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Community Comments To Security Absurdity Article
An anonymous reader writes, "Earlier this year Noam Eppel's Security Absurdity article generated much debate in the Information Security community (covered on Slashdot at the time). He claimed that we are currently witnessing a 'profound failure' in security. Now the author has posted a follow-up highlighting some of the community comments prompted by the article, titled 'Feedback to Security Absurdity Article — the Good, the Bad and the Ugly.'"
Well, I would be with you, except that if you believe the numbers in TFA (the original, not in the comments), cybercrime is more profitable than the illegal drug trade. I assume there's probably even more money being spent trying to prevent and defeat cybercrime, and on security. That's a lot of money diverted from legitimate enterprise, and a lot of missed opportunities.
When people don't trust technology and don't use online banking, then banks don't spend as much on it. Venture capital and other sources of funding start to dry up; the pace of development slows.
It's not a problem that's probably going to result in a city being vaporized overnight, but that doesn't mean it's not a problem. It's like muggings in a large city: sure, you can wave it off and say that it only happens to tourists, rubes, and the unwary -- why should street-smart people care about it? -- but over time it starts to take its toll everywhere. The economic cost alone starts to act like a tax on everything, and it drives away customers and new business.
People who understand computers and know what precautions to take to prevent being victimized, cannot just put their heads in the sand about the current situation. Particularly since most people who are capable of understanding the problem, earn their living in some technology-driven field, it's those people who stand to be affected by the 'downstream' effects of cybercrime and a culture of insecurity.
"Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
I'd love to hear a conclusive answer to this as well.
Also, I wonder what ports SP2 has open in its default, out-of-the-box configuration. Is it totally locked down, with no response to *anything* coming in from the outside? Or does it have a few services still running here and there that could be exploited? Plus, and perhaps this is a stupid question, if you're running a firewall on the local machine as opposed to on a dedicated box, isn't there always a problem of the firewall software having a vulnerability itself? Or the TCP/IP stack? (And why not -- stranger things have happened. Like firmware vulns.) I'm just thinking of everything on the machine that you could possibly overflow/break by sending malformatted packets, for example.
I suspect in the real world, most of the infections happen when users don't go straight to Windows Update right after taking their computer out of the box, and instead get excited and decide to browse around to their favorite forum or two. Since it's not unknown for vendors to load up PCs with all sorts of software, probably including compromised ActiveX controls, all it takes is a trip to the wrong site to get a rootkit/keylogger installed. From there, it's a one-way trip to reformatsville, at least if you're smart. (Which is a real trick, seeing as how many PCs don't even come with reinstall media, instead just taking a chunk of your hard drive for some shoddy "recovery partition.")
"Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
No. Just no.
I hate this sort of comparison, because it's bogus. It's a classic apples and oranges situation. You are comparing the security of Apache to IIS, not Linux to Windows. Modern versions of IIS are pretty good from what I hear, and besides it's not very hard to be secure when all you run is a firewall and a web server.
If you want to do a real comparison you should compare the Linux desktop to the Windows desktop. Your average Linux desktop is a security nightmare. Firstly there's no active security whatsoever, it's all passive. IE there are no virus scanners/anti-malware tools in common deployment. If the passive defences fail you are screwed, you cannot easily distribute signatures etc to clean up the mess. Secondly, the Linux security model is simply the UNIX security model, which was designed in the 70s for a totally different set of threats. Your average desktop is not a mainframe and does not need to protect users from one another - instead it's decayed into some kind of trivial black/white coarse grained security model in which "root" has absolute power and "users" have less power.
Unfortunately, Linux trains the user to enter their password all the time, given an essentially random set of situations. You have to enter your password to install software, remove software, configure hardware, set the system clock and worst of all to install security updates. The tasks that require root are to the average user totally unconnected. If you are a UNIX geek you can probably figure out why something might need root, but you're in the minority. So users are trained to just enter their password whenever they are asked to, making it trivial to phish it out of them.
Even if you can't get root - who cares? On a modern Linux desktop you can do anything you need without it. Want to crack bank details? Go right ahead, Firefox runs as user and you can ptrace() it to your hearts content. Want to hook into startup so you always run? KDE and GNOME will be happy to oblige. Want to "hide" yourself without modifying the kernel? No problem either, just inject yourself into the address space of each program as it starts and then hook the syscalls at the libc level. Childs play.
So to put it simply - you are dead wrong. The underlying problem at the system level is the system, which is basically the same regardless of whether you use Windows, MacOS or Linux. The UNIX/NT security model is incapable of solving the problem of malicious software, period.
First, most of the desktop (and non-desktop) development going on in the world is stuff that you do not see. It's going on inside businesses for their own use. And as a rule it's overwhelmingly Java and now .NET.
.NET haven't yet taken over the traditional desktop app share yet. But they are not about raw performance and haven't been for many years.
Second - What makes you think that you can optimize anything better than a compiler, much less one that profiles your application *as it runs* and makes adjustments on the fly? This has been proven over and over again - Java's garbage collection is in most cases *faster* than hand coded garbage collection. How is that possible? Because Java has more *information* about what is going on at runtime than you do at compile time. It can put very very short lived objects on a special part of the heap, it can do all kinds of things that you cannot do statically.
There are many reasons that Java and now
Pat Niemeyer
Author of Learning Java, O'Reilly & Associates