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Deconstructing a Pump-and-Dump Spam Botnet
Behind the Front writes "eWeek has teamed up with Joe Stewart, a senior security researcher at SecureWorks in Atlanta, to show the inner working of a massive botnet that is responsible for the recent surge of 'pump and dump' spam. It's a detailed picture of how these sleazy operations work and why they're so hard to shut down. Sobering numbers: 70,000 infected machines capable of pumping out a billion messages a day, virtually all of them for penis enlargement and stock scams. Excellent graphics, too, including one chart that shows that Windows XP Service Pack 2 is hosting nearly half the attacked machines."
If I were running an ISP, I'd have common ports such as IM, file-transfer/ftp/torrent, ssh, 80/443, irc, and many others allowed and all other ports blocked or restricted to certain destinations by default.
I'd have a web-page for my customers so they can click things such as:
Outgoing Email:
[x] web based [turn on port 80/443]
[x] through remote-login [turn on remote-login ports]
[x] through us [turn on mail ports, restrict to our servers]
[ ] through another server: ______ (specify list of outgoing mail servers)
[ ] through any server
+-- [x] check here to turn this off after 7 days (recommended)
x's show defaults.
Checking the last two would bring up the relevant sections of the AUP/TOS as a reminder of the strict "no spamming" and "we will suspend outgoing mail and charge you cleanup fees if your machine is taken over" clauses.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
Luck? Did you see www.spamstocktracker.com?
My ISP has a web-based configuration utility that allows me to set a server-side firewall to one of several default values. One of their options blocks several commonly-exploitable ports on Windows. I don't use those ports for anything, and I have my own firewall so those ports shouldn't reach my Windows boxes in any way whatsoever, but I set it to block them anyway. (This was the default setting, actually.)
Something similar would work fine. Block port 25 to SMTP by default and have a web config utility to change it. If you really wanted, you could set it up to email the user if they tried accessing port 25 when it was blocked ("You might be trying to get past this firewall. Or, you might have a virus. Here's how you can find out, and here's how you can disable it if you need . . . ")
Breaking Into the Industry - A development log about starting a game studio.
Those guys shouldn't be that hard to find with enough law enforcement effort. Get a credit card from a cooperating bank. Put a trace on it. Buy some Viagra from a spam. Watch where the money goes, which is probably some bank in a high-crime country. Visit the bank and talk to them. Threaten to have their abilty to process credit cards cut off. Pry the actual payee out of them. Discover that it's another intermediary and start over.
This is what we pay the FBI for. This is why the FBI has field offices outside the US. This is why the Financial Crimes Information Network exists.
The FBI's Internet-related criminal enforcement unit has gotten soft. They sit up in Baltimore and send out child pornography, then go after the people they've entrapped. The process is even mostly automated now. That's an easy way to get their stats up, and fits the Bush administration's "regulate sex, not business" mindset, but doesn't solve crimes that have victims. Something to push on after Jan. 20, when the Democrats take Congress and can start asking hard questions of the executive branch.