Multifunction Printers — The Forgotten Security Risk?
eweekhickins writes to share an article in eWeek highlighting the forgotten risks that a multifunction printer could possibly offer. Brendan O'Connor first called attention to the vulnerabilities of these new devices at a Black Hat talk in '06 and warns that these are no longer "dumb" machine sitting in the corner and should be treated with their own respective security strategy. "During his Black Hat presentation in 2006, O'Connor picked apart the security model of a Xerox WorkCentre MFP, showing how the device operated more like a low-end server or workstation than a copier or printer--complete with an AMD processor, 256MB of SDRAM and an 80GB hard drive and running Linux, Apache and PostGreSQL. He showed how the authentication on the device's Web interface can be easily bypassed to launch commands to completely hijack a new Xerox WorkCentre machine."
Wasn't one of the first Mac viruses spread by a mac printer?
They ARE out to get you simply because They are in it for themselves and they don't care about you.
Are we going to have a bot net of machines that print our spam for us?
Remove the toner from the printer and you only get white hats.
Engineering is the art of compromise.
This is actually a very good point, a network is only as strong as its weakest link (or firewall). While each machine on a network may be secure, hijacking a printer can do the same amount of damage as hacking any other machine on the network (save actual servers w/ data on them). Imagine hijacking a printer on a network and then having it send out spam (hey, its on superreliabledomain.com, no reason to hastily toss it in the spam bucket), or arp poisoning to listen in on other traffic on the network it should have no business with. Any device connected to a network should meet a certain standard of security, it only takes one weak link to really mess things up.
If you are about to mod me down, keep in mind that this post was most likely sarcastic.
As noted, this has been covered before. If you are not doing your best to segment your network for security reasons, then you probably deserve to learn about this one the hard way. EVERYTHING now has the smarts/hardware to launch/spread/spawn a virus attack on your network. Every day I get one or two messages about this and mobile computing being the 'number one' threat to our networks.
FerCrissakes, every USB stick has that ability if you have not done your work/research etc.
But still, by far, the most dangerous thing on your network is the end user(s)...
That's life, it's the way the cookie crumbles, and it's how you're going to lose brownie points with the PHB at work.
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Lexmark, Xerox, the list goes on. How about a Linksys WRT54G? How many devices out there can be easily rooted and owned? The list is endless. Who would suspect a logon attempt or a slow port scan from a printer, or a volume-page scanner?
Maybe your VoIP system's very happy you linked it to your Active Directory with an administrative logon. Seen any weird LDAP requests recently? Had to reboot your RIP engine recently? Surprise!
Diligence is its own reward.
---- Teach Peace. It's Cheaper Than War.
I'm calling you on this because I think it's very improbable without a laptop in the physical location. Sure it broadcasts like crazy in a LAN, but there's a HUGE leap from getting on the printer to turning it into your bot from a remote destination. Did the print server have a public IP?
Some details please.
http://www.maxineudall.com/2010/02/should-economists-be-sued-for-malpractice.html
Let's work with the concept that a multifunction machine get pwned for a moment. Instead of all the ideas of using it to root around on your servers, or join a botnet, what if the vulnerability did something as innocuous as FTP/SMTP (or even fax) images of scanned/printed documents to a server on the outside world?
Get a machine in a place that does financial or medical records and now you have a steady stream of confidential information going somewhere in the form of soc. security numbers, bank account numbers, etc. all in scanned form.
Since the machine probably already does this on a regular basis under normal use, it's possible that such an exploit could continue for a while before it would ever be discovered.
We have a $45,000 high quality high volume scan/printer that is a paperweight.
They purchased it for scanning confidential documents. The hitch is that there is only 1 way to get documents off of this printer: A public non-protected network share... This is basically against the law for a bank.
I suggested that I could set up a private network and they could securely upload docs to the proper place with the right security, however that plan was nixed for being "non-standard"
The result is that now they consult me when buying a pencil sharpener because they don't know how it will affect network security.