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Bruce Schneier Talks Brain Heuristics and Security
ancientribe writes "Bruce Schneier is at it again: the security icon shares his latest research and insight on the interplay between psychology and security in this article in Dark Reading. The focus of Schneier's latest research is on brain heuristics and perceptions of security, which may be the basis for the best-selling author's next book. His goal for the topic, which he'll be presenting at the RSA Conference next week, is to focus on how people think, and feel, about security, and how neuroscience can help explain how our perception of risk doesn't always match reality."
head.. as a matter of fact.. this reply is all in your head too.. it doesn't exist..
At one point in the article, Schneier comments on email encryption:
This is a good example, because encryption is in common use on the web. To the end user, using a website over an SSL or TLS connection is no different from using one in the clear. It's almost too easy, which is why browsers have lock icons, color changes, and "You are leaving a secure site!" messages.
Of course, the problem is slightly different, since HTTPS is all about protecting a client-server connection from eavesdropping, not protecting the data itself. Once the data reaches the server, the server is entirely capable of doing something boneheaded with it like saving it in plain text in index.html. Similarly, data sent to the client can easily be printed out and left face up on the car seat.
Client-server connections are easy to deal with, because the only people that need to manage them are the software developers and the admins managing the server. Similarly, it's trivial for an end-user to send/retrieve mail using a TLS-encrypted SMTP, POP3, or IMAP connection.
Email is harder, because it's fundamentally peer-to-peer (layered through a series of client-server interactions), which means the end users actually have to manage a digital identity.
Sony ha
More facts about Bruce. http://geekz.co.uk/schneierfacts/
Flexible bare-metal recovery for Linux/UNIX
Part of the problem is with our perception of probability. We see it mathematically, but we still expect cause and effect rather than randomosity. Most users will say things like "why would someone monitor me," not realizing that there's usually no direct causal relation between who they are and interest others might have in their information, and the question is better put, "how probable is it that someone like me might be monitored."
In other words, we feel relatively safe in a crowd. We are completely visible, but because we cannot see why someone would single us out as unique, we feel obfuscated. All the while not realizing that it's more opportunity than it is causality.
This is why we feel safe sharing information on websites like myspace, or using our credit cards over insecure wireless connections, because we believe that because everyone else is engaging in this fundamentally insecure behavior, we have safety in numbers. No one will read our blog for information about our identity, no one will try to use our amazon account to buy electronics.
But they will, with a probabilistically determined frequency.
I see five factors that make the user-space side of security so hard.
1. Incentives: Most people, especially employees, don't face personal consequences when their PC is infected or the company database gets pwned.
2. Rarity: Most people see security problems as something that happens to someone else. That so few breaches are publicized only enhances the belief in the low likelihood of problems.
3. Hubris: Most people believe they know what they are doing.
4. Boredom: Ask a person to be careful too many times in the face of a relatively low-probability event and they become trained to click "Yes, Install."
5. Sociality: Most people are nice and assume that other people are nice too. They hold the door open for the social engineering intruder, they click on the "cool link", they open email that looks like it might be from someone important. Malware creators prey on our desire to "do the right thing."
Some of these five are easier to address but some reflect deeper realities about being human.
Two wrongs don't make a right, but three lefts do.
Seems to me it would be good if more people understood the ways that their gut reaction to fear is often incorrect. It would at least make it harder for politicians to manipulate the populace.
It was interesting how Schneider said "you can feel secure even if you're not" - maybe this is also known as herd-mentality..
He's got herpes. She doesn't. They take VALTREX to keep it that way. So her neocortex is all hot for him. But her amygdala isn't convinced. Because he has herpes.
> Why do people trust complex programs with colorful symbols and logos more
> than a simple linux command, where you know what is going on?
Because end users *don't* know what's going on.
It's not a question of trusting something complex and inscrutable (proprietary security software) versus something simple and straightforward (open-source command-line software), but more a case of trusting something complex and inscrutable that looks well put-together and comes from a well-known maker, versus something complex and inscrutable that looks arcane and comes from nobody in particular.
Spend some time around end users, trying to understand their problems. It won't enable you to solve the problems, but it will help you understand what we're up against.
Cut that out, or I will ship you to Norilsk in a box.
For what it's worth, I wrote an in-depth look at the neuroscience of the brain and its impact on peoples' ability to change for CIO magazine here: http://www.cio.com/archive/091506/change.html.