California to Start Review of Voting Machines

An anonymous reader writes "California Secretary of State Debra Bowen just announced details about the previously discussed 'top-to-bottom review' of almost all voting and counting systems used in the state. The team features big names in e-voting security: David Wagner, Matt Bishop, Ed Felten, Matt Blaze, and Harri Hursti, among others. Vendors have time to submit their machines including documentation and source code until July 1st or face severe restrictions, including decertification, for the 2008 elections. Scheduled to start next week, the review will include a red-team attack and going through the source code."

Comments

Uh, no.

[raehl]

Voting machines provide no advantage

Electronic voting machines are in virtually every way superior to paper voting machines.

They prevent you from accidentally submitting an invalid ballot.

They can be updated with a correct ballot much easier than actually printing ballots.

They can more easily accommodate voting by the disabled.

They can randomly display the list of candidates, eliminating the 'first ballot position' advantage.

What does NOT have many advantages, and has several disadvantages, is electronic vote-STORING machines. We definitely don't want any of those. But as long as the voting machine kicks out a voter-readable paper ballot, we don't really even need to know the software it's running. Anything nefarious will be obvious on the ballots.

Re:Uh, no.

[Kandenshi]

"The day after the election, you best have a paper record saying you voted for my man Mr. McFakename.
It wouldd be most ... unfortunate if you were to fall down a flight of stairs repeatedly."

What I'm subtly alluding to is vote buying/intimidation being possible if you take an official record of your voting behaviours home with you.

State of California Read This and Save Millions!

[raehl]

I appreciate California's effort to verify that their electronic voting machines work. I have developed an economic process for certifying electronic voting machines.

1) Determine if the voting machine produces a voter-readable, paper ballot.
2) Determine if this ballot is the OFFICIAL voting record.
3) If 1 and 2 are true, then the machine is good. If not, it's not.

There you go. Why do people insist on making easy problems hard?

Re:Chuck the Lot

[raehl]

What we have is a case of a good idea implemented very poorly. Honestly something as simple as connecting a drivers license number and name to each ballot would vastly increase accountability and how reviewable an election would be. It's a good idea in need of a huge makeover.

It would also entirely destroy the concept of an anonymous voting system. One of the important parts of voting is knowing the winning candidate won't be able to track down anyone who didn't vote for them.

stupid...

[j0nb0y]

There is no need to see the source code for this software.

There is only one specification for a secure voting machine, and it is easy to test. There is no need to see the source code. If the machine meets the spec, it is a secure voting machine. Otherwise, it is not, and should not be certified.

Here is the specification:

1. The voter votes on the machine.
2. The machine prints out a ballot.
3. The voter checks the ballot for accuracy, then deposits it in the ballot box.
4. Ballots in the box are tallied for the official vote count.

Simple, easy, secure, reliable, and recountable. There is no need to see any source code.

A voting machine which doesn't meet this spec is not secure. It doesn't matter how many times you check the source, the machine will still not be secure. An "open source" voting machine which does not meet this spec is not secure. /.ers like to equate secure voting machines with open source. I like open source, but trying to inject it in this issue is foolish. It is irrelevant whether the voting machine uses open source software. Either it meets the spec, or it doesn't.

Re:Source code and freedom of information?

[Touvan]

Even if you could review the source code, there would still be no way for you to validate that the machines running on election day, are running code that was compiled from the source code you reviewed.

In other words, you can't look in the machine as see what it's doing.

Paper trails are useless, since you can't invoke them unless there is a good enough reason to do so (close enough election usually 1% or so - not a big deal really, just set your machines to steal more than 3%).

At the end of the day, the only difference between hand counted paper ballot voting, and electronic machine counted voting, is how hard the election is to steal. With hand counted paper, you need a lot of individuals all working together, at various levels during the tallying period to do it. With electronic machines, you just need one well positioned operative.