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Six Rootkit Detectors To Protect Your PC

An anonymous reader writes "InformationWeek has a review of 6 rootkit detectors.This issue became big last year when Sony released some music CDs which came with a rootkit that silently burrowed into PCs. This review looks at how you can block rootkits and protect your machine using F-Secure Backlight, IceSword, RKDetector, RootkitBuster, RootkitRevealer, and Rookit Unhooker."

25 of 108 comments (clear)

  1. Print version. by antdude · · Score: 5, Informative

    Click here to going to next pages. :)

    --
    Ant(Dude) @ Quality Foraged Links (AQFL.net) & The Ant Farm (antfarm.ma.cx / antfarm.home.dhs.org).
  2. I can see... by 42Penguins · · Score: 5, Funny

    "helpful" activex popup ads:
    Yuor compooter may be infectad with eh rootkit! Instal Pwn0r T0olbar now 2 protekt your system from teh threts!

    1. Re:I can see... by Jesus_666 · · Score: 4, Funny

      "helpful" activex popup ads:
      Yuor compooter may be infectad with eh rootkit! Instal Pwn0r T0olbar now 2 protekt your system from teh threts!


      Damn. I've been googling for hours now - do you have an idea where I can get the Linux or OS X version of Pwn0r T0olbar or maybe the source? I want to be protekted from teh threts too!

      --
      USE HOT GRITS WITH STATUE OF NATALIE PORTMAN (NAKED AND PETRIFIED)
    2. Re:I can see... by rvw · · Score: 4, Funny

      "helpful" activex popup ads:
      Yuor compooter may be infectad with eh rootkit! Instal Pwn0r T0olbar now 2 protekt your system from teh threts!


      Damn. I've been googling for hours now - do you have an idea where I can get the Linux or OS X version of Pwn0r T0olbar or maybe the source? I want to be protekted from teh threts too!

      To get this level of protection you should install Windows. These toolbars, you probably won't even have to install them. They come all by themselves.

  3. "The concept of the rootkit isn't a new one, by Indes · · Score: 5, Funny

    ... And dates back to the days of Unix. "

        Whew. Good thing GNU is Not Unix.

    1. Re:"The concept of the rootkit isn't a new one, by Evilest+Doer · · Score: 3, Funny
      I'm not seeing what your point is, can you explain? Or am I trying to overanalyze a throw-away comment? I do that sometimes...
      I think you missed the memo when you worked on The TTP Project.
      --
      I feel like death on a soda cracker.
    2. Re:"The concept of the rootkit isn't a new one, by Fred_A · · Score: 3, Funny

      Speaking of which, could we stick to rootkit for Unix and administratorkit for Windows ? It would be much less confusing.

      --

      May contain traces of nut.
      Made from the freshest electrons.
  4. On debian/ubuntu by delirium+of+disorder · · Score: 4, Informative

    apt-get install chkrootkit rkhunter

    --
    ------ Take away the right to say fuck and you take away the right to say fuck the government.
  5. Summarized: The free one is the best! by tgbrittai · · Score: 5, Informative
    Ironically enough, it was one of the independent tools -- Rootkit Unhooker -- that turned out to be the best.

    It's interesting that programmers working outside of a corporate environment produce such amazing products. Hmmm... I wonder what's up with that?

  6. Security solutions by chris(pinecone) · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Shouldn't these tools be a part of already-existent anti-virus solutions? Why another application for rootkits if trojans, virii, and spyware detection are (usually) in the same package? It's not like rootkits are new threats.

    --
    /.
    1. Re:Security solutions by Macthorpe · · Score: 3, Funny
      Norton AV 2007 boasts rootkits

      Fixed for you :P

      (Yes I know it's not true, but you'd have to pay me severely large amounts of money to expose my system to anything by Symantec)
      --
      "It does not do to leave a live dragon out of your calculations, if you live near him." - Tolkien
  7. I am the author of AFX Windows Rootkit 2003 by Afecks · · Score: 5, Informative

    Hey, thanks for the mention in the article but that is a really old version you've used to test! The last version I've released publicly is AFX Windows Rootkit 2005, it's open source and can be found on http://www.rootkit.com/ the other more recent versions I've sold privately.

    Now on the subject of rootkit detection. Most of these use the method based on Microsoft's Strider: GhostBuster. Which uses a low-level method to gather seemingly clean system information then gathers the same information using a high-level method. The idea is that rootkits will have only hooked the high-level methods so there should be a difference in results. Whatever is listed in the low-level results and not listed in the high-level results is displayed as "hidden information". Effectively they are using the rootkit's own hiding functions against itself to detect it. If the rootkit doesn't hide itself to avoid detection it's still made itself visible.

    The problem is that you put yourself in an arms race with who can hook system information at the lowest level. Luckily since we (the sysadmin) have access to the hardware and presumably the attacker does not, a hardware method of gathering system information would be the best. You can bet money that we are going to be seeing hardware level rootkit detectors sooner or later.

    The final problem is that a backdoor can be hidden without using these rootkit methods. By hooking incoming socket connections we can make a hidden backdoor that creates no new processes, threads, files, registry keys or any other permanent data. I and others have released POC code already. Also, making the same attack persist after reboot is only a matter of disabling SFC and altering userinit.exe, explorer.exe or whatever you like. Your rootkit detector will come up clean everytime.

    1. Re:I am the author of AFX Windows Rootkit 2003 by Afecks · · Score: 3, Informative

      My old site is down because I've moved away from this kind of stuff in the past. The only surviving mirror I can find is here. Basically you're just hooking accept() Winsock API in all processes and then any listening service is a potential backdoor. This is a simple user-mode method. Someone could write a more specific version for a particular service such as IIS that hooks deeper into the code that receives network data.

    2. Re:I am the author of AFX Windows Rootkit 2003 by Afecks · · Score: 4, Informative

      The simple answer is, yes.

      The complicated answer is, for a little while. The reason is that there are rootkits being developed that are designed to store itself in your video card. The idea is that after the hard drive is reformatted the video card will load this rootkit back into the kernel. Right now it's highly unlikely.

  8. Nervous about these... by ubuwalker31 · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Is it just me, or am I being overly cautious not wanting to download a rootkit detector from Chinese and Russian software developers? Are these programs opensource? Are they safe? Anyone?

    1. Re:Nervous about these... by kevinkite · · Score: 3, Funny

      In Soviet Russia kits root YOU!

  9. Wow.... by Creepy+Crawler · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Wow! Lets rate programs on diagnosing a potentially lying PC!

    This is just a stupid idea if anything. The purpose of a rootkit is to make a very hidden hole into a system. Doing this requires reprogramming and setting up the system in that nobody can diagnose itself. The key is to diagnose any sort of rootkit, one must run from known good binaries.

    Now, we dont have the source to Windows, but we have binaries. Well, lets MD5 the binaries and then compare to a known good (just installed, no network interfaces) installation. The differences are possible holes.

    No program can be trusted when the system it sits upon cannot be trusted. When system trust is gone, one must redeploy the system to regain trust.

    --
    1. Re:Wow.... by EvanED · · Score: 3, Informative

      If a native app can analyze the disk volume directly it can identify malicious drivers and reveal them to a friendly Win32 application that can remove them after a reboot...

      There's no fundamental reason why they couldn't intercept the I/O requests from your native app and return false but consistent data there.

      It's just very difficult to do, which is why rootkits try to skirt detection based on the Strider: Ghostbuster method (do a low-level scan of the on-disk filesystem data structures, compare to the results from the FindNextFile API; do a low-level parse of the registry hives, compare to the registry APIs; etc.) by UNHIDING the hidden/changed data from the rootkit detector rather than hiding from the low-level scans.

      If you're running on an infected system, you can't be guaranteed to find anything.

    2. Re:Wow.... by Creepy+Crawler · · Score: 3, Insightful

      ---If a native app can analyze the disk volume directly it can identify malicious drivers and reveal them to a friendly Win32 application that can remove them after a reboot.

      Oh bother... If I had a Kernel Level rootkit, I can SHIM all your commands through it and filter what I want you to see. You can guarantee that I will hide my program ID, memory used, swap used, location on fixed disks, and any network data transmitted/received. As far as you know, the system will be "ok". But it'll be OK, because you can analyze the volume directly!!

      ---This works for user mode and kernel mode rootkits, but if there's a BIOS rootkit you're pretty much screwed.

      Sure. If you have to run a "checking program" on a corrupted system, what makes you think you'll get good results? I keep drilling this point, but all you do is give dumb comments. And bios rootkit? Good luck with that one. You all might wannna give LinuxBios some help if you can flash WORKING hacked firmwares to the multitudes of X86 boxes. Oh... you mean diddle with the ACPI tables. Welllll.. Bah.

      ---See my previous post, Norton AntiVirus 2007 operates in this way.

      I ignore ads.

      --
    3. Re:Wow.... by EvanED · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Wrong. If I control the CPU as kernel level, I can do anything I want.

      That's true.

      The OS is too untrustworthy after you hook it on a network (in Windows case especially).

      Windows is no more vulnerable once you've got a kernel hook than Unix/Linux/whatever is. If anything, Linux is more vulnerable because figuring out the appropriate places to hook in Windows is a lot harder without source.

      ("Security through obscurity" is a bad idea -- but obscurity can be a layer and be helpful as long as you design and implement the rest of the system as if the obscurity wasn't there.)

      (The increased vulnerability of Windows comes from the fact that it's easier to inject your code. The above only applies once you have a suitable kernel of your code running in ring 0.)

      What does Kernel Level mean to you?

      It means you're running in ring 0, privileged mode, CPL 0, whatever you want to call it. It means you can *theoretically* do anything.

      I'm just saying that I don't think there are any non-VM rootkits that hide themselves so thoroughly that they can't be detected, because doing so is a difficult problem because there's way more that you have to trap if you want to be completely hidden than it initially seems. Like ALL I/O requests.

      Or rather, does Microsoft allow you to do extensive reprogramming? I know of extensive Linux kernel, GLibc, and usermode program backdooring. You hit one, and theres still all the others. Essentially, if you have no reference system to verify good data/files, you're screwed.

      Again, in theory, yes. In practice, now, there's still a lot you can do.

      Assuming you'd actually store data in the registry if you're using a backdoor. That just strikes me as friggin stupid.

      It really isn't; it's a perfectly legit method of ensuring that your rootkit is loaded if you can deal with the low-level/high-level scan thing or don't care if it's detectable with that method.

      I'd store my data across the whole system in stupid stuff like user settings, whitespace on text and html files, files near commonly executed programs, and other various random places. And the backdoor would be hidden in plain sight, but in no recognizable form. It should take no more than 50 KB to start a backdoor, and the rest loaded from a distributed amount of places that the backdoor would have access to... local machines and the internet.

      That's fine.

      Remember, my point is that if you have detectable information on the disk (e.g. something you could find with a signature-based scan), you MUST be able to vet all I/O requests to the disk. That means requests through the file APIs, requests for specific blocks sent to devices, and I/O requests that might be issued from other drivers. (For instance, you have to be prepared for detection software to load its own device driver and issue I/O requests itself.) Of course, if you can intercept all I/O instructions then the first two come free. Your rootkit must then be able to mutate the data that's returned so that it hides its presence but is still sane. This very well may mean that you have to understand NTFS and FAT, though it's possible that you could get all needed information from existing kernel data structures.

      I don't think such a rootkit is known to exist right now, and I don't think we'll see one. It's now easier to drop the OS into a virtual machine and have a VM-based rootkit. (Though I'm somewhat skeptical about a sudden loss of speed tipping people off, it should be possible in theory to make this undetectable to software running in the guest OS.)

  10. Easier solution... by Stormwatch · · Score: 5, Funny

    Do NOT buy music from stores. Instead, get them from torrents. It's safer!

  11. Re:Rootkit by chris(pinecone) · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Most rootkits target *nix. OS X is a Unix variant. But since Macs don't ever get viruses, I'm sure it would be impossible to get past Apple's expert, fully-secure software.

    --
    /.
  12. Blue Pill by Asztal_ · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Can any of them detect blue pill?

  13. Root of the problem with Windows by shanen · · Score: 3, Interesting

    It's really a philosophic problem. Microsoft sees the OS as a weapon against the competitors, and when you're building weapons, of course you make them as powerful as possible and of course safety gets a lower priority. (Microsoft's highest priority has always been on the money, however.) The problem is that the results are overpowered OSes that real experts can use in ways that completely overwhelm us normal mortals. Heaven help the little old lady who just wants to visit her church's website on Sundays.

    As regards the article, I read most of it, and might finish it later, but I wasn't too impressed with it or with the rootkit-detection tools that I've experimented with in the past. I'm supposed to be something of a computer expert, and I've certainly been using them long enough, but I regard myself as pretty much a helpless infant in these areas. If the NSA is planning to root my computer because I regard Dubya as an asinine embarrassment to my nation, I don't seriously expect to be able to do anything about it. Sure, I can use an expert's tools in many cases, but that doesn't make me any match for a real expert with corresponding tools. Or returning to the weapon metaphor, I may have a great gun, and even be competent enough in using it, but I'm sure that a seriously experienced killer would have little trouble taking me out, even with an inferior weapon.

    In conclusion, "It's a poor craftsman who blames his tools", but it's also a poor craftsman who can't tell the difference...

    --
    Freedom = (Meaningful - Coerced) Choice != (Speech | Beer^2), and sad sock puppets' bad mods avail them naught.
  14. Hunting down the bad guys like Dirty Harry. by toadlife · · Score: 3, Insightful

    I find it curious and a bit disconcerting when I see how much emphasis people place on the subject of malware detection in the realm of information security. What to do after malicious code finds it's way onto our systems, or into our networks is certainly something to consider, and any security plan would be incomplete without it, but this area takes up far too much of our time, given that other aspects of security bring a much more favorable cost/benefit ratio.

    I can only surmise that there is certain "sexiness" to malware detection; much the same way that fancy home alarm systems are the first thing that many think of when contemplating home security.

    In the home security market, advertisements depict evil prowlers dressed in sweat-suits busting through the back door of the house, while a frightened soccer mom with her five year old daughter cower upstairs. The alarm sounds, the prowler runs away, and a call comes in from the alarm provider, asking if they are ok. Quite dramatic. Quite unrealistic too.

    In the information security market there are no soccer moms, and the prowlers don't run around in matching sweat-suits, but the theme is similar. "Buy our product - it will catch intruders when they enter and save you." Again - quite dramatic, and quite unrealistic.

    In the real world, people forget to turn on their alarm systems, or they forget to change the batteries, or intruders know how to disable them without triggering them.

    In the real world, people also forget to update their AV/IDS signatures, or turn their security product off for various reasons - usually convenience-related, or like the prowler in the home, malware simply disables the security solution on it's way in.

    Just as in securing a home, we would be better off if we first focused on installing heavy doors and deadbolts on all outside entrances, in the virtual world, we would be better off focusing on the barriers that malware must overcome to gain entry to our systems and access to our information and resources.

    This is far from an original thought, but I'll say it anyway as it deserved to be repeated. The security industry is a joke. It's is filled by people who either don't understand the basic pricipals of information security, or do but choose to to sell 'sexy' solutions anyway. I once ran into the author of a somewhat popular Windows security product on a messageboard and was shocked at his aparent lack of understanding of how his platform of choice, Windows, worked.

    I supposed this is more of a Windows problem than anything else. Not a problem with Windows, the operating system, but a problem with WIndows, the culture.

    --
    I don't always use unix-like operating systems; but when I do, I prefer FreeBSD.