IPv6 Flaw Could Greatly Amplify DDoS Attacks
tygerstripes writes "The Register has a story about the discovery of a flaw in part of the IPv6 specification which has experts scrambling to have the feature removed, or at least disabled by default. From the article: 'The specification, known as the Type 0 Routing Header (RH0), allows computers to tell IPv6 routers to send data by a specific route. Originally envisioned as a way to let mobile users to retain a single IP for their devices... RH0 support allows attackers to amplify denial-of-service attacks on IPv6 infrastructure by a factor of at least 80.' Paul Vixie, president of the Internet Systems Consortium, described the fault bluntly. 'It can be exploited by any greedy Estonian teenager with a $300 Linux machine.'"
was involved? If it weren't for those guys at sendmail, he'd be the number one source of Unix(tm) root exploits.
I for one welcome our greedy teenage northern European Baltic overlords!
They make awesome glaag.
the NPG electrode was replaced with carbon blac
Please, if he were really that smart, he'd use an OLPC!
Clearly the problem here lies with Estonia, not IPv6.
That roughly translates to "It's so easy, an Estonian can do it".
Someone is gonna be buying them roast duck (with the mango salsa) soon.
You can hold down the "B" button for continuous firing.
Don't route stuff stupidly. Instead of banning RH0, make sure it doesn't do redundant routes.
Inventions have long since reached their limit, and I see no hope for further development.-- Frontinus, 1st cent. AD
Leave it in, but advise people to disable it for network security.
That already works for other problems, right?
Open Source Drum Kit, LPLC deve board - mjhdesigns.com
Where can I get one of these $300 Estonian Linux machines? To heck with Dellbuntu.
As I understand it, it is not sufficient to simply ignoring the rthdr0 headers. To protect the infrastructure, the safest thing is for all implementations to immediately DROP any packets containing these headers to keep them from propagating further.
However, there are still people in the IETF who don't want to recognize the severity of their mistake. Why do we, as a community of implementors and consumers, continue to trust these guys as a protocol standards body? It is obvious that they don't understand how complexity is the enemy of security. They add features to protocols without any concrete examples of how the feature would be used, simply because they don't ever want to make a decision. Rather than saying "No, this feature is not worth the extra complexity, we are not going to include it", it is always "OK, we will allow this as an optional mode of operation".
In this case, this was done in a particularly egregious fashion, considering the security issues with source routing have been known since at least '93 or so (in IPv4).
http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2007-05/6pong.html
How is this different to source routing packets in IPv4? Surely people will just configure firewalls and hosts to drop these packets in exactly the same way as is done for IPv4 now.
Check our DNA. We are, essentially, insanely ridiculous kludges. Nothing but organically accreted fixes to a long series of problems. Why should anyone be surprised that our technology mirrors this fundamental aspect of our selves?
What's more, IPv4+NAT (as standard) doesn't give you half the features of IPv6. I've listed them before, I'll list them again here. Sure, not many use them NOW, but most of these are major areas of growth and Internet-aware devices will (sooner or later) have to use IPv6 to get the support they need.
There are probably a whole bunch of other advantages not listed here. Go to your local USAGI dealership and test drive an IPv6 today.
It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
Some history and information:
The earlier drafts of the IPv6 RFCs had limited the Type 0 routing addresses to 23 per extension header. The current limit is theoretically 128, though maximum packet size through any one link will tend to get in the way.
The number of times an IPv6 packet may ping-pong is limited by the Hop Limit field, which is an 8 but unsigned integer (i.e. 255 times).
While it is true that a very permissive router or host may process a packet with more than one Type 0 routing header, RFC 2460 strongly recommends that a router or host only process one such extension header.
One product that has been designed to locate implementation problems with IPv6 stacks (it can't do anything about design flaws!) is the Maxwell product from http://www.iwl.com/. Truth in advertising requires that I point out I helped create some of the test cases for that product (however, I am not an employee of IWL or own any equity or options on equity in the company).
In any case, Estonia writes with Latin characters and the language is more like Finnish than anything else, apparently.
Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from a rigged demo
--Andy Finkel (J. Klass?)