US Voting Machines Standards Open To Public

Online Voting writes "The U.S. Election Assistance Commission has published new voting systems testing and certification standards for 190 days of public comment. For all the critics of electronic voting, this is your opportunity to improve the process. This will be the second version of the federal voting system standards (the first version is the VVSG 05). To learn more about these Voluntary Voting System Standards see this FAQ."

Comments

How about

[SamP2]

- Printed voting receipt
- All code open source, all architecture fully documented and publicly available
- No person-vote information recorded in database (database lists people as "voted" or "not voted", as soon as person enters a vote it changes to "voted" and won't allow another vote, while a separate database increments a counter for a particular candidate. These two databases are NOT linked together.
- No timestamps to ensure manual matchmaking between people and votes are not possible.

Ah hell. I could come up with lots of other reasonable suggestions, but its not like any of this will ever be implemented.

Re:How about

[mithras invictus]

No, the receipt should be the ballot, not the other way around. One machine is meant to help the voter produce a human and machine readable vote, the voter can check the produced ballot unassisted and decide whether or not to submit it.

big problem

[ILuvRamen]

Has anyone else noticed that more money and time and effort has been spent trying to make and use good, fair, electronic voting machines than it would have taken to just keep using paper ballots and have them counted like usual? Isn't the point to save money and time and make it more efficient? I think another point was to make elections less riggable and more accurate but Diebold killed that dumb idea behind a long time ago lol.

Re:big problem

[mOdQuArK!]

The main advantages of using voting machines is that they can be used to print out a nice, clean ballot which can be easily counted (no misaligned filling-out of ovals or odd marks, don't worry about #2 pencils or color of pens, no hanging chads, the ballot contains only the selected choices so no "they really meant this choice!" type of counting, etc).

They're also good at providing alternative interfaces for the disabled (sound or braille) while still printing out a nice, clean ballot.

The only reason for COUNTING machines is for speed though, and since there's no easy way to make sure the counting machines haven't been compromised, we shouldn't depend on them at ALL except maybe for "preliminary results". For the final official result, we should still stick to the hand counting votes (especially if we have nice, clean, easily-readable ballots).

Re:big problem

[zcat_NZ]

You missed another advantage. Since the printed ballot is in a consistent (and preferably standard) format, those votes can be optically counted by a tallying machine built by a completely different vendor. If the preliminary count and independent OCR count agree within some agreed margin (we'll allow for misreading a vote or two per million, OCR isn't perfect). Then we can have a final, trustworthy election result within minutes of the closing of the polls. Accurate, trustworthy, _and_ fast. Wouldn't that be nice!

Problems, not solutions

[michaelmalak]

You've violated the golden rule of specifying requirements:

- Printed voting receipt

The requirement is:

1. Individual vote verifiable by the voter's unassisted eye at the time of voting as to the vote selection and whether or not it has been tampered.
2. All votes verifiable by auditors' unassisted eyes after voting is complete as to the vote selections and whether or not they have been tampered.