paper audit

[irenaeous]

Very good point. I hope you get modded up.

The State of California now requires a paper audit trail. I asked a friend of mine who works as a poll worker volunteer about the system used in Orange County, California. She gave me a detailed and intelligent response with specific information on how it works now. I posted these under another article, but it didn't the attention that I thought her remarks merited. I am also interested in any responses to them.

The "OC" uses voting machines with a paper audit trail system developed by Hart-Intercivic.

Here is what my friend had to say:

The current electronic voting machines consist of a Judge's Booth Controller (JBC) & a daisy chain of (usually) 8 electronic voting screens w/Voted Paper Audit Transaction Systems (VPATS). The JBC governs all of the screens, but is not connected to any VPATS, each of which is independent to its own voting screen. The entire system is completely self-contained -- it does not hook into any other computer system. It only hooks into the wall plug to give it power.

The first voter (a non-volunteering, random citizen who just happens to be first in line) signs the OPEN POLLS paper tape that verifies that no votes have been cast on the JBC for that election. Each voter is given a temporary access code that allows him/her to vote on an assigned electronic screen. The number is randomly assigned by the JBC volunteer & has no connection to the voter's identity. It expires as soon as the voter casts his/her ballot and/or a brief period of time elapses with no voting activity on the electronic screen. The voter enters his/her access code, then chooses his/her vote for each candidate/race on the electronic screen. When he/she is finished choosing, a review screen displays all of the choices & prints the same review on the attached VPAT, which the voter can see, but cannot touch (it is sealed inside the VPAT machine). When the voter verifies that this is his/her correctly voted ballot, the ballot is cast electronically & is reprinted on the VPAT (again, the voter can read it, but cannot access it).

No poll worker can access the VPATS (actually for the duration of the election & counting, neither can a ROV employee), nor can they change the electronic screen. If the voter makes a mistake, the entire ballot must be cancelled & the voter must start again. Once the voting day is finished, & the JBC prints out an additional summary of all the votes cast during the day at that polling place, everything is turned back into the ROV (through a system of manual labor all done by community volunteers, supervised by a ROV employee). The VPATS go to one location. The printed JBC summaries (beginning & ending) go to another location. The JBC goes to a third location. All votes are tallied (by a mixed group of employees & community volunteers) in each of the 3 locations, & compared. If there are discrepancies, the VPAT tally is generally preferred first, then the JBC printed summary, then the JBC electronic count. (There could be legitimate reasons to change the ranking, but I don't know what those are. They are printed out & available to the public.)

About absentee ballots (which I am using this time since we are working a polling place not near our own precinct) -- once they reach the Registrar of Voter's (ROV) office, the unopened envelope is recorded so that you cannot vote again by showing up at the polls, & then it is transferred to a completely different office before it is ever opened. The different office has no access to the list of registered voters. There the envelope is opened & the ballot is taken out & separated from the envelope. All the envelopes are isolated elsewhere, the ballots are bundled together & transferred to a different office, where they are counted by non-employee community citizen volunteers like me.

Personally, I have no confidence in any system without the paper audit trail requirements, and none in Diebold in particular.

Re:Crazy idea...

[Chris Burke]

How about the machine counts the paper ballot you filled out and drops it in a bin?

Yeah, and in theory, it could also tell you if it couldn't read the ballot because it was badly formed. Okay, machines can already do that, though in some notable cases in Florida this capability was disabled (but people just assumed it was because those voters were idiots).

I do think an electronic ballot machine has some advantages. I like the part of e-voting where I can easily browse candidates, click buttons that show the full text of any propositions or measures being voted on, easily change a vote if I decide to change my vote, and so on. I like the idea of eliminating penciling errors by having the computer print it. I like the accessibility options e-voting can give.

In my ideal e-voting world, you'd have one machine that prints ballots on card stock in a human-and-machine readable format (with the same markings, not human-readable-text and a barcode). You'd take the ballot it prints out and put it in a different machine that could count the vote. In fact, because the format of the ballot would be a matter of public record, anyone could make a ballot counting machine and after passing some basic certification (that it doesn't mangle ballots for example) could bring it to the election to verify that their machine got the same count as everyone else's machine.

Of course something simple like you describe works. As long as there is the paper record which is considered authoritative, and the machine count only an initial estimate, then that's a voting system I support.