The Dozen Space Weapon Myths

Thanks to Disowned Sky for finding a good debunking piece on space based weapon systems. Slightly disheartening, because I really want to have solar energy satellites that are also lasers. The article does a good job of looking further afield at nations besides the United States efforts in this area.

Comments

Hey look, just for Slashdot!

[AKAImBatman]

Seems the author of the article reads Slashdot. Anyone remember back when the "official U.S. position on space weapons" story broke? As I recall, there was a torrent of comments (especially from those who failed to read the document) suggesting that the space policy was that only the U.S. was going to have access to space. Some even went as far as to suggest that just because it's not in the "official" document, that it was the actual policy regardless of what the public part of the document stated.

Well, here's The Space Review's take on it:

2. The latest United States "space policy" declares that it will "deny access to space" to those players it deems hostile, which translates to pre-emptive attack on non-US space objects and their supporting ground infrastructure.

Western news dispatches from Moscow, reporting on Russian official complaints about the policy, stated that it asserted the right "to deny adversaries access to space for hostile purposes," and that it claimed the right (some say "tacitly") for the US to deploy weapons in space. Vitaly Davidov, deputy head of the Russian Space Agency, complained: "They [the US] want to dictate to others who is allowed to go there."

But the actual policy document makes no such claim and displays no such intent to "deny" access. The Russian anxiety, echoed on the editorial pages and in news stories around the world, is apparently based on some over-wrought page 1 stories in US newspapers, written by people too careless to actually read the original US document and subsequent official US government clarifications, or too eager to misinterpret it in the most alarmingly stark terms.

On another topic, the author makes a very good point about the 1967 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. i.e. The same treaty that is credited with preventing the development of the Orion nuclear pulse propulsion vehicle. As item 9 points out, the Soviets had continued nuclear space development in violation of a treaty that had been signed specifically to prevent them from doing that. The Polyus ASAT Platform that was launched on the back of the first Energia in 1987 (and thankfully failed to make orbit) was intended to have nuclear weapon capabilities. The translations of the Polyus diagrams show that it would have carried "Nuclear Space Mines" to target and destroy missiles and satellites.

So much for that treaty. :-/

Re:Hey look, just for Slashdot!

[Rei]

I have problems with this article.

1. To a foe, our ability, which he admits, to blind or jam satellites, might as well be the ability to destroy them. Literally destroying them is certainly worse from an environmental perspective, but tactically, blinding them is just the same in the middle of a war, and one certainly ought to expect other countries (including those with less military resources who feel threatened by the US) to attempt to gain the same tactical ability to deny satellite access.

2. "But the actual policy document makes no such claim and displays no such intent to ?deny? access." One of many blatantly false claims in this article. I did "actually read" the policy, and it states:

The United States considers space capabilities -- including the ground and space segments and supporting links -- vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will: preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests

3. Space-based weapons *do* have a major advantage over ground-based ones: there is no boost phase. They have the potential to give *much* less warning and reaction time. Consequently, they're more destabilizing. It's the same reason why short range (tactical) ballistic missiles were banned: they reached their targets too quickly. Also, is he really so daft as to believe that the Bush adminstration *hasn't* been trying to create "usable" nuclear weapons? There's a new statement from an "anonymous administration official" (and sometimes named ones) every month or so about things like nuclear bunker busters and the like.

4. "Most discussions leave the impression the Russian system simply doesn?t exist." Undoubtedly, the author is talking about the S-400/A-135 network. It's certainly a threat to even our best warplanes (think a patriot missile battery on steroids, with a much longer testing history), but with the 100 km upper range for the biggest missile configurations (if memory serves), it's not going to be shooting down satellites, even low ones, any time soon.

5. "Equating a boost-phase anti-missile weapon (based at sea, on an aircraft, or even in space) to an anti-satellite weapon overlooks a fundamental design difference, their guidance mode." -- Apparently this person has never heard of THAAD. Not all of our systems are boost phase.

6. Yes, and the Istrebitel Sputnik was a response to the US's SAINT program ('60-'62). Was the SAINT program a response to anything? Not really. We discontinued it, but it was too late by then. We started it. Now, it was long enough ago that arguments about who started it are pretty moot, but still, if you want to pick hairs, like this person does...

8. "The enormous advantage of an orbital system (even if launched only hours or days before making its attack) is that simply by selecting a larger booster, the weapon can be sent into nearly any orbit of potential interest, at any altitude" -- No, that's the advantage of a ground-based system. Having to enter orbit is an extra delay and takes extra energy. The lowest-energy, fastest way to intercept a satellite at 400km? Be below it and launch 400km straight up. Being in orbit allows for incremental homing of the killer satellite, providing a simpler, more reliable, but slower kill. And who knows what he's thinking about when he writes about changing the orbit with "the moon's gravity". If he's talking about a lunar transfer orbit, he must be ignorant of the huge amount of time and delta-V needed for such a maneuver; it'd be foolish. If he's talking about the lunar perturbations of satellites already orbitting at GEO, that takes years. I have no idea what he's thinking. Anyone have any clue?

9. Very low o

Re:Hey look, just for Slashdot!

[Dun Malg]

Not every country has to go through the Manhattan Project stage again; the knowledge has already been discovered. They can theoretically buy/steal materials (enriched uranium) or parts (missile casings and launchers). Except that the Manhattan Project was all about discovering everything you left out. Just have uranium and a launch vehicle is not enough. That's the easy part. Making it explode reliably, that's the very, very hard part. There really is more to it than just smacking two chunks of uranium together any old way.

Who cares how new a technology is if it works?

[Phanatic1a]

FTA:

But since the 1985 air-launch satellite intercept, a project cancelled by Congress (see "Blunt arrows: the limited utility of ASATs", The Space Review, June 6, 2005), there is no evidence that a new satellite-killer technology has been developed

So what? Who cares if no new ASAT technology has been developed if the old ones work just fine? The Soviet orbital ASAT program predated the US's F-15 ASAT program by over a decade, and it worked.

Noy sure about this one...

[Anonymous Coward]

References to the "latent antisatellite capability" of the embryonic US anti-missile system in Alaska are somewhat disingenuous since Russia has a deployed anti-missile system with launchers around Moscow and in Kazakhstan, with much the same capability and nobody seems to complain. Most discussions leave the impression the Russian system simply doesn't exist.

Yes, it exists and has existed for decades, however, it was explicitely allowed under the ABM-Treaty. The US was allowed to build such a system for North Dakota but I'm not sure if we ever followed through with that. However, a national system was what the treaty intended to prevent, which it did until we decided to withdraw from the treaty in 2002.

Item 5 IS a correct statement.

[wiredog]

It's talking about a boost-phase anti-missile weapon.