New Controversy over Black Hat Presentation
uniquebydegrees writes "InfoWorld is reporting about a new controversy swirling around a planned presentation at Black Hat Federal in Washington D.C. this week. Security researcher Chris Paget of IOActive will demo an RFID hacking tool that can crack HID brand door access cards. HID Corp., which makes the cards, is miffed and is accusing IOActive of patent infringement over the presentation, recalling the legal wrangling over Michael Lynn's presentation of a Cisco IOS hole at Black Hat in 2005. Black Hat's Jeff Moss says they're standing by their speaker. A news conference is scheduled for tomorrow AM." Update: 02/27 20:10 GMT by Z :InfoWorldMike wrote with a link to story saying that the presentation has been pulled from the slate for Black Hat, as a result of this pressure.
"Your door is secure because bad guys would have to infringe on our patents to open it!"
The article and this guy on the video seem to be confusing RFID and Proximity (125khz).
/= Proximity
Its really odd to hear them mention you'd need to bring the card up to 2-3 inches to the reader, when they keep talking about RFID.
Its clearly proximity.
Also the fool on the video mentions this as if its new, numerous websites mention how to do this and have for years.
Proximity has its draw backs and EVERYONE knows this.
Which is why HID HAS addressed it with new products. HID iClass readers. 13.56mhz, with Encryption between the card and the reader. After 2 roll-overs of public to private encryption keys, you no longer can just read the card with any reader you actually need to know the private key.
So:
RFID not what they are talking about.
RFID
RFID should not be used for access control (unlocking doors from 5 feet a way... seriously...)
Proximity vulnerable (nothing new)
HID iClass (13.56mhz proximity with Encryption) HID has a solution (makes me wonder why they never mention it though...)
Disclaimer: I don't work for HID, but I'm a Sales Engineer for an Access Control company and we use HID readers or our own which are also Proximity.
The BlackHat speaker isn't presenting it as new...what he *is* doing, though, is giving away schematics to build devices to do the reading and cloning. That's what's getting HID's attention. Lots of people knew you could do this...not so many had a clear schematic & parts list to actually go *do* it.
.... More detail here:
+ badge+risks+nixed/2100-1029_3-6162547.html?tag=nef d.top
http://news.com.com/Black+Hat+talk+on+RFID+access
This is my opinion. To make sure you don't steal it, it's covered by the DMCA.
We're able to make copies of keys, yet they're still widely used as "security" measures in offices worldwide. Why is this any different? I've always been taught that a successful Security strategy is comprised of the 3 concepts:
What you have - your ID badge/card
What you know - the PIN associated with that card
Who you are - a fingerprint/retinal scan/etc to be used with that card
The point is, ok, someone figured out how to easily clone RFID enabled "access cards". Is it the manufacturer's fault that many places rely SOLELY on those badges for their perimiter/access control? If your facility is truly "secure", there should be at LEAST the requirement of a PIN typed in along with a card swipe as well as cameras, physical security, and other standard procedures. If your facility's management has opted to rely on the cards as the only means of controlling who enters and when, then blame that same management if a problem happens. The term "security" is very subjective. What might pass for your average office building would never pass at a serious Datacenter or other Critical Facility.
Several companies already make RFID blocking wallets. Presumably something similar could easily be designed for ID badges. I don't know for sure, but the wallets are probably lined in a way to make it act like a Faraday cage. Here are examples of RFID blocking wallets:
This is some of the most contemptible saber-rattling -- and caving -- I've seen this year.
This is not my sandwich.
Because of the parents usage of the (simplistic) 3 methods of authentication.
Clearly someone got their Security+ cert recently.
Something you know
Would be the PIN
Something you have
Would be the RFID card
Something you are
Is generally a biometric device confirmation
Any one of the above is normally relatively trivial to crack, as you add the others the difficuly goes up exponentially.
The best systems use all 3.
The Sproggg