Prototype Software Sniffs Out, Disrupts Botnets
coondoggie writes "Earlier this week researchers unveiled
a system to identify and eradicate botnets in the wild. While currently only a prototype, Georgia Tech's BotSniffer would use network-based anomaly detection to identify botnet command and control channels in a LAN. The system wouldn't require any prior knowledge of signatures or server addresses. 'The researchers said their prototype, which was presented at the Internet Society's Network and Distributed System Security Symposium this week, is based on the fact that botnets engage in coordinated communication, propagation, and attack and fraudulent activities.'"
I can see RIAA and friends going green with envy if it worked.
We don't need AI and network scanners and blah blah blah. It's crazy easy to detect just by the traffic patterns and amount of data sent if a computer is infected. So ISPs detect everyone that sent data to known botnet targets or controllers and disconnect that customer until they disinfect themselves. Then everyone will be convinced to practice better overall security and they won't crack down on p2p as much because botnet traffic will no longer bog down entire ISP networks and I'll have lots of business as a computer repairer :-P it's the perfect idea really.
Google's Super Secret Search Algorithm: SELECT @search_results FROM internet WHERE @search_results = 'good'
Won't happen ... From the summary:
The RIAA / MPAA / Congresscritters / Lobbyists / Subprime Lenders ? BushCheneyHalliburtonCo all claim prior art ...
This will work for plain text IRC connections but what if the bot is on an encrypted IRC connection?
While this is a step in the right direction it will be out maneuvered quickly.
It just occurred to me that there is going to be a point in this arms race where I am going to be interested enough to want to participate. Now how do I go about bringing myself up to speed on the subject I wonder.
Just run a web server where you allow things like .. .
index.php?main=xxx
and then watch the attempts that come in for xxx, they will
all be scripts that trigger the botnets. grab the scripts
and you have the irc server, the channel, etc.
A recent one that I saw was one katana.webchat.org in channel
#msdos -- no idea if it is still running (ironic since webchat
is supposed to have a security team). I reported it, but never
heard anything back).
Here are a bunch of other ones, access to botnets, free of
charge.
http://www.forestfamily.org/garc/.php/meifase.txt
http://bialoka123.fileave.com/script9.txt
http://raptortx.googlepages.com/inc3.txt
http://snock.host.sk/spread.txt
http://bialoka123.fileave.com/script9.txt
http://members.lycos.co.uk/enviescraps/pbot.txt
http://gikowns.googlepages.com/BOTNET-GIKO.txt
http://www.ligseg.com.br/Etc/24.gif
http://76.162.170.34/Photos/pbot
http://www.hotjazz.xpg.com.br/ty.txt
Use at your own risk, and maybe, these folks will get off their rear ends and shut these things down.
I know complaining over nothing.
At the traffic level, BitTorrent looks a lot like a bot net. It has a central controllers (the tracker) and makes random connections to other peers, which then trade large amounts of data.
So would this kill BitTorrent? I've heard network security people explain how peer-to-peer technologies are a dead end because they're impossible to run on a secure network since they do look like botnets. How does this deal with that?
1. Deny IRC traffic at your firewalls. If there is a business need for IRC then setup a IRC proxy, or inline authentication. This simple step will stop many of the bots out there from phoning home.
2. Enable reverse path detection on your network devices. This forces your internal routers to check whether the source ip address that the bot is sending, is available out the interface that your comprimised host exists on.
3. Enable DHCP snooping on your edge switches. By configuring this feature the switchport that your host plugs into passively observes what IP address was given to your computer. If traffic is spoofed (a common occurrence for botnets) the switchport effectively shuts your host down.
4. Monitor your network. There many free and commercial products that will make it clear that your traffic profiles have changed. Some good free tools for this are Cacti - http://www.cacti.net/, Nagios - http://www.nagios.org/ and NTOP - http://www.ntop.org/
5. Utilize update antivirus technology, hopefully one that reports to a central console. These are simple steps, that frankly most people do not use in their networks. If they would the botnet issue would be greatly minimized.
Colin McNamara - CCIE #18233 "The difficult we do immediately, the impossible just takes a little longer"
By the time Skynet became self-aware it had spread into millions of computer servers across the planet. Ordinary computers in office buildings, dorm rooms; everywhere. It was software; in cyberspace. There was no system core; it could not be shutdown. The attack began at 6:18 PM, just as he said it would. Judgment Day, the day the human race was almost destroyed by the weapons they'd built to protect themselves. I should have realized it was never our destiny to stop Judgment Day, it was merely to survive it, together. The Terminator knew; he tried to tell us, but I didn't want to hear it. Maybe the future has been written. I don't know; all I know is what the Terminator taught me; never stop fighting. And I never will. The battle has just begun.
Any Similarities?
Http://Stineomite.org (Yeah Thats Right I'm An Organization)
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You obviously don't understand what anomaly detection is. If you don't know about a subject, shut the fuck up and stop trying to comment okay?
let me get this right. bots in the net routinely connect to a C&C server and then execute identical commands...
so just like the MSAutoUpdate? I like the direction this could go!!!
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The system as described shows promise. The current crop of botnet software all exhibit a behavior pattern that can be detected.
Of course there's been other attempts at botnet detection software, but network deployment has been sparse. Deployment is key. Maybe Georgia Tech's good name will help get it deployed. It has be be proved useful to the large network operators or it will never spread beyond a few test systems.
The network operators have to want this detection software enough to deploy and maintain it. It has to help their bottom line. Then it can be developed beyond a university research prototype.
Will the bad guys update the botnet software to out maneuver the good guys? You can bet on it. But keep in mind that the the people who developed the botnet software generally are generally not the same ones who operate the largest botnets. The botnet operators will be greatly impacted until they can get updated software and then get it deployed.
This system will cause a botnot disruption that will take time to rebuild. Then, the botnet detection software will need to be updated. And the arms race will continue...
The problem is not one of identification, it is very easy to detect members of a botnet without resorting to Deep Packet Inspection everywhere. The main problem is lack of local laws and regulation, and varying degree's of takedown management.
1) Deploy network IPS 2) Deploy HIPS 3) Deploy Anti virus solution (symantec, kaspersky, trend micro) 4) Firewall Rules 5) Windows WSUS (updates) 6) Switch IDS cards (Cisco) 7) Sniff and monitor high traffic utilization 8) Internet Content filtering (ex. WebSense + the advanced protection option to filter requests to infected hosts) 9) Good Anti Spam solution (ex. Borderware MXstream) 10) Educate users ExtremeSecurity Blog Admin http://extremesecurity.blogspot.com/
Perhaps what I have to say is oversimplifying or ignorant. But I'm sure the nice people here at Slashdot will be more than willing to educate me.
The more I watch this issue, the more it seems clear to me that a losing battle is being fought. I picture an analogous world where, by default, houses are constructed with multiple doors that open to the outside world. And also by default, the doors are not locked. To make matters worse, the locks on the doors aren't visible. So even after a door has been secured, the owner can't be sure if it really is secure other than to try to open it. Isn't this the computing world we live in now?
I imagine that when the current mainstream operating systems were conceived the architects didn't imagine thousands of attackers, script kiddies and zombies knocking on their "doors". But that was a different time. It seems to me that the true solution to this issue, and many others, is a paradigm shift. It seems that we really need an OS that is built from the ground up with a stronger sense of security. Perhaps an OS that requires interaction from the user to enable communication with others.
By no means have I laid out a full plan for such a system. I don't know...I almost feel silly now that I see this in writing. But it seems to me that all we're doing now is applying band-aids to a design that didn't take our current computing environment into account.
If it ain't made of shiny plastic building bricks, I'm only partially interested.