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Obsession With Firewalls Could Hinder IPv6

DosIgriegas writes "The obsession with firewalls in IPv6 may result in some of the quirks of IPv4 reappearing. Ars Technica has an article looking at the topic in depth, exploring the technical challenges of securing the new protocol, and looking a the re-emergence of old problems in new guises. 'Ironically, what's required to make IPv6 work through a stateful firewall is almost identical to what's required to make IPv4 work though NAT. This means the IETF's efforts to keep IPv6 NAT-free in order to make protocols do their job without messy workarounds are defeated by the notion that everything should be firewalled.' If we decide to stick with firewalls in IPv6, we'll see many of the same hard-to-diagnose network problems that we have with IPv4."

25 of 278 comments (clear)

  1. Transmission by eldavojohn · · Score: 4, Funny
    Request:

    Obsession With Firewalls Could Hinder IPv6
    *incoming request on port 9045, port reserved for new ideas*

    Response: 'Obsession'?! I don't know what you're talking about.

    *request identified as critical of host*
    *request forwarded to port 6666*
    *incoming request on port 6666, port reserved for criticism*


    Response: Maybe I'm not the problem, maybe IPv6 is the problem? Shouldn't a solution to a problematic situation meet the needs of said situation, not the other way around?

    *incoming request passed through network firewall, computer hardware firewall and finally rejected by software firewall, request complete*
    --
    Come on, this is like intercourse, sometimes girls/requests just require double or even triple bagging, the last thing you want is a virus. Some girls are regular port scanners ifyaknowwhatImean ...
    --
    My work here is dung.
    1. Re:Transmission by Sancho · · Score: 4, Insightful

      The problem was that NAT makes connections somewhat hard to deal with. IPV6 was designed to solve that problem. The problen now is that we realize that computers are vulnerable and need protection. IPV6 was not designed to solve that problem, and furthermore, it's not a problem which is likely to be overcome using technology or a new protocol.

  2. Defective by design? by gstoddart · · Score: 4, Insightful
    Not to overuse the whole 'defective by design' thing, but:

    'This means the IETF's efforts to keep IPv6 NAT-free in order to make protocols do their job without messy workarounds are defeated by the notion that everything should be firewalled.' If we decide to stick with firewalls in IPv6, we'll see many of the same hard-to-diagnose network problems that we have with IPv4.

    So, they're saying the way to get security in IPv6 is to throw away the whole concept of firewalls and hope that the protocol won't leave us with out collective bums hanging out in the wind??

    I can't see a widespread adoption of a protocol that wants to get rid of firewalls. Now, I guess it's entirely possible that the IPv6 would secure networks since I'm not really up to speed on it's details. But I'm going to need an awful lot of convincing before I put any machines onto a network without something physically between me and it.

    Unless IPv6 is very different, the only way I'm going to be able to set up my own personal network (and secure it) is with NAT. I'll take 'hard to diagnose' over pwn3d any day.

    This just sounds so wrong.

    Cheers
    --
    Lost at C:>. Found at C.
    1. Re:Defective by design? by Detritus · · Score: 4, Interesting
      You can still have firewalls, it's just that some firewall "features" have unintended consequences.

      The old-style stateless firewall will work just fine.

      --
      Mea navis aericumbens anguillis abundat
    2. Re:Defective by design? by drinkypoo · · Score: 4, Insightful

      But, who is going to trust an application to determine network policy? The first malicious application to come along will bork the whole system, won't it? I mean, 'random' hosts is the perfect invitation for badness.

      It's worth mentioning that there is little or no reason for most people to run these programs at work, with certain notable exceptions like FTP (Which should just be allowed to fucking die already) and Bittorrent (which can be configured to use a single port.)

      Maybe I'm just (once again) demonstrating my ignorance of such things, but this sounds like it will introduce more problems than it fixes.

      It's not introducing a problem! This problem exists today with IPv4 whether you are using NAT or just firewalling!

      What they're saying is that IPv6 is not going to fix a problem with the logistics of firewalling that is already with us today.

      --
      "You're right," Fisheye says. "I should have set it on 'whip' or 'chop.'"
    3. Re:Defective by design? by Kadin2048 · · Score: 5, Informative

      I really don't think the problem is as big as it's being made out to be.

      The advantage to IPv6 is that you can have more fully routable addresses, to the point where there wouldn't be any NAT anymore -- you might still have dynamically assigned addresses, but they'd still be fully routable across the entire network. This makes firewalling a lot simpler, because you can have more than one DMZed device.

      Devices which are known to be relatively secure and are designed to sit out in full view of the public -- for instance, maybe a VoIP appliance that by definition has to accept incoming traffic, but rejects everything else (but which needs lots of ports and can't tolerate NAT or much 'dumb' firewalling), could be easily put into its own DMZ without compromising the rest of your LAN. Right now, with IPv4 and only one shared IP address per household, this is fairly difficult -- all firewall rules need to be port-based. With IPv6, you can also do more complex address-based routing.

      So, let's say you have a network consisting of four devices and an IPv6 firewall; you have two highly insecure Windows boxes (for whatever reason) which aren't designed to and consequently cannot safely be exposed to the world, plus a hardened BSD machine which can have certain ports exposed (say, for email and SSH), and an VoIP appliance which needs to be able to make whatever connections it wants. You configure the firewall (which all traffic passes through) to not perform any packet filtering on the VoIP appliance's address, effectively leaving it outside the perimeter. (Hopefully the manufacturer of the appliance knows what they're doing. But, to be safe, you could set it up so that traffic from it doesn't get let in to the firewalled zone, so someone couldn't compromise it and use it to get in to the rest of your network.) The BSD machine's address gets only the necessary ports opened, with everything else to it automatically rejected. And the Windows boxes are totally firewalled, with all incoming connections rejected unless a port is specifically requested open.

      The firewall required to do this isn't any less complex than a current NAT/stateful-firewall, but it provides several advantages. Rather than having only one externally-facing address for the entire LAN, and routing traffic based on the port or TCP connection, you can just route based on the IPv6 address, and create all sorts of (in)flexible rules based on how much trust you have in the destination device, which can include creating further subnets that are isolated from each other, for security purposes.

      IPv6 isn't "insecure," in fact I think its wide adoption will greatly enhance end-user security, once people start figuring out how to work with it, and the Linksys and Netgear-type manufacturers start building inexpensive boxes to do the job.

      The main difference between v4 and v6 is that with v4, there's a clear demarcation between "LAN" and "WAN." With IPv6, this isn't quite as true; rather than thinking of security in terms of castle walls, you need to use a more fluid metaphor. Everything in your house is part of the "WAN," in terms of addressing, but parts of it may be more secure than others.

      --
      "Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
  3. Translation by Zarhan · · Score: 5, Informative

    "Today we learned, that lots of people who have thought of NAT as a security mechanism, are getting a hit with cluebat when they find out that the IPv4 NAT also implements a stateful firewall as a byproduct. Since there is no NAT with IPv6, you only have to implement stateful firewall without address translation."

    Sigh.

    This is a non-issue.

    What IS an issue are the new IPv6-specific things related to security. You cannot do a network scan anymore since even a /64 is a huge address space to scan and so on. The presentation I watched at IETF Prague was quite interesting: http://www3.ietf.org/proceedings/07mar/slides/v6op s-1/sld1.htm

    There are some implementation issues, such as anycast addresses and stuff like that you need to take into account.

    However, this "getting rid of connectivity issues due to no longer having to NAT" has NEVER been expected by anyone who knows even a bit about networking. Because we're not returning to an un-firewalled world.

    1. Re:Translation by Raphael · · Score: 5, Interesting

      However, this "getting rid of connectivity issues due to no longer having to NAT" has NEVER been expected by anyone who knows even a bit about networking. Because we're not returning to an un-firewalled world.

      There are also some features of NAT that I would like to keep even when using IPv6, the main one being the ability to hide the topology of my networks from the outside world. So in a way, I do want to have some connectivity issues.

      For example, I currently maintain a firewall and NAT box that has a pool of several public IP addresses (Internet access) on one of its interfaces, and 3 additional network cards connected to different networks. Each of these 3 networks contains a number of machines and some servers for various protocols that are mapped to some of the public IP addresses. One of these private networks is rather open (with protocols such as NIS and NFS used by most hosts) and another one is rather secure (no host trusts any other host on the same subnet). I do not want to allow an external attacker to guess on which network a given server could be. Maybe this extra level of security through obscurity is not really necessary, but I want to maximize my chances in case of an attack (e.g., zero-day exploits). Some services that I mapped to an external IP address and port may go to a server on one network, while the same IP address but a different port may go to a different network. I do not want to reveal too much information about the topology of my networks, that's why I like NAT.

      NAT causes some connectivity issues, but I consider some of them as features, not problems. Oh, and I know that some people claim that the network hiding brought by NAT is just some false security and that IPv6 with its much larger address space will also make it difficult to scan hosts on a network. But that's not the point here: hiding the topology is just one of the many layers of security that I use, and the larger address space of IPv6 will not prevent some information from being disclosed in routing table updates, etc.

      --
      -Raphaël
  4. In order to help technology progress by Timesprout · · Score: 4, Funny

    I hereby announce I am giving up my obsession with firewalls and reverting to my earlier obsession with Halle Berry.

    --
    Do not try to read the dupe, thats impossible. Instead, only try to realize the truth
    What truth?
    There is no dupe
  5. Firewall != NAT by 0racle · · Score: 4, Insightful

    You can have a firewall that does not use NAT. Both sides are publicly addressable but there is still a security device between you and the outside world.

    --
    "I use a Mac because I'm just better than you are."
  6. It has already happened by The+One+KEA · · Score: 5, Informative

    Linux has already gone down this path - the old IP connection tracking code in the Linux iptables packet filter has already been reworked into a more general layer-3 connection tracking mechanism, with separate 'drivers' for tracking the IPv4 and IPv6 protocols and separate 'plugins' that can handle specialized protocols (FTP, IRC, H.323, PPTP and so on).

    I suspect that commercial firewalls will probably follow suit.

    --
    SCREW THE ADS! http://adblock.mozdev.org/ Proud user of teh Fox of Fire - Registered Linux User #289618
  7. I like my firewall, thanks by Carrion+Creeper · · Score: 5, Insightful

    I would say I personally am not obsessed with firewalls per se, I'm obsessed with privacy and security.

    The firmware on a firewall also has a much smaller amount of code to debug in order to make sure that it will function properly all the time. I would never assume that my Windows XP machine was properly patched with enough confidence to plug it straight into a cable modem all the time.

    I am also not interested in having each computer in my home being identified and tracked individually, and I don't pirate software or download music. As such, even if the need for NAT is removed, I would still be highly interested in purchasing a device to block incoming connections and mask my IP address (maybe by swapping with other devices within my home on certain connections).

  8. 128 bits by CrtxReavr · · Score: 5, Funny

    Since we have the attention of the IPv6 crowd, everyone should add this record to your forward zones:

    aacs IN AAAA 09f9:1102:9d74:e35b:d841:56c5:6356:88c0

    -CR

    --
    "So is the BSD licence even more 'free' (than GPLv2)? Yes. Unquestionably." --Linus Torvalds (TinyURL.com/2vugzl)
  9. stateless firewalls by greenrom · · Score: 4, Informative

    You can have a firewall without using NAT. Being able to assign every device a routable address means that you can implement a stateless firewall instead of a stateful firewall. For most purposes, a simple firewall that filtered incomming TCP connection requests and UDP packets on all ports except those specifically allowed would suffice. This has the advantage that the firewall wouldn't need to track the state of TCP connections, and would eliminate problems like firewalls deciding a connection has been idle too long and closing it.

    For the home user, being able to assign a routable IP to every PC has other advantages. Do you have multiple PCs with Remote Desktop running that you want to access remotely? NAT makes this difficult since all the PCs share the same IP address and need to listen for connection requests on the same port. Assigning every machine a routable address makes this problem go away. Don't like that example? The same applies to a web server, or SIP phone, or Bittorrent, or a myriad of other applications.

  10. Re: Privacy Concerns? by FreezerJam · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Not to mention your average consumer ISP, which, like a cable company, would love to start charging "per outlet".

    Much as a NAT-less world might be easier to build and debug, I think I'm happier if my network connection is like my electric connection.

    One connection delivers: all electric energy / all bits
    I can go up to a max of: 200 amps / 5 Mbps
    I might still be billed: by energy used / by gigabytes sent
    But I don't pay extra: for more outlets / for more devices
    I cover all the costs: of the electric panel / of the router

    Handing someone else the information to break the above model is not something I want to do.

  11. Re:Its ridiculous even having to rely on firewalls by Vellmont · · Score: 4, Insightful


    Its a nonsensical situation that operating systems in general cannot be relied upon for the security of their own network interfaces - after all it is down to the operating system to accept or reject user logins. In the same way it should be the operating system that sets policy about whether to accept or reject packets from arbitrary locations.

    In general the software firewalls that come with Operating Systems are quite reliable and can be trusted.

    What can't be trusted is that all the firewalls on every machine are configured properly. It's FAR easier to administrate one firewall than it is to administrate 10 or 100 different workstations/servers.

    --
    AccountKiller
  12. Re:NAT needed? by Kadin2048 · · Score: 4, Insightful

    This isn't about NAT, it's about firewalling (blocking ports). You can have a firewall without NAT, but apparently allowing firewalls allows NAT too. Since NAT is bad design, and as you say unnecessary, we'd like to disallow it at the protocol level. However if you do that, you can't have a firewall which is a problem for some people. IMO, firewalls are bad design too. Close the ports you don't need, and use ACLs to limit access to the ports you do.

    Sort of. By definition, a stateful firewall probably has the capability of performing NAT, but there's no reason why you'd want to, if you have enough external addresses for everything on your network.

    I don't think that NAT is "disallowed at the protocol level," as much as just rendered unnecessary. You could still build an IPv6 NAT box, if you really wanted to, but it would be a bit stupid. It's like building a box that hides two Ethernet cards behind one MAC address -- sure, you could do it, but since they both already have unique identifiers, why would you want to? There's no shortage. (Okay, that may not be the best comparison in the world, but you get the idea.)

    NAT is driven by a shortage of routable IP addresses. With v6, there's no longer a shortage. However, people are still going to want the security offered by stateful firewalls (NAT, in its most trivial 1:1 implementations, doesn't offer any security -- it's all in the firewall anyway), which if configured incorrectly or overzealously, could create almost as many problems themselves as NAT does currently.

    However, I still think that IPv6 is a big improvement. Why? Because with v6, you have the option of not using the stateful firewall, on devices that are hindered by it, while still retaining the ability to use one and mimic IPv4 security behavior. With IPv4, unless you are wealthy enough to afford a static IP for everything in your house, you don't even have the option of exposing more than one device (per port) to the public Internet.

    To me, this demonstrates that there's really no downside (besides the obvious implementation cost) to IPv6. People who just want nothing to change, can basically have nothing change. Their IPv6+Firewall network will behave just like an IPv4 one, but people who want to use the capabilities of IPv6 (for example, VoIP using SIP) will be able to, by reconfiguring their firewalls to be a bit smarter about incoming traffic.

    --
    "Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
  13. IPv6 Needed? by igb · · Score: 4, Insightful
    SO it's been more than 11 years since RFC1883, and there's been no non-toy deployment. Had IPv6 just been IPv4 with longer addresses, it might have been deployed, but they decided to add a load of extra features to complicate proceedings (the worst offender being mandating IpSec, which for practical purposes no-one uses for anything other than a minority of VPN clients). Normally a technology that has no major deployment after a decade is assumed to be dead: X.400 springs to mind, in many ways.

    ``Running out of IP numbers'' is like ``running out of oil'': it'll happen, but crying wolf didn't help the cause. It's claimed IPv6 is Big In Japan but, like popular beat combos, that means ``dead elsewhere''. And I"m sit in a hotel room in Tokyo happily IPv6-free, and i've just come from a building owned by one of the largest IT companies in Japan which was entirely IPv4.

    IPv6 has been ``next year'' for the last ten years. It's still no-where. What'sdriving it now that wasn't driving it five years ago?

    ian

    1. Re:IPv6 Needed? by Znork · · Score: 4, Interesting

      "What'sdriving it now that wasn't driving it five years ago?"

      Virtualization. Where you once had one machine serving several applications, it's now become trivial to separate applications into differing vm's for security, simplicity and scalability. You'll still want to adress the unique vm's, and ipv6 is a great way to do it.

      Fast forward ten years and you'll have applications the way you have VM's today. Instead of deploying an app on a specific platform, you'll be able to deploy a VM image like you fork a process today. If you thought you needed IP's today, wait 'til your processes not only require their own PID but also their own IP address.

    2. Re:IPv6 Needed? by numbski · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Actually, the inability for the small guy to get an IPv6 allocation from ARIN is more than a bit annoying. I was willing to pick up a block of IPv6 addresses to built out my data center on, and then use IPv4 tunnelling where required. I couldn't get an allocation unless I had enough customers to use a full (IPv6) /32, which of course I don't. We're just starting out, so they basically force the little guy to use IPv4, and then do a migration later. This is LAME. They don't even charge for IPv6 allocations, so far as I can tell there's a monetary sub-motive here to squeeze as much money out of IPv4 as they can, and if you're big enough, they'll let you have IPv6 for free. If you're too small, either buy an IPv4 block, or go buy an IPv6 block from one of the big guys that got it for free. :\

      --

      Karma: Chameleon (mostly due to the fact that you come and go).

  14. Re:NAT needed? by MobyDisk · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Software firewalls are a non-sequitor in my opinion. It's really an added layer of obscurity.

    If someone installs a firewall and say "please block port 123" I can't help but ask "Why did you open port 123 in the first place, then build a wall in front of it?" The fact that these firewalls exist just shows how stupidly the operating-systems UI is that it is so complicated to determine what apps are listening on the network, and what apps aren't.

    Blocking outgoing apps is a completely different issue, and software firewall might make sense for that, if you don't trust the applications on your machine (which is a sad state of affairs anyway)

  15. Broken protocols by Skapare · · Score: 4, Insightful

    A protocol that requires a firewall to be stateful just to allow it to pass, I would call broken. And yes, I have for years called FTP a broken protocol (acknowledging that this observation is hindsight). I'm not talking about statefulness for NAT purposes, but rather, statefulness to track permissions on related communications (e.g. the DATA connection in FTP). FTP was designed in the day when no one expected blocking of arbitrary ports. But this is something we will be doing apparently forever.

    Let's fix the broken protocols and move forward. While we can use HTTP for many file transfer needs, a new protocol that conducts everything over a single TCP connection or a single SCTP session is where we need to go. Then a firewall can be simple in operation and probably more secure as a result.

    --
    now we need to go OSS in diesel cars
  16. Re:NAT needed? by Kadin2048 · · Score: 4, Informative

    When people talk about using NAT, 99% of the time they don't mean a 1:1 NAT, but a NAPT as found in home routers and configurable in many midsize routers and PC operating systems.

    Such a NAPT does offer security because it disallows all uninvited incoming connections and thus shields "services" running on systems inside of the NAPT from access from the Internet.


    Sure. But what they're really describing isn't NAT, but rather the stateful firewall that's inherent in all non-trivial implementations of NAT.

    Since you can take just the stateful firewall part, and use it with IPv6, there's no security disadvantage there. All you lose is the kludgy NAT parts, and in trade you gain the ability to do much more complex and useful routing -- creating various subnets with different security levels, etc. It's nothing that hasn't been going on with big corporate networks for years (those companies that have Class A blocks and can afford to give every workstation a 'real' IP still have firewalls and security policies), but now home users can have the same flexibility, if they want it.

    --
    "Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
  17. Security by obscurity doesn't work by Moraelin · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Sorry to rain on that parrade, but the (variants of) "IPv6 is secure because it's a 64 bit space and noone will ever guess your address" sound... surrealistic. It's security by obscurity of the worst kind. The kind that can't possibly work.

    We live in an age where far larger combinations of bits -- e.g., email addresses or name/password combinations -- are sniffed, phished, compiled into lists and sold, etc. What on Earth makes people think that a fixed IPv6 address would be more secure? No, honestly, what's so special about an 8 byte IPv6 address that makes it un-sniffable?

    The notion that your machine is only findable by raw brute-force scanning is pretty laughable. Yes, it's one of the easiest and most non-brainer methods, but it's not the only one.

    As a counter-example, look at how email viruses work. Because they _do_ work without scanning and without looking for you speciffically. They just go through more hops, each hop sending itself further to everyone in your address book.

    Guess what? The exact same can be trivially adapted to an IPv6 worm. Each pwned machine just continuously looks for incoming and outgoing connections, and tries to spread to those too.

    Or how about lists of static addresses, the same as the lists of email addresses that spammers buy and sell. Only unlike email addresses, if you're unfirewalled, you can't keep yours secret. You _have_ to tell each visited site your address every time you connect to it, so it knows where to send the response packets.

    So basically it's the setup for the easiest kind of phishing imaginable. It's like automatically giving your email address to every site you ever visited, except this time it's your IPv6 address. Someone just has to create or pwn a popular site, and just record all the IP's that connect to it. Voila, that's a nice list to sell to the hackers. No more brute force scanning needed.

    We already have major corporations whose computers are spam bots. What makes you think none will host IP recording bots? How do you know none of the ecommerce sites or forums you visit could be pwned to record all those static IPv6 addresses?

    Or it just takes one bored intern working at a major ISP to run a sniffer and get a huge list of all static IPv6 addresses that sent or received anything through their pipe. Remember, idiots exist everywhere. One guy sold the whole list of AOL addresses to spammers, for example. So are you _sure_ noone will sell the list of allocated/known IPv6 addresses?

    And since it's static addresses (after all, the whole idea is to get rid of NAT, right? No more dynamic addresses and remapping, right?), you know that each address logged will be available for a long long time thereafter.

    Basically let's stop using the whole "we're secure by obscurity" concept to rest already. If there are other security mechanisms in place, fine, I want to hear about them. But "noone will find your IPv6 address" is _not_ security. If you want to talk security, you start from the most paranoid scenarios imaginable, not from wishful thinking.

    --
    A polar bear is a cartesian bear after a coordinate transform.
    1. Re:Security by obscurity doesn't work by kebes · · Score: 4, Informative

      Everything you've said is true...

      However, I don't think the argument is "the large IPv6 address space provides robust security" but rather "it's an extra roadblock to attackers."

      Switching to the large IPv6 address space doesn't mean that we can get lazy with patching our boxes, surfing safely, blocking ports, having strong passwords, and so on. However, it does mean, at least, that one vector of attack (port scanning) is no longer possible, or at least very difficult.

      All the workarounds and attacks you describe are certainly possible, but they mean extra effort on the part of the attacker, which induces a corresponding decrease in the frequency and success rate of attacks. And it's worth noting that in addition to the workarounds that the attackers will no doubt employ, there may very well be some clever usages of IPv6 to counter them. For instance, if I'm in control of 10^20 addresses, I may run my web browser from a VM whose IP address changes on every connection. So knowing the IP of my web-browser doesn't give you the IP of my file server, etc. Similarly the 10^20 - 4 addresses that I'm not using can be a very efficient honeypot for detecting attackers.

      To re-iterate: the large address space of IPv6 should not be viewed as "killer security"... but nor should we ignore that it will provide a (arguably minor) security advantage.