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Protecting IM From Big Brother

holden writes "Ian Goldberg, leading security researcher, professor at the University of Waterloo, and co-creator of the Off-the-Record Messaging (OTR) protocol recently gave a talk on protecting your IM conversations. He discusses OTR and its importance in today's world of warrant-less wire tapping. OTR users benefit from being able to have truly private conversations over IM by using encryption to obtain authentication, deniability, and perfect forward secrecy, while working within their existing IM infrastructure. With the recent NSA wiretapping activities and increasing Big Brother presence, security and OTR are increasingly important. An avi of the talk is available by http as well as by bittorrent and a bunch of other formats."

6 of 185 comments (clear)

  1. Encryption by nurb432 · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Its time to implement encryption of ALL traffic from ALL applications. Perhaps even IPC encryption incase you have some sort of 'tap' installed on your computer.

    Sure, it eats resources, but do you want others reading your information? I dont. Not even when its "we are out of milk, please pick some up on the way home", as its NONE OF THEIR BUSINESS.

    --
    ---- Booth was a patriot ----
    1. Re:Encryption by QuantumG · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Blah, that's a load of shit. It's an academic answer to how to fix the problem of people logging your conversation with them.

      When the log is presented in court the person who logged it will be asked "is this log an accurate representation of the conversation you had with the accused?" and they say "yes, it is" and the defense then has to show not that it is possible that the log was doctored but that person who has just sworn, under penalty of perjury, is lying. They typically do this by showing instances in the past where the person has submitted false evidence to a court, or they can try to show that the person has something to gain by changing the log and that they had the skills (if any special skills are required, which they wouldn't be). It would be a very tough sell and a jury is more likely to believe that the log is accurate because what kind of idiot would lie in court when the punishment is so severe.

      Consider that email is so trivial to fake and yet emails are considered official correspondence in many many many court cases. It's not about the technology, it's about the people making the claims.

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      How we know is more important than what we know.
  2. Encryption is only part of the solution by compumike · · Score: 4, Insightful

    This is a good step, and I wish that more people would use encrypted messaging systems. This includes IM, e-mail, and voice.

    However, while encryption can protect against "big brother", you can never eliminate the risk from the other end of the line. What happens if the person you are talking to has a rootkit, or prints out the conversation, or otherwise compromises the data? There's no real way to protect your entire conversation.

    --
    Educational microcontroller kits for the digital generation -- great gift!

  3. Re:Encrypted RAM and HDD Storage by Cracked+Pottery · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Fine, let me get those chips out for you. Bring the back after you get the information off of them.

  4. The real problem is U.S. government corruption. by Futurepower(R) · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Quote: "With the recent NSA wiretapping activities and increasing Big Brother presence, security and OTR are increasingly important."

    The real problem is U.S. government corruption. See this example from Cooperative Research, a complete 911 Timeline of 3962 events: U.S. Government corruption TimeLines.

    The government should serve the people, not spy on them.

  5. Why does it use a separate keyring? by Grendel+Drago · · Score: 3, Insightful

    I have four sets of keys on my machine--keys for SSH, for PGP, for WASTE and for OTR. Why does every app using encryption insist on using its own wrappers for public keys? What's wrong with the infrastructure already present in the OpenPGP standards?

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    Laws do not persuade just because they threaten. --Seneca