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LA Airport Uses Random Numbers To Catch Terrorists
An anonymous reader writes "Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) is using randomization software to determine the location and timing of security checkpoints and patrols. The theory is that random security will make it impossible for terrorists to predict the actions of security forces. The ARMOR software, written by computer scientists at the University of Southern California, was initially developed to solve a problem in game theory. Doctoral student Praveen Paruchuri wrote algorithms on how an agent should react to an opponent who has perfect information about the agent's choices."
Wrong! It is random, actually. It's right there in the summary of the
If you keep throwing chairs, one day you'll break windows....
Remember, there are many ways to be random: check area X Y% of the time; perform check W Z% of the time, etc. What should Y and Z be? How do you balance the occurrence of Type I and Type II errors? Some strategies are better than others: there's a reason why game theory was invented.
Try reading the study; the results are not trivial.
It's comparing apples and oranges, as far as I can tell. It describes private security companies and "posses" pursuing known perpetrators in the 19th century. This is essentially police work, and is a quite different issue from preventing unknown threats from boarding in the first place. It claims that going after criminals is better than screening large numbers of non-criminals. Well duh, the problem is to find out who the criminals are, in a way that safely prevents them from carrying out whatever acts they're trying to carry out.
The article also says the private companies also sent guards on trains to foil robberies and such. Well, that's what federal air marshals are for. We've already got those. The article appears to be arguing that we just need the air marshals, and don't need any airport screening. Well, that's debatable, but as far as I am concerned, it doesn't have much to do with private vs. government security.
I think the situation with train robbers vs., say, suicide bombers is quite different. The article gives an example of train robbers who threatened to blow up the train if they weren't allowed to escape. Well, that's quite different from a guy who intends to die with everyone else: he's got no reason to negotiate. If you let him on with a bomb, you've already lost, unless you're really, really counting on those air marshals or helpful passengers (a la Richard Reid). It's a harder security problem.
Finally, the article says that the railroads booted troublemakers off the premises instead of letting them board the trains. It also says that federal law prohibits airlines from doing the same. I don't understand this; I've certainly read news stories about suspicious passengers being removed from planes, and of course TSA can prevent them from boarding in the first place.
Now, I am not trying to argue in favor of draconian airport screening, but I think the differences between security against train robbers and security against airline terrorists have more to do with the completely different settings and goals, rather than private vs. government administration of the security measures.