Detecting Rootkits In GNU/Linux
An anonymous reader sends note of a blog post on rootkit detection in GNU/Linux. The article mentions only two utilities for ferreting out rootkits — the first comment to the blog post lists three additional ones — but it could be useful for those who haven't thought about the problem much. From the article: "A rootkit... is a collection of tools that a cracker installs on a victim's computer after gaining initial access. It generally consists of log cleaning scripts and trojaned replacements of core system utilities such as ps, top, ifconfig and so on."
That may have been true 30 years ago when a compiler license cost thousands. If a person has write access to your system, they can just copy a compiler binary over.
I run Gentoo Linux servers for hosting email and websites, and have wanted a way to really secure the boxes.
/tmp /var/log
/usr/bin on a read-only drive seems like an effective way to protect against many, many different root-kits, worms, etc.
Many hard drives have jumpers that make them read only.
I thought it would be great to have all of the rarely changed portions of the operating system on a separate drive set to read only.
The only time you would move the jumper to read-write would be when you were installing updates.
Things like:
etc
Would have to always be on a read-write drive.
But having things like
What do you think? Feasible or impractical?
Lose Weight and Feel Great with Isagenix
Does root have access to /proc/kcore? If yes then an attacker with root access can modify the kernel in memory as needed. Heck there's even projects to bring this into the mainstream for carrier grade Linux (no need for those pesky reboots after a kernel upgrade):
http://pannus.sourceforge.net/