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First OpenOffice Virus, Not In the Wild
NZheretic writes "According to APCmag, the first cross-platform OpenOffice.org virus — 'SB/Badbunny-A' — was emailed directly to Sophos from the virus developers. The proof-of-concept virus affects Windows, Mac OS X, and Linux systems and uses different methods on each. It has not yet been seen in the wild. Despite Sun's OpenOffice.org developer Malte Timmermann's claims to the contrary, this kind of embedded scripting attack represents a real threat to OpenOffice.org users. Back in June 2000 when Sun first announced the open sourcing of OpenOffice.org, the twelfth email to the open discussion list put forward a two-part solution for providing OpenOffice users with Safe(r) Scripting using restricted-mode execution by default and access by signed digital certificates. In October 2000 the issue of treating security as an 'add-on' feature rather than as a 'system property' was again raised. Is it time to now introduce such measures to the OpenOffice.org Core to greatly reduce any future risk from scripted infections?"
So how long should we count down to until someone embeds the backdoor from hell in not only Linux, but Solaris, then the BSD's... As an FYI... I've got a functional backdoor-worm for Free and Open ... Just makes no sense to even post it. Many don't even get what I mean when I state "there is a world of pain coming your way if you do that" ... Mark the calendars, I give it about 9 months before something ala SOBig/Blaster hits the *nix scene...
Infiltrated dot Net
Scripting is a very important part of Office productivity suites. This is not going to change. But what does have to change is the notion of "I'll just toss in a macro with my document/spreadsheet". In reality, macros can get so complex, especially with Microsoft Office's ability to set up references to COM libraries, anything but the simplest macros require careful distribution.
Documents and spreadsheets should not have macros. Ever. The Office vendors need to make it a lot easier to create macro files that are distributed differently than document files. If you have to send along macros to recalc/resort a spreadsheet or something, they should go in a different file. When you open the macro file, the Office app should state which macros that are being activated, and give you the option to use them temporarily or permanently, and by default do not allow them access to the file system unless you specify otherwise, etc. Enabling/disabling macros is not enough, there needs to be levels of trust.
Certificates are good things, especially if you are a company that uses macros a lot internally. But for an individual, getting a code signing certificate by a trusted authority is cost prohibitive and difficult. The Office macro engines simply need to do a better job of limiting the exposure to macro vulnerabilities and make it easier for Joe User to distribute macros in a "responsible" manner.