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Deep Packet Inspection and Net Neutrality
EncryptKeeper writes "Ars Technica has an in-depth feature on deep packet inspection, and it's a disturbing read. ISPs are starting to turn to DPI to monitor their networks, and, more troubling, to look at how they can use it to shape, block, monitor, and prioritize traffic. 'The "deep" in deep packet inspection refers to the fact that these boxes don't simply look at the header information as packets pass through them. Rather, they move beyond the IP and TCP header information to look at the payload of the packet. The goal is to identify the applications being used on the network, but some of these devices can go much further; those from a company like Narus, for instance, can look inside all traffic from a specific IP address, pick out the HTTP traffic, then drill even further down to capture only traffic headed to and from Gmail, and can even reassemble emails as they are typed out by the user.'"
Hmm, I need some help with this one, since my networking kungfu sucks... When I login to Gmail, I am in a https mode, and this persists through my whole session. I was under the impression, perhaps naively, that this meant my session to Gmail was encrypted and that only I and the Gmail server could decipher the contents of my mail, that is until I click send, and it goes from the Gmail server to wherever I send to. So if this is true, how would someone be able to reassemble my email as I type?
If you use Firefox and Gmail's web UI, use this extension to make sure your Gmail session is encrypted:
... and check the box labeled "Secure (switch to https)" in the Gmail section.
CustomizeGoogle: Improve Your Google Experience -- Firefox Extension
If you are using POP3 access to Gmail, you are already using SSL.
If I understand packet sniffing correctly (I'm no programmer), that just shows the source and destination but the contents are encrypted. Please let me know if I'm incorrect.
i am a soviet space shuttle
It really is time to start encrypting everything from everywhere/to everywhere.
The NSA wiretapping with the collusion of the US telecom industry is just the start.
This technology is going to be seen as a data mining opportunity. Want to bet that some of the big data aggregators are going to start installing this technology - or paying ISPs or backbone providers for the privelege.
It's a snowballing system. The new tech companies want to come up with new technology. The government wants to make use of new technology. The new tech companies want to come up with new technology to appease the government regulations which make use of the new (-1) technology. The government wants to make use of the new technology. The new tech companies want to come up with new technology to appease the government regulations which make use of the new (-1) and new (-2) technology. Repeat.
I, as a private system admin, would simplify the entire problem and choose not to engage in packet inspection unless there were absolutely blatant abuses--like setting a threshold. There are ethical reasons why I wouldn't feel that it's proper to go delving through each and every packet. Once government becomes involved, though, then there's no way to turn it off. In order to receive the money for an ISP start-up, for example, one must demonstrate that they can play within the ever shrinking boundaries defined by the laws.
The article (and summary) mentions reassembling e-mails as their being typed. Is this accurate? I have, for some time, wondered if some text entry forms in web pages are "active" in that they exchange keystrokes with the remote end at real-time intervals. Again, from an ethical point of view, I would never make use of anything but passive entry boxes where none of the user's text is transferred across the network until they actually deliberately send it. What possible reason, as an admin, could I have in wanting to watch a user as they type text into an entry form?
I guess the argument can be made for automatically modifying forms. Pfizer uses this for their online resume submission. For example, the available options in the various locations (country, state, county, city, zip, etc.) are pared down as soon as one makes a selection in the heirarchical predecessor. While I appreciate the "wow! neat!" factor I just don't see how it's really necessary and, although I don't see that Pfizer would be using it for some uber-nefarious conspiracy scheme, I can liken it to the desensitization similar to "Click OK if you wish to allow this action" and EULAs.
the NPG electrode was replaced with carbon blac
I've become more and more convinced that information sent over the internet should afford the same protections that federal mail does. Net neutrality is a step in that direction. But, it's just a step.
ISP's currently have no limits that keep them from violating the privacy of their subscribers. Well, nothing short of market forces. Which in this case is laughable. Since packets can travel through a number of networks before ending up at their destinations, there is no guarantee it won't travel through an ISP the consumer doesn't support financially.
Star Pirates
If an isp wants to do this, I think they should simply loose any common-carrier status. that is, deep inspection means that they become responsible for content: accomplices in any crime committed via that traffic.
ISPs don't have common carrier status. They're "information services." They've historically fought getting common carrier status, because they believe it would subject them to a different set of rules; the ones pertaining to telecommunications common carriers (as distinct from seaway common carriers, railway common carriers, etc).
This is a questionable belief, since there isn't necessarily any equality between "common carrier" and "telecom provider," but it's the reasoning, anyway.
Basically, AT&T (the phone company) is a common carrier. AT&T (the ISP) is not.
Reality has a conservative bias: it conserves mass, energy, momentum...
I wonder about this somewhat.
I work for a telephone coop in their internet dept. We've been drilled about the evils of Vonage/Skype, etc cutting in to our MUCH more lucrative-than-internet-or-tv-depts for a while now.
But, as all of our customers have access to our's and other's(namely cable) broadband. I don't know that filtering out VoIP would be a good move. We've had a few customers whine that their VOiP isnt reliable(duh) on our service. (mine seems to work just fine) So the first thing they do is go to the cable company for service(not that this makes any difference in their reliability)
So with the cable and other non-dialtone companies, filtering VoIP causes phoe co's to loose not only an internet customer but a landline costomer as well. As we require a landline for our broadband, we stil get the best of both worlds while still providing VoIP access.
Deep packet inspection technology was developed by the likes of Cisco for the sole purpose of obtaining access to the Chinese market. The Communist Party wanted the power of the internet, but they also wanted the power to control it. With deep packet inspection and a suite of other related solutions, I think it's reasonable to say they got their wish. There are millions of Chinese internet users and the country is father from a revolution now that it was in 1989.
It's not just China. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran are also taking advantage of this new technology, every byte of it developed by corporations right here in the "free" west.
And now? The technology is simply being marketed here to. Exported back into the west if you will. ISP, companies, governments are all being given the power to put the internet genie back in the bottle. Time was that corporations were developing technology to help make democracy stronger. Now they're simply giving democracy the rope it needs to throughly hang itself.
I'd like to be optimistic about our society, but frankly it's too tiring in this day and age of fear and surveillance. The worst part is the overwhelming acceptance, nay approval, of our loss of freedoms. The Net Neutrality debate is not an isolated argument. It's a symptom of the underlying shift in Western society, back into a dark age.
May the Maths Be with you!
Yeah, I thought that too, until I realized that meant all commercial activity (ebay, bill pay, amazon) gets shunted to scavenger class. Somehow, I don't think "the money" is going to go along with this....
He put his boots up on the table and made a face. "The sig," he smirked. "You can waste your life in search of the sig."
Best way to do it is just to create a bookmark to https://mail.google.com/mail/ and then ALWAYS use that link to get your mail (don't click on any of Google's Gmail links from your homepage, etc.).
If you use POP access, you can enable SSL both for incoming and outgoing mail, I believe.
"Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
I worked on developing one of these boxes. Not Naurus, but a competitor (who's name starts with "P"). You are absolutely spot on. But you, and many here, are really not understanding the scale or the scope intended, or what is possible. This stuff is kept well out of the mainstream press, for good reason.
First, it's not just ISP's and the NSA, but also Universities. U.C. Berkeley is the biggest fanboi of this stuff. Any new tech, they want. And their IT department has been all over this. Nor are they aren't the only University.
And yes, the RIAA is promoting this stuff too. Very eagerly. And every other control freak out there.
The next obvious step is to network these boxes across the global, to keep track of traffic in realtime. Yes, that's a jump up. But it's doable. And it will happen. That is, people will be able to keep track of what you're doing on the internet in real time.
Also, what people aren't thinking about is the abilitiy to preserve this information. Vast storage is cheap, and getting cheaper. People are targeting saving two-years of realtime data. That's pushing things, but this is what people want. And they want to be able to preserve it longer. There's a huge amount of potential datamining there. Especially when they are able to preserve Internet traffic for longer and longer periods.
In short, the goal is to not only be able to track your every Internet connection, and what you did, but to preserve it for years. Some folks want cradle-to-grave. While they won't get it for a while, that's the direction this stuff is headed.
The bottom line is that encryption is one key defense. Necessary but not sufficient. Just be grateful that the PGP battle was won back in the 90's. If the battle for publically available strong cryptography had been lost then, you wouldn't be having this option. Connections are the other item. The support for obscuring this is lagging, and some cases broken. But it's still critical.
Finally, everyone should be aware that all of these boxes are hackable. If you know why Ethereal/Wireshark was kicked out of OpenBSD, you understand what's going on. The development environments common in this industry are also prevalent here. Harried developers don't care about buffer overflows. That's a total afterthought with minimal risk in the commercial space.
Or, to put it simply, you should in theory be able to not only detect when your traffic is being sniffed, but also be able hijack the sniffing as well.
So in summary, yes, encryption is useful. But it's not sufficient. And there's a heck of a lot more going on in this field than people are aware of, or even thinking about.