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Cambridge Researcher Breaks OpenBSD Systrace
An anonymous reader writes "University of Cambridge researcher Robert Watson has published a paper at the First USENIX Workshop On Offensive Technology in which he describes serious vulnerabilities in OpenBSD's Systrace, Sudo, Sysjail, the TIS GSWTK framework, and CerbNG. The technique is also effective against many commercially available anti-virus systems. His slides include sample exploit code that bypasses access control, virtualization, and intrusion detection in under 20 lines of C code consisting solely of memcpy() and fork(). Sysjail has now withdrawn their software, recommending against any use, and NetBSD has disabled Systrace by default in their upcoming release."
...Only two remote holes in the default install, in more than 10 years!
It's unfortunate too tho, considering that OpenBSD is heralded as one of the most secure *nix's around. Looks like it's patch time for many.
This is not the greatest
He's probably one of the *only* FreeBSD hackers.
> I know for the TrustedBSD tools it would be minimal due to their strict code checking policies
I hope that works out for them because "Secure by default" and "Unbreakable" are amusing rhetoric.
There are places where the networks are not touching,and there are places where they are-Boeing's Lori Gunter