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New Anti-Forensics Tools Thwart Police

rabblerouzer writes "Antiforensic tools have slid down the technical food chain, from Unix to Windows, from something only elite users could master to something nontechnical users can operate. 'Five years ago, you could count on one hand the number of people who could do a lot of these things,' says one investigator. 'Now it's hobby level.' Take, for example, TimeStomp. Forensic investigators poring over compromised systems where Timestomp was used often find files that were created 10 years from now, accessed two years ago and never modified."

19 of 528 comments (clear)

  1. Macs... by Wizard+Drongo · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Hate to sound like a apple fanboi, but even for those with something to hide that don't know much about computers at all, and therefore lack the know-how required to use these tools, simply using Mac OS X and turning on File-Vault, sad as it sounds, is enough to confound the majority of law enforcement. Most of the contractors that the police in the UK use are windows only. I know for fact that any linux or 'specialist' computers get passed to a specialist data firm in Germany for decoding...
    Macs?
    Only in the most serious of cases are macs in the UK sent for hacking if File-Vault's on. They go to Canada and take upwards of a year to crack. If ever.
    Unless you've done something pretty fucking serious, and the police know the evidence is on the machine, just can't prove it, they usually won't go to the expense.
    Of course, only the most stupid and inept of morons would be doing illegal shit and storing it on their computer without using the most powerful encryption possible, and only storing that which absolutely must be stored. Mind you, criminals are not usually noted for their cunning and intelligence....

    It goes without saying that the above does not translate to across the pond, nor does it apply on Security operations with terrorists and the like. How MI5 & MI6 do things is completely different and tends to involve some 'specialist' people from the likes of the I-corps and in-house solutions....
    I could elaborate, but I'm not THAT dumb.....

    --
    The truth shall always be free: Boris Floricic is Tron.
  2. oh geez... the "police" by porkThreeWays · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Let me let everyone in on a dirty little secret about 99% of police computer forensics experts... they are less skilled than most 9 year olds at recovering vital information. Many of them use bootable disks that just check the hard drive for IE's cached files and history, etc, etc. Simple stuff a child could do. These people aren't doing complex low level block analysis. They are doing the level of recovery parents do at the end of the night to see what websites their children went on. Does it surprise anyone then it's extremely easy to fool them? God forbid you use encryption, an OS they aren't familiar with, or hardware they've never seen. They'll never recover anything.

    --
    If an officer ever threatens to taze you, say you have a pacemaker.
  3. Re:interesting by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Interesting

    By physically examining the disk you could better determine the age of the data -- but this is not how digital evidence is usually collected.

    In fact, this just exposes how ludicrous courts' treatment of digital "evidence" is. The information they accept as evidence can be trivially faked. Think it sounds far-fetched to be framed for a crime? That's not so difficult when someone can just flip a few bits on your hard drive, maybe via a memory-resident-only exploit, then call in an anonymous tip to the police. There will be nothing on the drive to exonerate you. You could then easily spend years in prison for nothing.

    It's like the situation we face now with electronic voting, but easier to defraud than even that. The people making these laws and procedures seem to have no idea how computers actually work.

  4. A year ago... by Lord+Kano · · Score: 3, Interesting

    My girlfriend told me that her nephew was going to college for "Computer Forensics" and my immediate response was, when he's done all he'll be able to do is catch cheating spouses. People who are engaging in real criminal activity are already using strong crypto and it's getting easier every day.

    You just can't beat the numbers. If there is a 256 bit keyspace and a secure algorithm, you are not going to be able to crack the machine. I suppose that perhaps American and European law enforcement could take a page out of Israel's book and start using "strong persuasion" to get keys from suspects, but I don't imagine that happening any time soon.

    LK

    --
    "Hi. This is my friend, Jack Shit, and you don't know him." - Lord Kano
    1. Re:A year ago... by Beryllium+Sphere(tm) · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Robert Morris Sr. gave a talk long ago about the two major rules of crypto. First, never underestimate how far someone will go to read your data (for example, hiring Alan Turing and inventing digital computers). Second, look for plaintext, which will pop up in unexpected places while you perfect the algorithm that create the ciphertext.

      If you typed a passphrase into a Windows machine, would you bet your freedom that the passphrase wouldn't show up in "strings /dev/hda", in a swap file, in an MRU list, or in the files of whatever spyware happened to infect that machine? Or that potentially incriminating file names wouldn't be tucked in the registry someplace?

      Hiding things on a general purpose computer is still hard, despite the availability of little-known but powerful techniques like the ATA commands to create an unreadable Host Protected Area, or simply to misreport available disk space (I'm waiting for the hack that takes advantage of the fact that a disk drive has tens of megs reserved for its own use, several megs of RAM, and a 32-bit processor: a 1990s desktop worth of machinery that nobody thinks of as a computer).

      Fearless prediction: technology will lose on both offense and defense. Successful police will flip accomplices, successful criminals will move to jurisdictions where they can form an under$tanding with the police, and anyone who tries to win a technological arms race will lose in the end.

  5. Touch by ShakaUVM · · Score: 3, Interesting

    >>Five years ago, you could count on one hand the number of people who could do a lot of these things,' says one investigator.

    Yes, yes.

    Five years ago (2002) there were five people (or less) that knew touch.

    Lol. The guy is a moron.

    I remember walking through a parking lot in college in 1996 and listening to a couple guys talk about how they would touch their files to make late homeworks appear as if they were done on time.

    About a year after that, UCSD switched to a turnin-based system. =)

  6. Re:So... by X0563511 · · Score: 4, Interesting

    It is. Hell, if people get sick of it all and the shit hits the wall, I'll be right up there with the 'enemy' pushing for real freedom.

    Yes, I don't care If I get flagged for that. I care for my liberty.

    --
    For large sets, this will be our guide even unto death, for the LORD will work for each type of data it is applied to...
  7. Re:Key quote by arodland · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Got a little something to hide? The point wasn't to provide deniability for your kiddie porn. The idea is more like, you rooted my machine, stole my data or did something evil with it, and now you want to cover your tracks. So you toast the logs as well as you can, you jumble up mtimes and permissions on files so that someone going back and doing forensics has a harder time establishing a pattern. The first step towards finding out who did something is figuring out when it was done, to find out who had access at that time, where to look in (non-compromised) logs, etc. So if you obscure that information you make it a little harder to trace things back to you. It's about hiding an identity, not data.

  8. Re:Pfft. by andy_t_roo · · Score: 5, Interesting

    actually, that's a bit extreme, all you need to do is to heat it above the curie temperature (300-380 for Fe-Nd alloys) at this point the magnetic properties become completely dependent on the applied magnetic field, so as it cools down again, the only magnetization left is due to the earths magnetic field. Below this temperature you need to apply a strong magnetic field to reverse *most* of the magnetization (thats how normal recording works). As an added bonus if you do this in such a way as there are not dust contaminants (inductive heating of the platters in a vacuum) you still have a working drive.

  9. Re:interesting by dwandy · · Score: 4, Interesting

    The people making these laws and procedures seem to have no idea how computers actually work.
    It continues to amaze me how the same people that accept that their computer crashes for no reason also accept anything printed by a computer is pure truth.
    --
    If you think imaginary property and real property are the same, when does your house become public domain?
  10. Here's a real good one by Travoltus · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Imagine a filesystem that is encrypted 3 times, in "headerless" fashion. What I mean by headerless is, whereas a zip file leaves reliable signatures identifying it as a zip file, this scheme would be a naked 128 or 256 or 1024 bit encrypted file (bear with me here) with no signature. There would be no way to even identify this file unless you managed to decrypt it with the right password and the exact corresponding decryption scheme. (It could be a zip file or a rar file or an arj file but you'd have to guess.)

    That's for the first layer. Then you use the same (or different) scheme to scramble that already encrypted file again. With the same or different password.

    Then you do it a third time.

    Granted this would take a hell of a lot of computing power and a single bit of data corruption would screw you royally (which calls for more advanced recovery techniques which leads to some weaknesses...), but the effect is this.

    First, you get the hard drive and the whole filesystem is encrypted. It's utterly garbage to you. You don't know which scheme was used to encrypt it. You certainly don't know the password. But you may know it's triple layer encrypted. Or double, or quad.

    What is certain is, if you get the correct encryption scheme AND the password for that first layer, the decrypted file is STILL GARBAGE. You don't really know if you got the correct information or not, because you're still looking at a "headerless" pile of garbage data. Good luck guessing that second layer because no matter what, you still get a pile of incoherent garbage.

    If you've done this to all your files on your hard drives, DVDs and CDs, this is where you demand your Constitutional right (in the United States) to a SPEEDY trial and then plead the Fifth Amendment in court when asked for your password/encryption schemes. Why? Because if I'm right, the police and their descendants down to the 7th generation will have died of old age before they figure out the 2nd layer, much less the 3rd.

    Mind you, the cops may have slapped a keylogger on your system ahead of time. If that's the case, you're screwed.

    Lawyers and hackers, please rip my idea to pieces and tell me what you think...

    --
    --- Grow a pair, liberals... stop letting the Republicans bully you!
  11. Re:Pfft. by Daniel+Dvorkin · · Score: 5, Interesting

    When I suffered a bizarrely bad disk crash (i.e., it crashed in an odd way that was much more destructive, and made the data much harder to recover, than most crashes; I've forgotten most of the details, but I remember that) a few years ago, I took my disk to a recovery specialist that does, among other things, contract work for the FBI. I got a brief glimpse inside their clean room. They had disks that had been pounded with hammers, run over with trucks, immersed in salt water ... you name it, these guys could get data off it.

    --
    The correlation between ignorance of statistics and using "correlation is not causation" as an argument is close to 1.
  12. Re:Ah, the police... by Shads · · Score: 3, Interesting

    I think you're making a big assumption there, I've worked for the government and with the police on several occasions... thus far I wouldn't consider most of them competent beyond a first year systems administrator, they have a lot of books that explain processes to them that were written by someone far more intelligent but often have to consult with someone who knows their shit to even complete the more difficult processes. If you do something that falls far outside their realm of commonly available and used encryption, knowledge, etc... you stand a fair chance of them not being able to break it *IF* you're not someone they consider a big fish. If you're someone they consider a big fish, they'll keep calling in bigger guns until they do get someone who can do whatever needs done to get into your data. Keep a nice sized tub of thermite on top of your pc that runs the full length with a magnesium strip in it and connect it to something that can ignite it... if you see them coming and can ignite it before they get to you, there won't be a pc and potentially a standing room by the time it finishes burning out... shy that, if they got undamaged physical hardware... they can get the data eventually if you're important enough.

    --
    Shadus
  13. Re:Epically bad. by rjh · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Why do you think hidden-volume mode TrueCrypt is bogus?
    Let's imagine that you've got a TrueCrypt container on your hard drive. The FBI gets a tip that you're involved in child porn. You get arrested. The DA has a jailhouse snitch who'll testify that you have kiddie porn. The DA has a forensicist who will testify that you've got an encrypted container on your disk drive. You don't want to be doing 10-to-25 in federal pound-me-in-the-ass prison, because you're a scrawny pimply-faced geek and you don't want to get married off to the biker with the most cigarettes. You tell the DA "... look, okay, here's the passphrase to my TrueCrypt container. See? There's just porn in there I was hiding from my wife! But everyone involved is over 18! Let me go! It's bogus!"

    The DA just smiles at you and says... "I'd like to see the hidden container inside that TrueCrypt volume. My forensicist says oftentimes people do that with TrueCrypt."

    You say "umm... there isn't a hidden container... there's nothing more there..."

    The DA continues to smile. "Prove it to me."

    You say "umm... I can't... that's exactly what TrueCrypt means when they say it's hidden... you can't prove it exists and you can't prove it doesn't exist..."

    The DA rises from the table. "Say hi to your husband for me when you meet him."

    Moral of the story: it is very, very important that you be able to prove the existence or nonexistence of your data.

    Can you explain more of this please?
    I don't know how to make it any simpler. If compositing encryption functions makes things harder to break, we'd expect two applications of ROT13 to be stronger than one application of ROT13. It doesn't work that way. And in an exactly similar way, two levels of AES may or may not be any better than a single layer of AES. Or one layer of Blowfish and one layer of 3DES. Or...

    If you want to get more sophisticated than this, you need to take a collegiate math course focusing on group theory.
  14. Re:interesting by tbo · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Disclaimer: I am a physicist.

    As far as I know, there has not been one scrap of evidence showing that past disk writes can be examined through microscopy, or any other kind of direct physical examination.

    The most powerful technique I know of would be Magnetic Force Microscopy (MFM), which is essentially a variant of AFM (Atomic Force Microscopy) that uses a magnetized tip. When I was an undergraduate, I used AFM to image surface features as small as 50 nm, which a quick calculation shows to be comparable to the square root of the physical area used to store a bit on a modern hard drive. Presumably, somebody with more experience or better equipment could do better; it's not a difficult technique if you just want to learn the basics. To actually scan a hard drive in a reasonable amount of time would require a very specialized MFM machine, but I see no reason why such things wouldn't be available to various three-letter agencies.

    Now, I don't know whether there is any residual information to get from an overwritten bit, but it would surprise me if there wasn't, and if there is, it can probably be gotten with MFM, if not an easier technique.

  15. Re:Pfft. by Gordonjcp · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Yeah, but at what point does recovering the data become prohibitively expensive?

    At the point where the disk has been entirely overwritten *once* with data. In theory, someone with very specialised equipment could pick out the residual flux transitions from the new ones. However, modern (or rather, disks larger than tens of gigabytes) use a different modulation scheme similar to QAM, and once that is overwritten the old data is irretrievably gone.

  16. Re:Pfft. by networkBoy · · Score: 4, Interesting

    That drive you opened was old then eh?
    Most current drives are glass platters. I found this out when I had a batch of DeathStars go bad. IBM wanted the drives back for RMA, but we had company restricted secrete data on the disks... I informed IBM of the dilemma and that I would be drilling a pair of holes in the platters. When I did I heard a crunch sound, followed by broken shards of glass coming out the holes.
    Got replacement drives in no problem.
    -nB

    --
    whois gawk date unzip strip find touch finger mount join nice man top fsck grep eject more yes exit umount sleep dump
  17. Re:Working drive at 700+F? by CurlyG · · Score: 3, Interesting

    I believe the parent poster was speaking in terms of removing the platter from the drive and heating it in some sort of induction heater. This allows precise control of temperature and only directly heats conductive materials. Building one requires only some fairly simple electronics (scroll down for action shots).

    --
    You know they call 'em fingers but I've never seen 'em fing. Oh, there they go.
  18. Re:Epically bad. by davFr · · Score: 5, Interesting

    I don't know how to make it any simpler. If compositing encryption functions makes things harder to break, we'd expect two applications of ROT13 to be stronger than one application of ROT13.
    It is a cryptanalysis problem. Encryption scheme are designed so that your clear text will become close-to-random garbage when encrypted. Why? Because if it is not random, forensics can do statistical analysis on the crypted data 1/ to identify the encryption algorithm, 2/ to try to guess the encryption key (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptanalysis/ for more details).

    If you crypt your text twice (or more) you modify the entropy of the encryption scheme, and the encrypted data will be not optimally close to random data. As a conclusion, encrypting twice made your data less robust to forensics.
    --
    RIP Slashdot. I used to love you. dead account - but slashdot wont let me delete it.