Quantum Cryptography Slowed by "Dead Times"
coondoggie writes "Researchers at the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Joint Quantum Institute said today that technological and security issues will stall maximum transmission rates at levels comparable to that of a single broadband connection, such as a cable modem, unless researchers reduce "dead times" in the detectors that receive quantum-encrypted messages."
The problem comes when researchers attempt to observe the time their predictions are based on. As the waveform collapses from a simultaneous dead and non-dead state to reveal its true underlying characteristic, novel techniques created by S. King et al. become necessary to fill the volume of space between the two sides.
Most of these implementations (like http://www.idquantique.com/products/vectis.htm) use quantum mechanics only for key exchange and not for generating a one time pad.
The only quantum thing in quantum cryptography is key distribution, or key generation, to be more precise.
The net result is that as you send more and more signals to a spectroscopy system, the dead time increases and eventually you get no output because the electronics are constantly saturated. A well put together system will include a measurement of dead time so you know how many signals you're loosing.
Most single photon detectors are a reverse biased photodiode. When a photon strikes it, it creates an electron-hole pair, which then collide with other electrons creating more pairs, making an avalanche effect that results in a pulse, indicating a photon. After this pulse, there is some "dead time" before everything is settled down back to its original state. During this dead time, if a photon hits the detector it will not be detected. Typical dead time is about ~50 ns, limiting the device to about 20M counts/second.
AFAIK that's basically how it works - the quantum link can't transmit any actual "information" - it just allows Alice and Bob to exchange a big random number in a way that allows them to detect whether Eve is listening in. Even that requires a "conventional" information link and several rounds of back-and-forth commuinication to "agree" on the key.
I guess the other problem is that to be 100% guanranteed uncrackable the key needs to be the same length as the plaintext - "cycling" the key introduces redundancy that could be open to a "brute force" attack, and part of the motivation behind quantum cryptography is that the guys in the next lab are trying to build quantum computers that could eat that sort of calculation for breakfast...
In a survey of 100 programmers, 111111 thought that duck-typing was a good idea.
IAAUP (I am an undergraduate physicist), but if YAAP and know better, please correct me if I'm at all wrong.