Obsession With Firewalls Could Hinder IPv6
DosIgriegas writes "The obsession with firewalls in IPv6 may result in some of the quirks of IPv4 reappearing. Ars Technica has an article looking at the topic in depth, exploring the technical challenges of securing the new protocol, and looking a the re-emergence of old problems in new guises. 'Ironically, what's required to make IPv6 work through a stateful firewall is almost identical to what's required to make IPv4 work though NAT. This means the IETF's efforts to keep IPv6 NAT-free in order to make protocols do their job without messy workarounds are defeated by the notion that everything should be firewalled.' If we decide to stick with firewalls in IPv6, we'll see many of the same hard-to-diagnose network problems that we have with IPv4."
Response: 'Obsession'?! I don't know what you're talking about.
*request identified as critical of host*
*request forwarded to port 6666*
*incoming request on port 6666, port reserved for criticism*
Response: Maybe I'm not the problem, maybe IPv6 is the problem? Shouldn't a solution to a problematic situation meet the needs of said situation, not the other way around?
*incoming request passed through network firewall, computer hardware firewall and finally rejected by software firewall, request complete*
--
Come on, this is like intercourse, sometimes girls/requests just require double or even triple bagging, the last thing you want is a virus. Some girls are regular port scanners ifyaknowwhatImean
My work here is dung.
So, they're saying the way to get security in IPv6 is to throw away the whole concept of firewalls and hope that the protocol won't leave us with out collective bums hanging out in the wind??
I can't see a widespread adoption of a protocol that wants to get rid of firewalls. Now, I guess it's entirely possible that the IPv6 would secure networks since I'm not really up to speed on it's details. But I'm going to need an awful lot of convincing before I put any machines onto a network without something physically between me and it.
Unless IPv6 is very different, the only way I'm going to be able to set up my own personal network (and secure it) is with NAT. I'll take 'hard to diagnose' over pwn3d any day.
This just sounds so wrong.
Cheers
Lost at C:>. Found at C.
"Today we learned, that lots of people who have thought of NAT as a security mechanism, are getting a hit with cluebat when they find out that the IPv4 NAT also implements a stateful firewall as a byproduct. Since there is no NAT with IPv6, you only have to implement stateful firewall without address translation."
/64 is a huge address space to scan and so on. The presentation I watched at IETF Prague was quite interesting: http://www3.ietf.org/proceedings/07mar/slides/v6op s-1/sld1.htm
Sigh.
This is a non-issue.
What IS an issue are the new IPv6-specific things related to security. You cannot do a network scan anymore since even a
There are some implementation issues, such as anycast addresses and stuff like that you need to take into account.
However, this "getting rid of connectivity issues due to no longer having to NAT" has NEVER been expected by anyone who knows even a bit about networking. Because we're not returning to an un-firewalled world.
I hereby announce I am giving up my obsession with firewalls and reverting to my earlier obsession with Halle Berry.
Do not try to read the dupe, thats impossible. Instead, only try to realize the truth
What truth?
There is no dupe
You can have a firewall that does not use NAT. Both sides are publicly addressable but there is still a security device between you and the outside world.
"I use a Mac because I'm just better than you are."
Linux has already gone down this path - the old IP connection tracking code in the Linux iptables packet filter has already been reworked into a more general layer-3 connection tracking mechanism, with separate 'drivers' for tracking the IPv4 and IPv6 protocols and separate 'plugins' that can handle specialized protocols (FTP, IRC, H.323, PPTP and so on).
I suspect that commercial firewalls will probably follow suit.
SCREW THE ADS! http://adblock.mozdev.org/ Proud user of teh Fox of Fire - Registered Linux User #289618
I would say I personally am not obsessed with firewalls per se, I'm obsessed with privacy and security.
The firmware on a firewall also has a much smaller amount of code to debug in order to make sure that it will function properly all the time. I would never assume that my Windows XP machine was properly patched with enough confidence to plug it straight into a cable modem all the time.
I am also not interested in having each computer in my home being identified and tracked individually, and I don't pirate software or download music. As such, even if the need for NAT is removed, I would still be highly interested in purchasing a device to block incoming connections and mask my IP address (maybe by swapping with other devices within my home on certain connections).
Since we have the attention of the IPv6 crowd, everyone should add this record to your forward zones:
aacs IN AAAA 09f9:1102:9d74:e35b:d841:56c5:6356:88c0
-CR
"So is the BSD licence even more 'free' (than GPLv2)? Yes. Unquestionably." --Linus Torvalds (TinyURL.com/2vugzl)
You can have a firewall without using NAT. Being able to assign every device a routable address means that you can implement a stateless firewall instead of a stateful firewall. For most purposes, a simple firewall that filtered incomming TCP connection requests and UDP packets on all ports except those specifically allowed would suffice. This has the advantage that the firewall wouldn't need to track the state of TCP connections, and would eliminate problems like firewalls deciding a connection has been idle too long and closing it.
For the home user, being able to assign a routable IP to every PC has other advantages. Do you have multiple PCs with Remote Desktop running that you want to access remotely? NAT makes this difficult since all the PCs share the same IP address and need to listen for connection requests on the same port. Assigning every machine a routable address makes this problem go away. Don't like that example? The same applies to a web server, or SIP phone, or Bittorrent, or a myriad of other applications.
Not to mention your average consumer ISP, which, like a cable company, would love to start charging "per outlet".
Much as a NAT-less world might be easier to build and debug, I think I'm happier if my network connection is like my electric connection.
One connection delivers: all electric energy / all bits
I can go up to a max of: 200 amps / 5 Mbps
I might still be billed: by energy used / by gigabytes sent
But I don't pay extra: for more outlets / for more devices
I cover all the costs: of the electric panel / of the router
Handing someone else the information to break the above model is not something I want to do.
Its a nonsensical situation that operating systems in general cannot be relied upon for the security of their own network interfaces - after all it is down to the operating system to accept or reject user logins. In the same way it should be the operating system that sets policy about whether to accept or reject packets from arbitrary locations.
In general the software firewalls that come with Operating Systems are quite reliable and can be trusted.
What can't be trusted is that all the firewalls on every machine are configured properly. It's FAR easier to administrate one firewall than it is to administrate 10 or 100 different workstations/servers.
AccountKiller
This isn't about NAT, it's about firewalling (blocking ports). You can have a firewall without NAT, but apparently allowing firewalls allows NAT too. Since NAT is bad design, and as you say unnecessary, we'd like to disallow it at the protocol level. However if you do that, you can't have a firewall which is a problem for some people. IMO, firewalls are bad design too. Close the ports you don't need, and use ACLs to limit access to the ports you do.
Sort of. By definition, a stateful firewall probably has the capability of performing NAT, but there's no reason why you'd want to, if you have enough external addresses for everything on your network.
I don't think that NAT is "disallowed at the protocol level," as much as just rendered unnecessary. You could still build an IPv6 NAT box, if you really wanted to, but it would be a bit stupid. It's like building a box that hides two Ethernet cards behind one MAC address -- sure, you could do it, but since they both already have unique identifiers, why would you want to? There's no shortage. (Okay, that may not be the best comparison in the world, but you get the idea.)
NAT is driven by a shortage of routable IP addresses. With v6, there's no longer a shortage. However, people are still going to want the security offered by stateful firewalls (NAT, in its most trivial 1:1 implementations, doesn't offer any security -- it's all in the firewall anyway), which if configured incorrectly or overzealously, could create almost as many problems themselves as NAT does currently.
However, I still think that IPv6 is a big improvement. Why? Because with v6, you have the option of not using the stateful firewall, on devices that are hindered by it, while still retaining the ability to use one and mimic IPv4 security behavior. With IPv4, unless you are wealthy enough to afford a static IP for everything in your house, you don't even have the option of exposing more than one device (per port) to the public Internet.
To me, this demonstrates that there's really no downside (besides the obvious implementation cost) to IPv6. People who just want nothing to change, can basically have nothing change. Their IPv6+Firewall network will behave just like an IPv4 one, but people who want to use the capabilities of IPv6 (for example, VoIP using SIP) will be able to, by reconfiguring their firewalls to be a bit smarter about incoming traffic.
"Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
``Running out of IP numbers'' is like ``running out of oil'': it'll happen, but crying wolf didn't help the cause. It's claimed IPv6 is Big In Japan but, like popular beat combos, that means ``dead elsewhere''. And I"m sit in a hotel room in Tokyo happily IPv6-free, and i've just come from a building owned by one of the largest IT companies in Japan which was entirely IPv4.
IPv6 has been ``next year'' for the last ten years. It's still no-where. What'sdriving it now that wasn't driving it five years ago?
ian
Software firewalls are a non-sequitor in my opinion. It's really an added layer of obscurity.
If someone installs a firewall and say "please block port 123" I can't help but ask "Why did you open port 123 in the first place, then build a wall in front of it?" The fact that these firewalls exist just shows how stupidly the operating-systems UI is that it is so complicated to determine what apps are listening on the network, and what apps aren't.
Blocking outgoing apps is a completely different issue, and software firewall might make sense for that, if you don't trust the applications on your machine (which is a sad state of affairs anyway)
A protocol that requires a firewall to be stateful just to allow it to pass, I would call broken. And yes, I have for years called FTP a broken protocol (acknowledging that this observation is hindsight). I'm not talking about statefulness for NAT purposes, but rather, statefulness to track permissions on related communications (e.g. the DATA connection in FTP). FTP was designed in the day when no one expected blocking of arbitrary ports. But this is something we will be doing apparently forever.
Let's fix the broken protocols and move forward. While we can use HTTP for many file transfer needs, a new protocol that conducts everything over a single TCP connection or a single SCTP session is where we need to go. Then a firewall can be simple in operation and probably more secure as a result.
now we need to go OSS in diesel cars
When people talk about using NAT, 99% of the time they don't mean a 1:1 NAT, but a NAPT as found in home routers and configurable in many midsize routers and PC operating systems.
Such a NAPT does offer security because it disallows all uninvited incoming connections and thus shields "services" running on systems inside of the NAPT from access from the Internet.
Sure. But what they're really describing isn't NAT, but rather the stateful firewall that's inherent in all non-trivial implementations of NAT.
Since you can take just the stateful firewall part, and use it with IPv6, there's no security disadvantage there. All you lose is the kludgy NAT parts, and in trade you gain the ability to do much more complex and useful routing -- creating various subnets with different security levels, etc. It's nothing that hasn't been going on with big corporate networks for years (those companies that have Class A blocks and can afford to give every workstation a 'real' IP still have firewalls and security policies), but now home users can have the same flexibility, if they want it.
"Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
Sorry to rain on that parrade, but the (variants of) "IPv6 is secure because it's a 64 bit space and noone will ever guess your address" sound... surrealistic. It's security by obscurity of the worst kind. The kind that can't possibly work.
We live in an age where far larger combinations of bits -- e.g., email addresses or name/password combinations -- are sniffed, phished, compiled into lists and sold, etc. What on Earth makes people think that a fixed IPv6 address would be more secure? No, honestly, what's so special about an 8 byte IPv6 address that makes it un-sniffable?
The notion that your machine is only findable by raw brute-force scanning is pretty laughable. Yes, it's one of the easiest and most non-brainer methods, but it's not the only one.
As a counter-example, look at how email viruses work. Because they _do_ work without scanning and without looking for you speciffically. They just go through more hops, each hop sending itself further to everyone in your address book.
Guess what? The exact same can be trivially adapted to an IPv6 worm. Each pwned machine just continuously looks for incoming and outgoing connections, and tries to spread to those too.
Or how about lists of static addresses, the same as the lists of email addresses that spammers buy and sell. Only unlike email addresses, if you're unfirewalled, you can't keep yours secret. You _have_ to tell each visited site your address every time you connect to it, so it knows where to send the response packets.
So basically it's the setup for the easiest kind of phishing imaginable. It's like automatically giving your email address to every site you ever visited, except this time it's your IPv6 address. Someone just has to create or pwn a popular site, and just record all the IP's that connect to it. Voila, that's a nice list to sell to the hackers. No more brute force scanning needed.
We already have major corporations whose computers are spam bots. What makes you think none will host IP recording bots? How do you know none of the ecommerce sites or forums you visit could be pwned to record all those static IPv6 addresses?
Or it just takes one bored intern working at a major ISP to run a sniffer and get a huge list of all static IPv6 addresses that sent or received anything through their pipe. Remember, idiots exist everywhere. One guy sold the whole list of AOL addresses to spammers, for example. So are you _sure_ noone will sell the list of allocated/known IPv6 addresses?
And since it's static addresses (after all, the whole idea is to get rid of NAT, right? No more dynamic addresses and remapping, right?), you know that each address logged will be available for a long long time thereafter.
Basically let's stop using the whole "we're secure by obscurity" concept to rest already. If there are other security mechanisms in place, fine, I want to hear about them. But "noone will find your IPv6 address" is _not_ security. If you want to talk security, you start from the most paranoid scenarios imaginable, not from wishful thinking.
A polar bear is a cartesian bear after a coordinate transform.