A Little .Mac Security Flaw
deleuth writes "The de facto online connectivity software sold along with many Apple computers, .Mac, has a Web interface through which users can check their 'iDisk' while away from their own computer. However, there is no Log-Out button in this Web interface, so most users just close the browser and walk away... not realizing that their iDisk has been cached by the browser and that anyone who wants to can open up the browser, go back to the link in History, and get into their iDisk completely logged in. From here, files can be downloaded and/or deleted. This seems like a minor security flaw via bad interface design, and podcaster Klaatu (of thebadapples.info) posted this on the discussion.apple.com site, only to have his post removed by Apple. Furthermore, feedback at apple.com/feedback has gone unanswered. The problem remains: there is no way for the average computer user to log-out of their iDisk on public computers. A quick review of any public terminal's browser history could bring up all kinds of interesting things."
I've never noticed that before. Probably because desktop WebDav on OS X is so slow that I just use dedicated client apps. The poster isn't being perfectly clear on the whole process for accessing your iDisk via dot mac. Here's how it goes. You sign into dot mac, then you sign into your iDisk. Same username, same password for both. You get a web page that access your WebDav folder on Apple's servers. Signing out of dot mac doesn't sign you out of the iDisk. A simple history check pulls it right back up with full write access to your iDisk (clearly not from web cache). No one would expect that behavior. I would assume there is a network idle time out, as dotmac has.
In real experience terms, this isn't going to be much of an issue until it's fixed, but does put a small stain on the portability of the service. Which is one of Apples main advertising points for it. Gotta remember though, Apple, like all other companies is filled with a lot of people. There are moderators on Apple forums, for all we know one of them removed it then notified management of the problem and it's working it's way up the command. It's not like Steve Jobs read it and said, "OMGWTFBBQ!?!?! PULL THAT NOW!".
Though, the extra publicity will help.
Burn Hollywood Burn
No SSH session for transmission of personal data, and reliable logout for protection? Insane security practice from a now UNIX-certified OS vendor, especially when it comes to something so private as the transfer of one's hard disk contents to an internet backup? Ah well, it was bound to happen, and it has probably happened in the past, and will likely happen again in the future. Anyone can slip up.
Still waiting on Serviscope_minor to wake up to fucking reality and realize that Jessica Price isn't going to fuck him.