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Interview with Developer of BackupHDDVD
An anonymous reader writes "HD DVD and Blu-Ray were supposedly protected by an impenetrable fortress. However a programmer named "muslix64" discovered that this was not the case, and released BackupHDDVD. Now, Slyck.com has an interview with the individual responsible, who provides some interesting insight to his success."
Well, the server is being bombed now. Here's the text from the page if you don't want to wait for 5 minutes per sentence.
The next generation of optical disc technology holds the promise to change the way we interact with and store digital media. Perhaps the most exciting change is the arrival of High Definition (HD) video, with its glorious 1920x1080 pixel resolution. It's a quantum leap forward in terms of watching digital content, as its vast resolution reveals a quality never seen before in such fine detail.
Because of the rapid escalation of digital file-sharing - especially of video files - Hollywood has been working around the clock to protect HD content. This is especially relevant for one of its primary delivery mechanisms - HD DVD and Blu-Ray discs. These next generation discs, with capacities of 30 gigabytes and 50 gigabytes respectively, have their content protected with an array of DRM (Digital Rights Management.) Both are protected with a scheme called AACS, or Advanced Access Content System. This DRM is a great leap forward compared to the weak CSS, or Content Scrambling System, that currently "protects" DVDs. Thanks to Fox, Blu-Ray has an additional layer of protection, called BD+, although most discs have yet to support this protection.
Although Hollywood has constructed enough DRM architecture to rival the Pyramid of Giza, it has long been suspected that it would be only a matter of time before HD DVD and Blu-Ray content protection were compromised. Convinced the golden DRM egg had been laid, it seemed that nothing could penetrate the great AACS wall. And to this day, that great wall still stands.
But why crash through the main gates of Constantinople when you can just pick the lock of a long forgotten rear entrance?
On December 26, 2006, a member of the Doom9.com forums named muslix64 introduced himself as circumventing the content protection - not the copy protection - of HD DVD. Additionally, he made available an open source program named BackupHDDDVD. At the time, this program was a command line program that bypassed the content protection - providing the individual successfully obtained the title and volume keys associated with the HD DVD. Once the individual has the keys, the AACS protection can be sidestepped, and the HD movie content can be extracted. According to muslix64, it took all of eight days to successfully circumvent HD DVD content protection.
Much of the more difficult work, such as extracting the keys, has been alleviated as the once encrypted information has proliferated online. To understand where this stunning turn of events is heading, Slyck.com spoke with muslix64, who agreed to a PM (private message) interview.
The mainstream media tends to have many labels for you, i.e. hacker, cracker, pirate, etc., in response to your efforts. What would you call yourself and what would you label your efforts?
I'm just an upset customer. My efforts can be called "fair use enforcement"!
What motivated you to help circumvent the content protection scheme associated with HD DVD and Blu-Ray?
With the HD-DVD, I wasn't able to play my movie on my non-HDCP HD monitor. Not being able to play a movie that I have paid for, because some executive in Hollywood decided I cannot, made me mad...
After the HD-DVD crack, I realized that things where "unbalanced" by having just one format cracked, so I did Blu-Ray too.
Explain how decrypting the device and volume keys are critical to your success. Could you explain the difference between the two?
The device keys, are the keys associated to the player.
The volume key, is the key associated to the movie.
I don't care about device keys. I do care about volume keys, because by using volume keys instead of devices keys, I totally bypass the revocation system. There is no "volume key revocation". There is content revocation, but I really doubt they will ever use it. If you use device keys, they can revoke them. Having the volume key means that you can decrypt ti
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Well, he didn't crack it in the same way. With DECSS, you can crack any disk by just putting it in a drive and running the program. With the AACS crack, you have to run some other player and extract the title key out of memory, probably by using a debugger or something. The CSS crack was harder because they actually cracked every disk, and reversed the encryption. The AACS crack doesn't accomplish the same thing. Although you can still decrypt disks, you can't just make program that does it automatically.
Anthropic principle: We see the universe the way it is because if it were different we would not be here to see it.
This can't be stoped. It's not like the first DeCSS that used stolen Xing keys and could only work for as long as the keys weren't revoked.
This uses the keys specific for the DISC, which can't be changed anymore.
And the best part : In order to decrypt the movie and play it, every player *HAS* to have the volume ke in memory or SIMD register for a short period of time. No matter if players key are revoked, version upgraded, bugs fixed, etc... This technique doesn't rely on any bug that can be patched. It only rely to the fact that, whatever player you choose, at one moment it needs the volume key - which you can then grab and share on the net.
There's no way to patch this.
This is one more proof that the fundamental mechnics of the DRM - ie.: providing both the crypted data and the key in the same place - is flawed. You can't protect a content from the one who bought the disc. If data must be decrypted on the buyer's computer, then nothing cab prevent it from being circumvented.
"Sufficiently advanced satire is indistinguishable from reality." - [Tips: 1DrYakQDKCQ6y52z6QbnkxHXAocMZJE61o ]
The original poster was incorrect in his explanation. The "bit" is implemented in the software, not in the disc. In Windows Vista, Microsoft is calling it the "tilt switch". Any attempt to "subvert" the Protected Media Path is supposed to flip the bit, causing degradation of the signal. This means things like "unsigned drivers" or home-grown ripper type activity.
John
You can play an unencrypted movie wherever you want; an update of the encryption-scheme will not magicalle re-encrypt the movie. DUH!
An unprotected movie does not require HDCP; HDCP has _NOTHING_ to do with this.
I don't think you read these questions the same way muslix64 did. You are incorrect, because the content industry could force future versions of PowerDVD to automatically downgrade the video quality of any unencrypted video it played. This would be a "Hollywood counterattack" that does not re-encrypt the video like you assumed. Likewise, because an unprotected movie does not require HDCP, Microsoft could force all video played on its operating system to be downgraded unless HDCP is enabled.
I know, neither PowerDVD nor Microsoft would ever actually do this. Even if they did, there are alternative open-source players, and alternative open-source operating systems, to which these changes would never be made. This is exactly what muslix64 says when he replies "Or you can use open-source player, like VideoLan, if a player like PowerDVD become more restrictive about playing decrypted movies."
It doesn't hurt to be nice.
Media Center's PVR utility also encrypts & adds DRM to plain analog recordings made over S-Video -- on behalf of HBO, Showtime, and others. MS claims that this triggered by the Analog SGMS flag in the S-vid signal, but my own unscientific experiments suggest otherwise; if I set MCE to record a different, unprotected program, then change the channel to the "protected" program directly on the cable box (instead of through MCE's guide & tuner), I get an unprotected recording. That would suggest to me that the DRM flag is somewhere in the guide data rather than the S-vid signal.
At any rate, if MS is already superlatively brutal when it comes to adding unnecessary DRM to legacy technology, I can't imagine they will allow unprotected full-resolution component output through Vista's content imprisonment system. No other software DVD player I know restricts the playback resolution, and no other PVR suite I know of implements SGMS or wraps S-Video recordings in DRM of any kind. I *thought* that the HDCP spec required degradation of component analog outputs, but even if it doesn't, you can bet that MS will do it anyway, if past performance is at all indicative of future behavior.
Anyway, I hope I'm wrong & you're right, since HDTV recording from component inputs will probably be practical & affordable much sooner than many people think.
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