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Should Vendors Close All Security Holes?
johnmeister writes to tell us that InfoWorld's Roger Grimes is finding it hard to completely discount a reader's argument to only patch minimum or low security bugs when they are publicly discovered. "The reader wrote to say that his company often sits on security bugs until they are publicly announced or until at least one customer complaint is made. Before you start disagreeing with this policy, hear out the rest of his argument. 'Our company spends significantly to root out security issues,' says the reader. 'We train all our programmers in secure coding, and we follow the basic tenets of secure programming design and management. When bugs are reported, we fix them. Any significant security bug that is likely to be high risk or widely used is also immediately fixed. But if we internally find a low- or medium-risk security bug, we often sit on the bug until it is reported publicly. We still research the bug and come up with tentative solutions, but we don't patch the problem.'"
Exploit Chaining means that low risk holes can become high risk hole when combined. Patch them all. Patch them quickly.
If you mod me down, I shall become more powerful than you could possibly imagine.
Hax-fu?
We do the same thing. Every company has limited resources, and every decision is a usiness priority decision. So the decision is always between new features and old bugs.
Outside of terribly serious security holes, security holes are only security holes when they become a problem. Until then, they are merely potential problems. Solving potential problems is rarely a good idea.
We're not talking about tiny functions that don't consider zero values. We're talking about complex systems where every piece of programming has the potential to add problems not only to the system logic, but also to add more security holes.
That's right, I said it -- security patches can cause security holes.
It is our standard practice not to touch things that are working. Not every application is a military application.
I'll say it again. Not every application is a military application.
Your front door has a key-lock. That's hardly secure -- they are easily picked. But it's secure enough for most neighbourhoods.
So the question with your software is: when does this security hole matter, and how does it matter. If it's only going to matter when a malicious person attacks, then the question comes down to how many attackers you have. And if those attackers are professional, you might as well make their life easier, because they'll get in eventually in one way or another -- I'd rather know how they got in and be able to recover.
How it matters. If it reveals sensitive information, it matters. If it causes your application to occasionally crash, when an operator is near-by, then it doesn't matter.
There are omre important things to work on -- and many of these minor security holes actually disappear with feature upgrades -- as code is replaced.