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Flaw Found in Apple Bug-Fix Tool

eldavojohn writes "The Month of Apple Bugs (MOAB) is well under way with a startling bug released Monday. From the description: 'Application Enhancer (APE) is affected by a local privilege escalation vulnerability which allows local users to gain root privileges.' APE is the same software used to deploy fixes during 'The Month of Apple Fixes' (MOAF). I know it's confusing but MOAB came first and MOAF was a developer's answer to the bugs — after all, the purpose of posting bugs is to have them identified, confirmed and eradicated. The article talks about potential remote root access by an intruder. Note that this is third party software that all of the bugs seem to be stemming from. I guess Apple has made a fairly secure system but they can't expect all third party developers to follow the same rigorous standards."

35 of 168 comments (clear)

  1. A HA! by Thansal · · Score: 5, Funny
    I guess Apple has made a fairly secure system but they can't expect all third party developers to follow the same rigorous standards.


    I see it now. This entire MOAB thing is just there to tout how great and secure Apple Products are, and that the only bugs possible HAVE to come from 3rd party software!

    It is all a plot by Jobs!

    A PLOT I TELL YOU!

    [/psycho]
    --
    Do Or Do Not, There Is No Spoon, There Is Only Zuul. Everything in the above post is probably opinion.
  2. Well, well, well by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Funny

    What do you have to say for yourselves now, Apple fanboys? With this glaring bug, coupled with the other devastating bugs, it now is clear that your smug castle is crumbling. Maybe it's time to give the rock-solid Vista another chance, no?

  3. Personally I think by 0racle · · Score: 2, Insightful
    Note that this is third party software that all of the bugs seem to be stemming from. I guess Apple has made a fairly secure system but they can't expect all third party developers to follow the same rigorous standards.
    Personally I think that the reason most/all of the bugs released are 3rd party apps and not OS X itself is that the people running the project are to lazy to try and find some actual Apple bugs.
    --
    "I use a Mac because I'm just better than you are."
  4. Errr... by WalterGR · · Score: 3, Informative

    Note that this is third party software that all of the bugs seem to be stemming from.

    So far MOAB has released 2 bugs for QuickTime, 1 for iLife, 1 for DiskManagement/diskutil, and 1 for Finder.

  5. Instead ... by Salvance · · Score: 5, Funny

    Rather than just tell people not to use APE, Landon Fuller (who reported this bug on his blog), should have written an APE SHell Investigative Tool to help people find and fix this error.

    Technology needs more catchy acronyms

    --
    Crack - Free with every butt and set of boobs
  6. MOAB by dr_strang · · Score: 2, Funny

    Does that make it the Mother Of All Bugs?

    --
    This is a sig. It is like every other sig in the world, except that it is mine, and it is different.
  7. I might be missing something, but.... by 8127972 · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Why would anyone who is serious about computer security use a THIRD PARTY app to fix a security issue?

    --
    This is my opinion. To make sure you don't steal it, it's covered by the DMCA.
    1. Re:I might be missing something, but.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

      You wouldn't. These third-party fixes are being done as an intellectual exercise, not a serious offering.

  8. Re:Story at 11 by paulpach · · Score: 5, Insightful

    So, this is the best MOAB has to offer? A security bug in a third-party "enhancement"? No, the best they have to offer are vulnerabilities in quicktime, iPhoto, Disk Management, Finder which are apple products. Why CNet and slashdot chose to report on this particular vulnerability, which to many is the least important in the list, is a mistery to me.
  9. Anatomy of the Runtime MoAB Patches by shawnce · · Score: 4, Informative

    From Anatomy of the Runtime MoAB Patches

    ------

    01:04 Tue, 09 Jan 2007 PST -0800
    Anatomy of the Runtime MoAB Patches

    Introduction

    For the past few days I've been releasing patches for software vulnerabilities in an assortment of Mac OS software. This project was intended to be a technical one, and I've never sat down to explain, in clear terms, how the patches work, what Application Enhancer is, or what the potential risks are in running these patches. I'm also not the first one (not by a long shot) to think of implementing third party patches for unpatched software vulnerabilities, either, and I'd like to discuss those efforts.

    Here goes ...

    Third Party Patches, Past and Present

    Generally speaking, a software vulnerability is usually announced in coordination with a vendor-supplied software update. However, there are cases when a vendor patch is not available for a critical software vulnerability, leaving the user with limited options. Relatively recently, the idea of a "third party patch" has emerged; when a vendor patch is not available, a third party can reverse engineer the software in question and produce a temporary bug fix.

    This technique has previously been used for both unpatched Windows and Mac OS X vulnerabilities. In 2006, Alexander Sotirov presented "Hotpatching and the Rise of Third-Party Patches" at the Las Vegas Black Hat conference, and is responsible for implementing two patches for unfixed Internet Explorer vulnerabilities. ZERT (Zero-day Emergency Response Team), who is composed of an impressive array of individuals, "work(s) together as a team to release a non-vendor patch when a so-called '0day' (zero-day) exploit appears in the open which poses a serious risk to the public, to the infrastructure of the Internet or both." On the Macintosh, Unsanity released Paranoid Android, a run-time patch for a critical vulnerability in Mac OS X's document handling. I believe the award for the first third party Windows patch for an unfixed vulnerability goes to Ilfak Guilfanov's December 2005 WMF patch. Guilfanov is the author of the excellent IDA Pro disassembler and debugger.

    Risks and Benefits of Third Party Patches

    A vendor-supplied update is always preferable to a third party patch. Third party patches are created by reverse engineering the vulnerable code, and are subject to limited testing and potential implementation deficiencies -- like the author of the vulnerable software, patch implementors are human, too. It is always possible that a bug in the patch could result in instability, or potentially expose a new exploit scenario.

    On the other hand, a third party patch can provide protection against a critical vulnerability before the vendor is able to implement, test, and release a fix. The decision to use a third party patch should be made after a careful assessment of the vulnerability's risks and your own requirements -- it's never unreasonable to wait for an officially provided vendor fix.

    Patching (more) Safely with Application Enhancer

    The patches we've provided have all been implemented using Unsanity's Application Enhancer, and are "run-time patches" -- the patches insert themselves into applications at runtime, find the vulnerable code, and apply a band-aid. Nearly all of the patches released so far work by wrapping the vulnerable code and providing additional data validation, rejecting data that would otherwise cause the vulnerable code to malfunction (and thus allow the exploit to succeed). There are other options for implementing run-time patches on Mac OS X, including the open source mach_star -- I've previously used mach_star to implement runtime security patches for software on my own Mac. However, for the purposes of providing these fixes, I decided upon Application Enhancer.

    Application Enhancer provides a nice, easy to use GUI for installing Applicati

  10. Re:The problem isn't really 3rd party apps by Drizzt+Do'Urden · · Score: 3, Informative

    So it's Linus' fault if Apache or Sendmail has a security problem?

    The software has to be secure from top to bottom. If your PHP app has a security problem, it can do bad things on your machine no mather the OS.

  11. Re:Story at 11 by Rosyna · · Score: 2, Informative

    This is scaremongering at its best. Nothing to see here, move along.

    I disagree with "at its best". The example "exploit" installs what basically amounts to a rootkit. So, in other words, this security "researcher" is distributing malware that gives him access to anyone's computer that accesses it. Since when do real security researchers distribute malware? More information is in the comments here.

    Not to mention he posted this thing with nothing but malice. It was done because Landon Fuller refused to work with LHM. LHM wanted to keep the bugs from the developers and said as a condition of such working together, that Landon Fuller must not tell anyone else about the bugs.

  12. Sticking up for APE by usermilk · · Score: 5, Informative

    The vulnerability is that APE installs itself in /Library where its supposed to go. /Library is writable by local admins. So a local admin can replace the APE executable and gain root privileges. Read that again. A local admin can replace the APE binary to gain root access.

    A local admin, an effective root user account, can gain root access.

    Or they could open up NetInfo Manager and enable the root account and enter in a password of their own choosing and then log into the GUI as root. Or they could open up Terminal and run sudo sh and get a root shell.

    This is simple revenge. Rosyna called them trolls and linked to an APE fix for one of their bugs. I think Rosyna may be right of the 9 published bugs, 4 of them are not from Apple provided software.

    1. Re:Sticking up for APE by ioErr · · Score: 3, Informative

      The problem is not that a malicious admin can gain root access -- of course he can, as you pointed out. No surprise there.

      The problem is rather that a trojan or similar run by a clueless admin can gain root access without the user being prompted for his password. Most Mac home users do use an admin account for day-to-day work, and think that they'll be fine. So the real problem is either that too many Mac users are running as admin, or that admin users have too broad write permissions without using sudo.

      Personally I've solved this by using a normal user account that's added to sudoers. I can wreak full havoc on my machine when I want to, without having to log in as my admin account, but can't do so unknowingly (I hope).

  13. Apple Bug-Fix Tool? by Aqua+OS+X · · Score: 4, Informative

    An Apple Bug-Fix Tool? Err, um, no and no.

    APE is developed by Unsanity and it's not a "bug fix tool."
    It's a third party framework and daemon used for a number of thing.

    --
    "Things are more moderner than before- bigger, and yet smaller- it's computers-- San Dimas High School football RULES!"
  14. Re:Story at 11 by 93+Escort+Wagon · · Score: 5, Insightful

    "No, the best they have to offer are vulnerabilities in quicktime, iPhoto, Disk Management, Finder which are apple products. Why CNet and slashdot chose to report on this particular vulnerability, which to many is the least important in the list, is a mistery to me."

    Look, while they have included some legitimate bugs it's pretty obvious the project is flailing around somewhat, given that it's only the 10th of "MOAB". In addition to the APE flaw, they've included a VLC flaw and an OmniWeb flaw - neither of which is part of OS X nor installed on any stock Apple box. Additionally they've included a PDF flaw, which isn't even specific to OS X! That's just plain silly.

    --
    #DeleteChrome
  15. Re:Story at 11 by Jeremy+Erwin · · Score: 2, Informative

    The Month of Apple Bugs intended to identify 31 security problems in Apple Software. The Month of Apple Fixes intended to fix those bugs in short order, so that they would not represent as much of a security threat between announcement and release of an official bugfix. Because much of MacOSX is closed source, patched binaries were a means of distributing these fixes. The latest bug was found in the third party tool that was used to patch the binaries at runtime.

  16. Summary to date... by shawnce · · Score: 3, Informative
    Note that this is third party software that all of the bugs seem to be stemming from.


    This statement doesn't make sense. The MOAB issues outlined to date have been a combination of Apple and 3rd party issues. See the following break down...

    MOAB #1 - Apple issue
    MOAB #2 - 3rd party issue
    MOAB #3 - Apple issue
    MOAB #4 - Apple issue
    MOAB #5 - Apple issue
    MOAB #6 - Apple and 3rd party
    MOAB #7 - 3rd party issue
    MOAB #8 - Apple and 3rd party
    MOAB #9 - Apple issue
    1. Re:Summary to date... by 99BottlesOfBeerInMyF · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Apple's default permissions on that directory are plain wrong. APE is just an example application that proves the point.

      This is just wrong. The framework file is installed by a third party application, which sets the permissions. Giving administrators the right to set permissions is a design choice, and arguably a bad one, but it is not a bug in and of itself.

      I think the real problem here is that the MOAB deniers are woefully ignorant of the problems.

      Deniers? What the project isn't happening? I'm pissed because the MOAB is being conducted in an unethical way that decreases the security of the general populace in order to benefit the people running it. Your claim that I am ignorant, is, in itself ignorant. Take a look at my posting history.

      I think it's great. I also work in the security field and I have done so for the past 5 years. I've been aware for the past 2 years that OS X is a horrendously insecure OS.

      Gee, what a coincidence. I too am a long time worker in the security industry. OS X is horrendously insecure, if compared to a locked down server or ultra secure workstation solution. Compared to the average Linux desktop, it is very similar. It has different problems, mostly from Apple's new features and integration with existing code bases, but it benefits from active, motivated updates, and some of the best handling of the HCI portion of the security problems.

      It's a consumer workstation. As a consumer workstation, its security is "good enough" for the average user. Sure an expert directly attacking it can probably break in, just like the average linux desktop. But it is "good enough" because the current level of security does not cause any problems for the average user, who are rarely if ever compromised.

      If the Mac pundits just admitted the problem exists and took steps to secure their OS they'd get the two thumbs up.

      Please. Apple does a very good job of working with the security community and fixing issues. My coworker submitted a bug a short time ago, they fixed it in a little more than a week and gave him credit. They're also proactive doing security audits and introducing new features like workable encryption for user accounts, mandatory access controls, dtrace, and application signing. They fix any real bug that is reported to them.

      They blame the MOAB guys, or they start from an ignorant understanding of the issues and claim that the faults aren't faults.

      I blame the MOAB guys because their disclosure is about as irresponsible as you can get. Intentionally providing a vendor who acts in good faith with no advance notice and intentionally spacing public disclosure to make development/qa cycles have the longest possible time between disclosure and patch. Imagine you're working on a product and security researchers announce one bug they already know about every few days. You can start a cycle and it won't get the next several bugs or you can wait a whole month. Either way your users are swinging in the wind. It's like they're intentionally trying to open big enough window for a worm to work. If you really are a person in the "security field" then you must be pretty clueless.

      Part of fixing the problem is admitting that the problem exists.

      Apple admits to and thanks those who submit bugs to them. I've never heard of them trying to cover one up. Who are they trying to convince to fix things?

      I'm extremely surprised that nobody has released a security manager or lockdown tool for OS X.

      Have you ever looked?

      Sorry, but I wouldn't trust a security person with your attitude or ignorance anywhere near my boxes. Good luck with your career.

  17. Re:Story at 11 by peragrin · · Score: 4, Insightful

    so out of 10 days in this month so far only 4 have been Apple security bugs. So far 40% have been holes that are apple's fault.

    I don't know about you, but if some one found a bug in Windowblinds, or some other Windows skinning app, and said it was MSFT's fault then I would be suspicious too.

    Also there is a bug in VLC. how is a VLC player bug that is also found in the windows and linux versions an "apple" bug.

    If it's an apple product by all means go for it. But no one blames MSFT for bugs in Lotus Notes.

    --
    i thought once I was found, but it was only a dream.
  18. InputManagers in general by Lord+Grey · · Score: 3, Informative
    For those of you who don't know about APE: There exists in the OS X framework this concept of enabling alternate input mechanisms for already-installed applications. The mechanism is the InputManager. A properly-constructed bundle is simply copied to a designated location and the OS will happily load it whenever an application is launched. The bundle is loaded as part of the application, and the bundle has access to the application's internals. Some good information on InputManagers can be found on CocoaDev.

    The "designated location" is actually one of several: /Library/InputManagers/ or ~/Library/InputManagers/. In other words, it doesn't take special privileges to make an InputManager bundle active on a given system for a specific user. You do have to have admin privileges to place the bundle into /Library/InputManagers/ so that all applications executed by all users are touched, but that's it.

    Objective-C lets objects of one class "pose" as objects from another class. Posing is like dynamic subclassing; method dispatch happens against your class first and then on up to the original class if you didn't implement it or if your method specifically calls the "parent." This is where code injection comes in. You write a new class that poses as some class in the application and intercept the calls; your code starts executing.

    Figuring out the application's classes isn't difficult. A free utility like class-dump can be used to grab an OS X application's class and data structure definitions, and from there it's easy write your own posing classes. Lots of bugs arising from injected code is due to sloppiness on the part of the programmer, and some of it is due to an InputManager modifying an application's data at the wrong time (which is easy to do, because the application rightfully believes that it owns its data).

    I was going to write something about the security issues this entire scheme raises, spelling out how a nefarious programmer could hijack passwords and the like. I'll leave that to your imagination, though.

    Shameless plug: While I didn't use APE, I did use InputManager technology in order to create Concierge (a bookmark manager for Safari, in the form of a drawer).

    --
    // Beyond Here Lie Dragons
    1. Re:InputManagers in general by TheUser0x58 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Not quite... InputManager only works with Cocoa applications, as the CocoaDev page you cited mentions, and class posing will only work with parts of applications written using Objective-C classes.

      APE uses mach_inject and mach_override to actually patch new code into applications loaded into memory. This works at the kernel level and thus is framework and language agnostic.

      --
      -- listen to interesting music, support independent radio... WPRB
  19. Bugs in apples.. by FrostyCoolSlug · · Score: 4, Funny

    When I find a bug in my apple, I throw it away..

  20. Re:Story at 11 by paulpach · · Score: 2, Interesting

    If it's an apple product by all means go for it. But no one blames MSFT for bugs in Lotus Notes. from the faq on the first page

    3. Are Apple products the only one target of this initiative?

    Not at all, but they are the main focus. We'll be looking over popular OS X applications as well.

    So they are not blaming apple anywhere in their site or implying this vulnerability is apple's fault at all. Where did you get that idea? This is not a project to destroy or harm apple, quite the opposite, it will help them in the long run.
  21. Re:Story at 11 by 99BottlesOfBeerInMyF · · Score: 3, Insightful

    I guess it depends if the purpose of publishing the bugs is to fix OS X, or whether it's to educate Apple users that just because you use OS X, you are not immune; it's possible (probable?) that somewhere on your system there will be vulnerabilities.

    If you think that is the purpose of the MOAB then you're very, very optimistic, perhaps naive. The purpose is to gain publicity for a few, unscrupulous researchers. They've done this before with other vendors and even agreed to cancel one such project after being paid off. Apple users who know anything about security know there is the potential for security flaws, but they also know the potential is much less than if they are running Windows. Apple users and potential Apple who don't know anything, may be confused by this into thinking that OS X is no more secure than Windows and hence stay with Windows. The simple message "use a mac and you're unlikely to suffer from worms and viruses" is true and simple enough for most people. Complicating the message with, "but if you're using some third party utility, or even some included utilities there is the possibility someone could write a worm, but tso far no one has and they are unlikely to do so in the near future" is way too complex.

    At minimum, it's a reminder that whilst OS X is more secure than Windows XP natively, it is not immune from vulnerabilities.

    Finding vulnerabilities and not reporting them to the vendor or making them public until it will get you the most press, is detrimental to security and does more to help black hats than it does to help users. Trying to obscure and complicate the simple message that mac==more secure than windows, likewise is detrimental to overall security. The only thing this project is really accomplishing is publicity for themselves at the expense of everyone else. These guys are anti-security researchers. If they aren't willing to behave ethically, they can rot.

  22. Re:Story at 11 by Moofie · · Score: 2, Funny

    "Where did you get that idea?"

    Um, from the title of the "project", which is "Month Of Apple Bugs". Golly, how could I possibly have been mislead?

    --
    Why yes, I AM a rocket scientist!
  23. Re:Story at 11 by BorgCopyeditor · · Score: 2, Interesting

    So, the title "Month of Apple Bugs" doesn't imply anything? Yes, you could take it to mean "bugs that infect applications developed for use on the operating system running on most computers made by Apple," but that's just not as sexy, is it? If a similar project were called "Month of Microsoft Bugs" and mostly targeted 3rd party apps, I wager people would more quickly see the problem.

    --
    Shop as usual. And avoid panic buying.
  24. Re:Story at 11 by profplump · · Score: 2, Funny

    While there are some valid bugs listed, the Disk Management one basically says "anyone in the admin group can arbitrarily set file permissions". I don't know about you, but given that the admin group has, by design, unrestricted access to `sudo` I wouldn't consider their ability to set file permissions in a convoluted way a very serious security threat.

    The report talks about the ability to change permissions and then use those changed permissions to run programs as root. Maybe it's just me I'm pretty sure it would be easier to just type `sudo su` followed by your password. Follow that with `rm -f /var/log/asl.log` and you'll even delete the evidence.

  25. Re:Story at 11 by 99BottlesOfBeerInMyF · · Score: 2, Insightful

    No, the price of using a computer is to patch it and not run untrusted software.

    Bullshit. That's like saying the purpose of forks is to eat vegetables, and if some forks happen to create a toxic substance when they touch other substances, it is not a concern. People want to run untrusted binaries, because the majority of binaries people run are untrusted to some degree or another. When malware is common, it makes sense to make sure that untrusted binaries are restricted by default.

    It does not matter what OS you are using. If you tell people they are invincible because they have a Mac or use linux, you are doing them a disservice. You are also lying to them.

    Yeah, now show me one example of a person with any authority seriously saying macs are invincible... just one. Apple doesn't say that. I've never seen a security researcher, or even sensationalist papers say that. If you do a Google search for "mac invincible" you find one blogger asking if Macs are invincible and one article explaining that your statement is a classic strawman argument.

    I tell people that Macs or anything but windows are safer because less people care to attack them.

    That is a fine message to spread, but if the paper is reporting, "30 bugs in Macintosh computers in a month demonstrate they are not secure," what do you think the average Windows user will take away from that headline? Do you think they will correctly derive from that headline that if they get a mac the chances of them getting malware are almost zero, or do you think they will take from that that it does not matter if they have a mac or a Windows machine, they are still going to get malware? Do you think it makes people more or less likely to be infected with malware, considering it may well dissuade people from moving to both Mac and Linux machines?

    The poorly named MOAB is dropping vulnerabilities one after another intentionally spread out, with no prior notification in such a way that Apple either has to wait for all of them, or commit to not fixing some of them right away simply because of the time necessary for development and QA cycles. Can you think of a better way to encourage malware without actually creating exploit code yourself? Further, they're intentionally delaying releasing vulnerabilities they have found to the public, increasing the window for exploitation. Why? It gets them more press that way and a truly cynical person might say because it is the best way to encourage malware based upon their bugs so that they can get more press as they talk about how they discovered the hole first and were right about how Apple would get hacked. It is utterly irresponsible.

  26. Re:Story at 11 by profplump · · Score: 4, Informative

    Upon further investigate, the Finder vulnerability is also pretty weak. It's at least got the potential to allow code execution (but not privilege escalation) and I agree that it's sloppy programming that should be fixed.

    But their report says that in trying to expliot the flaw their DMG failed validation test done before mounting the image and that they were therefore unable to create a working exploit. The rest of their report is based on the assumption that they could manipulate parts of the DMG file and bypass the validation already in place, without any real indication of how that might happen.

  27. In the words of Walter Sobchak: by Night+Goat · · Score: 2, Funny

    "Fuck it dude, let's go bowling."

    Reading that summary as a Mac user, I just can't be bothered to sort all of this out.

  28. It's not an APE bug, it's a big Apple bug. by argent · · Score: 4, Informative

    The bug is that /Library/Frameworks is group-writable by users in the admin group.

    ANY application run setuid, or any framework or plugin used by any application run setuid, could have been used to demo it. It's got nothing to do with APE. This is no different from the many privilege escalation issues in Windows caused by writable executables and system directories.

    To tell if your Mac is susceptible to this kind of privilege escalation attack, run this command:

    find /Library /System /Applications -perm -022

    If there are no results, then your system is probably safe. If there are more than a few results, then you're likely vulnerable.

    Try it and see.

  29. Placing the blame in the right place... with Apple by argent · · Score: 2, Informative

    The vulnerability is that APE installs itself in /Library where its supposed to go. /Library is writable by local admins.

    Too many words. Let me fix that for you: The vulnerability is that /Library is writable by local admins.

    Even if you don't install APE on your system, an attacker who has the ability to execute this exploit can simply drop an input manager or other plugin into /Library and piggyback their way to root on any privileged application.

  30. Re:The problem isn't really 3rd party apps by spun · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Well, privilege defines the difference: if an unprivileged app can be hacked in such a way as to escalate privileges, that is the fault of the OS, no matter what the app did wrong. If it can be hacked only so that a remote user can execute arbitrary commands with the privilege of the process they hacked, that is the fault of the app.

    --
    - None can love freedom heartily, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but license. -- John Milton
  31. Better start looking for spyware in /Library by argent · · Score: 2, Insightful

    While you're looking at APE, have a look in /Library... maybe you'll be the first to find some spyware hiding in there thanks to all the world-writable files and directories... ... because that's the real problem. They didn't need APE, they could have used their own Input Manager instead. They just picked APE to thumb their nose at Landon Fuller.