California to Start Review of Voting Machines

An anonymous reader writes "California Secretary of State Debra Bowen just announced details about the previously discussed 'top-to-bottom review' of almost all voting and counting systems used in the state. The team features big names in e-voting security: David Wagner, Matt Bishop, Ed Felten, Matt Blaze, and Harri Hursti, among others. Vendors have time to submit their machines including documentation and source code until July 1st or face severe restrictions, including decertification, for the 2008 elections. Scheduled to start next week, the review will include a red-team attack and going through the source code."

Comments

California should use Certified mail.

[Anonymous Coward]

Ballot materials are "delivered" without proof. Even the moment to cast a ballot should be a postal duty. So-far, they can't say if mail was delivered or not when using the non-stamped commercial mail-meter rate. Every certified mail delivery of a vote from a person should be counted once by the postal Clerk in Record of the Direct Treasury Account. A network would facilitate a real-time audit of the vote; emphasizing between the debt to cast a vote in one's favor in valuation of their debt: a citizen-subject as opposed to a Citizen, not confused with a denizen or a national.

Not to sound particularly paranoid, but...

[infestedsenses]

Vendors have time to submit their machines including documentation and source code until July 1st or face severe restrictions, including decertification, for the 2008 elections.

How will the state ensure that these machines will be identical to those used on election day? Will random voting machines be checked with similar precision during the elections, or what guarantee do we have that these machines will not have been tampered with through "enhanced" source code? I had a glimpse at the FAQ but could not find any information on this, perhaps someone has some pointers?

For this same reason, Consumer Reports and other reviewers buy products anonymously from stores instead of receiving them from vendors, due to previous cases in which the process (such as that intended with the voting machine review) has been taken advantage of.

Source code and freedom of information?

[Marcion]

Anyone know what the rules for freedom of information apply here? Could these rules be used to examine the source code for flaws?

Re:I don't think you understand how this works.

[Chandon Seldon]

using a machine AND voter-readable font

Machine counting of votes is also sketchy. The big controversies in the 2004 election weren't about direct-recording machines, they were about the automated ballot counting machines. Unless you have a policy in place to require that the paper ballots be retained after scanning (rather than being destroyed) and a way to force a manual recount if *anyone* suspects machine tampering, you really haven't gained anything.

Someone on Slashdot once suggested separating ballot sorting from ballot counting. Put the ballots in a sorting machine and then use a dumb counting machine to count the sorted stacks. That's a much better plan (as long as the counter checks the stack to verify that it's sorted).