Linux is now everywhere. From people wanting to save money to corporations using it. It may never hit 70% desktop share, but it has hit a point where a Linux Desktop will always be a viable solution for those that want it and it fits their needs.
I finally spent the time to learn tiling window managers and get comments that my desktop (awesome) looks like something from the 90s, but it works for me. There are enough awesome-wm users that there's a FreeBSD port and it's available for every popular Linux. If I search google for how to add a widget there are enough online resources to figure out the solution. And I'm a very small fraction of a fraction of Linux users.
I recently switched to pop!OS. Which is pretty well put together by Systems76. It's built on Ubuntu and has a LTS (18.04) that will be supported for a good while. (So it's "binary compatible".
Most major companies release a.deb of their software, even if it's proprietary. Nvidia releases drivers for both FreeBSD AND Linux. (Although CUDA is Linux / Windows only).
Arguing over desktop share is pointless at this point.
It's almost to the point where the *BSD desktop is the same way. Project Trident (https://project-trident.org/) is about where Linux was ~15 years ago.
Hurray for DO-178C, I want to see the high and low level requirements. That '7' vs '1' is probably sitting in a header file somewhere with a commit tied to a specific requirement put in by an engineer that is probably sweating or lawyering up.
Aerospace operates entirely on the Peter Principle these days. Everyone that could find other jobs in a hot job market have left.
Good Aerospace engineers that lead the R&D went to Automotive for the upcoming ISO26262 certification and ADAS. All that's left is a skeleton of the old American companies that are coasting on decades old engineering with more money spent on marketing. (See also IBM, Oracle).
Asking pilots on Reddit in various sub reddits, it does pitch up a bit at higher AoA, but it just means you have to adjust the yolk a bit.
The car analogy is different feels for clutches. It's not too unstable. They should have just eaten the cost to retrain pilots. That is where the most compromises were made.
How many subcontractors did this project get spread out across? I know you have small companies like Performance Software do the actual work.
One of the world’s top systems suppliers was building a next-generation computing platform for Boeing’s commercial aircraft. Its initial attempt to repurpose an existing military platform for commercial use presented a number of unforeseen challenges. Fatal bottlenecks formed since the three target hardware sets available were not enough to support the large team of 47 developers necessary for testing at the required rate. This created much more work than was originally anticipated against a razor-thin timeline. Having worked with Performance Software on previous programs, the supplier knew this was a partner who was well-versed in safety-critical software and able to consistently deliver on time.
How much did those 'shortcuts' play in to deaths? Was there a UI team? Is this a case of some small design decision not to show something?
Not sure if I should lob my senator questions like:
What is your entire development toolchain. Especially:
What compiler. (GHS?)
What OS. (Windows... XP?)
How much of it was 'autocode'? Are your simulink models documented to the FAA? Could the senate & house cobble together enough engineers/scientists to know what they were looking at?
Can a 3rd party review the SIL/MIL/HIL testing documents?
Who made you plant model of the plane? How close is it to actual flight data. In a simulator, under a failed sensor does the simulation/HIL behave like the two crashes?
People have gotten smart since DO-178B was first implemented. They're following the letter of the laws but not the spirit.
So you break 'don't kill people' into 50 different requirements. All of them technically are met. No one of them directly contributed to the death of anyone. So no one engineer directly caused this. All of the software requirements were met.
Plus you have all of the requirements interfacing with their suppliers. Did GE fudge the numbers on how parts of the engine would perform to get the contract? How much did their air sensor supplier fudge how safe it was? How much did Boeing 'magic wand' testing and requirements to meet delivery dates?
Was it only tested around seattle? Did they do some extreme climate testing in their time frame? Or did they "eh, it's close enough to the last one we don't have to recert".
The end result is a software fix to not pitch the thing into the ground, but there were a lot of other physical design shortcuts that occurred to get to this point.
I just want to know how many people are lawyering up right now. Audi's down fall was an engineer with an e-mail in a safe. In the mean term I'm really weary of parts of flying.
As someone that has worked in both functional safety and off-highway vehicles.
How the fuck did this ever make it into production. Why is a 'second sensor' an upsell?
When given the option to completely update the cockpit to the latest and greatest with digital displays.
They chose to replicate the old mechanical dials so the pilots couldn't be retrained.
The entire thing from start to finish was rushed. Mechanical design comes first. There is no 'try and develop software in parallel'. A clean software design depends on a good mechanical design.
The plane should have been a white board redesign, it should have been balanced such that a pilot could fly it stable with no avionics. This isn't a jet fighter.
But it was rushed because Europe invested in R&D and beat them to economy routes. How much money did Boeing C-suites make before 2011? During the 2009 crash there was a hiring spree by some companies because the market was flooded with cheap, good engineers that just got laid off. Companies invested in talent. Did Boeing?
People died because... Boeing sat on R&D from post WWII while making a ton of money so when Airbus released a good plane they scrambled to retrofit an old design by putting huge engines on an airframe causing it to pitch up but to appease its clients it added software to mimic the old plane behavior and tested it themselves and told the FAA they promise they did it right.
As someone that has worked in both functional safety and off-highway vehicles.
How the fuck did this ever make it into production. Why is a 'second sensor' an upsell?
When given the option to completely update the cockpit to the latest and greatest with digital displays.
They chose to replicate the old mechanical dials so the pilots couldn't be retrained.
The entire thing from start to finish was rushed. Mechanical design comes first. There is no 'try and develop software in parallel'. A clean software design depends on a good mechanical design.
The plane should have been a white board redesign, it should have been balanced such that a pilot could fly it stable with no avionics. This isn't a jet fighter.
But it was rushed because Europe invested in R&D and beat them to economy routes. How much money did Boeing C-suites make before 2011? During the 2009 crash there was a hiring spree by some companies because the market was flooded with cheap, good engineers that just got laid off. Companies invested in talent. Did Boeing?
People died because... Boeing sat on R&D from post WWII while making a ton of money so when Airbus released a good plane they scrambled to retrofit an old design by putting huge engines on an airframe causing it to pitch up but to appease its clients it added software to mimic the old plane behavior and tested it themselves and told the FAA they promise they did it right.
Same with IRC. I listened to an interview with the founder of Slack and everything he said I just nodded along with "yeah, that's how we developed software over IRC."
In 4th grade (early 90s) I got in trouble for something and had to write out something 20 times.
I convinced my teacher that typing was a useful skill. I failed to mention how copy and paste worked. So I said I typed it out 40 times to practice and got a congratulations for that.
Since then my whole career has been slight of hands with managers and code in the background.
That 4 hours invested will 'break even' after 24 times. Maybe it takes a year or two, but after that you're working on 'free' time.
Add in a few more scripts here and there and those 10 minutes add up into real productivity gains after a decade in industry.
That's not what they're talking about. They're talking about automating *something* with code.
Even the slowest BLAS libraries are faster than a human at doing matrix multiplication. Having humans do math was inefficient and slow until some coders came up with a way to do it 'automatically'. Then the world moved on.
Right now I'm Jenkins-ing everything at work. Even trivial stuff that takes time. I just put it in a batch job and let it run.
v4e (or eV4 in some documents): Enhanced version of the v4, launched in 2000. Adds optional MMU, FPU, and enhanced MAC unit to the architecture.
Just like Apple, industry moved on to the PPC. The Coldfire was still a 'last gen' embedded chip where it was a catch all between microcontroller/microprocessor. For example NXP has the MPC5744P that has an Arduino compatible $40 devboard. It is ASIL-D certified (SIL-B IEC-61508;DO-178/254 DAL-B) chips. It has a lockstep processor and ECC RAM. It's used in stuff like your brakes and powertrain.
It's in the same family of chips as the PowerPC G4 and RAD750 (which is running around on Mars and outerspace) implementing Power ISA v.2.03.
There's being conservative and there's being lazy. At this point it's just laziness. Automotive (ISO26262) and Industrial (IEC61508) are getting close to Aerospace's requirements tracking (DO-178C).
Part of that progress has been getting Functional Safety (FuSa) certified chips. The NXP MPC574xP is ASIL-D certified (SIL-B IEC-61508;DO-178/254 DAL-B) chips. It has a lockstep processor and ECC RAM.
It's more or less an embedded PowerPC G4 (Power ISA v.2.03). For the more general purpose computing, the [RAD750](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAD750) is off this world. The embedded e200 cores are likely out running around the JSF, in another custom core configuration. I *think* it's a tri-core embedded MPC56xx series.
It's also what every GM vehicle and Caterpillar engine has been running since Mid 2000s.
It's safe. The 68k decision was made by someone retiring in 4 years as a 'fuck you'. It's the only thing he knows. They literally have no one lined up to replace him. But because he's in charge until D-day, they picked a 68k. An *uncertified* chip (but had been in a previous certified system), where they draw the boundary diagram of "won't fail" gets political.
ARM is getting certified or recently got certified. Dig through NXP's "automotive" chip website and see what's available. From Drivetrain through ADAS (self driving) to Infotainment, the chipsets exist for functional safety.
The smoking gun for this incident isn't going to be what the final report says. It'll be on some notes by some engineer when this project started saying everything above. There isn't a way that this project made it this far without some intelligent engineers speaking up and getting over ruled by management.
I lasted exactly 45 days in Aerospace and it was terrifying, they picked a "COTS" architecture that hasn't been "COTS" since the Macintosh moved away from 68k. I was told to 'deal with it'. Other people quipped that "this wasn't the worst design decision he's seen". The schedule was everything because customers had already bought what we were working on.
But everything HAD to move forward according to THIS timeline because someone already bought it. In those 45 days I had to work on trial versions of everything, they couldn't figure out how to get us licensed in to their network. Everyone else on the project had always been in aerospace, so this was 'par for the course'. I came from automotive where we actually did put safety first (at least where I worked).
I want to see the MIL/SIL/HIL reports. This should have been caught in the plant model long before it came to market. There should be a high-fidelity model that shows this exact scenario and how it plays out. It was buried for some reason or another. If there isn't then they didn't test as comprehensively as they should have (because of rushing to market).
There are a lot of people, that have been coming to similar conclusions about the MAX8. It's an 'unstable pendulum' that they thought they could just 'fix it in software'. Good hardware design is crucial to a good controllable system.
Someone spoke up, either they have an e-mail in a safe (like Audi's Dieselgate) or they're no longer with Boeing (or one of their subcontractors like GE, or GE's subcontractors) because they did speak up and were told they were 'toxic to the project'.
This is the boring un-sexy parts of engineering. But 'Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)s' are important. We literally sit down and go "What happens if this fails" and then write out a full plan in software. Plus a full test plan.
I don't have a doubt this was caught by someone somewhere. Management got involved and now this is going to be another Challenger O-Ring example for freshmen engineers.
Is ignoring a plugged sensor a bad idea? Absolutely. Should the failure mode be plowing into the ground an full tilt after fighting the pilots? No.
Boeing intentionally [re]worded parts of how the system behaves so that the "FAA" (themselves) wouldn't have to recertify.
Aerospace has a huge recycling problem where once something is certified they'll just reuse it as "COTS" (commercial off the shelf) so that they don't have to recert.
It also leads to incredibly stupid decisions that are more political than engineering.
I just ditched a gig at a Tier1 vendor because they picked a Coldfire (68k) processor because it was "in production". They had no dev boards. They can't find dev boards. But the whole project was stuck with the decision because of politics that happened far away from where I was.
The smoking gun for this incident isn't going to be what the final report says. It'll be on some notes by some engineer when this project started saying everything above. There isn't a way that this project made it this far without some intelligent engineers speaking up and getting over ruled by management.
I lasted exactly 45 days in Aerospace. It was terrifying, they picked a "COTS" architecture that hasn't been "COTS" since the Macintosh moved away from 68k. I was told to 'deal with it'. Other people quipped that "this wasn't the worst design decision he's seen". The schedule was everything.
But everything HAD to move forward according to THIS timeline because someone already bought it. In those 45 days I had to work on trial versions of everything, they couldn't figure out how to get us licensed in to their network. Everyone else on the project had always been in aerospace, so this was 'par for the course'. I came from automotive where we actually did put safety first (at least where I worked).
I want to see the MIL/SIL/HIL reports. This should have been caught in the plant model long before it came to market. There should be a high-fidelity model that shows this exact scenario and how it plays out. It was buried for some reason or another. If there isn't then they didn't test as comprehensively as they should have (because of rushing to market).
There are a lot of people, like the poster above, that come to the same conclusions. It's an 'unstable pendulum' that they thought they could just 'fix it in software'. Good hardware design is crucial to a good controllable system.
Someone spoke up, either they have an e-mail in a safe (like Audi's Dieselgate) or they're no longer with Boeing (or one of their subcontractors like GE, or GE's subcontractors) because they did speak up and were told they were 'toxic to the project'.
Slashdot Mirror
Linux is now everywhere. From people wanting to save money to corporations using it. It may never hit 70% desktop share, but it has hit a point where a Linux Desktop will always be a viable solution for those that want it and it fits their needs.
I finally spent the time to learn tiling window managers and get comments that my desktop (awesome) looks like something from the 90s, but it works for me. There are enough awesome-wm users that there's a FreeBSD port and it's available for every popular Linux. If I search google for how to add a widget there are enough online resources to figure out the solution. And I'm a very small fraction of a fraction of Linux users.
I recently switched to pop!OS. Which is pretty well put together by Systems76. It's built on Ubuntu and has a LTS (18.04) that will be supported for a good while. (So it's "binary compatible".
Most major companies release a .deb of their software, even if it's proprietary. Nvidia releases drivers for both FreeBSD AND Linux. (Although CUDA is Linux / Windows only).
Arguing over desktop share is pointless at this point.
It's almost to the point where the *BSD desktop is the same way. Project Trident (https://project-trident.org/) is about where Linux was ~15 years ago.
Hurray for DO-178C, I want to see the high and low level requirements. That '7' vs '1' is probably sitting in a header file somewhere with a commit tied to a specific requirement put in by an engineer that is probably sweating or lawyering up.
You know that Simulink can link to software requirements.
https://www.mathworks.com/solu...
Requirements tracking with code gen is trivial. You can trace everything both ways.
Aerospace operates entirely on the Peter Principle these days. Everyone that could find other jobs in a hot job market have left.
Good Aerospace engineers that lead the R&D went to Automotive for the upcoming ISO26262 certification and ADAS. All that's left is a skeleton of the old American companies that are coasting on decades old engineering with more money spent on marketing. (See also IBM, Oracle).
Asking pilots on Reddit in various sub reddits, it does pitch up a bit at higher AoA, but it just means you have to adjust the yolk a bit.
The car analogy is different feels for clutches. It's not too unstable. They should have just eaten the cost to retrain pilots. That is where the most compromises were made.
How many subcontractors did this project get spread out across? I know you have small companies like Performance Software do the actual work.
One of the world’s top systems suppliers was building a next-generation computing platform for Boeing’s commercial aircraft. Its initial attempt to repurpose an existing military platform for commercial use presented a number of unforeseen challenges. Fatal bottlenecks formed since the three target hardware sets available were not enough to support the large team of 47 developers necessary for testing at the required rate. This created much more work than was originally anticipated against a razor-thin timeline. Having worked with Performance Software on previous programs, the supplier knew this was a partner who was well-versed in safety-critical software and able to consistently deliver on time.
How much did those 'shortcuts' play in to deaths? Was there a UI team? Is this a case of some small design decision not to show something?
Not sure if I should lob my senator questions like:
People have gotten smart since DO-178B was first implemented. They're following the letter of the laws but not the spirit.
So you break 'don't kill people' into 50 different requirements. All of them technically are met. No one of them directly contributed to the death of anyone. So no one engineer directly caused this. All of the software requirements were met.
Plus you have all of the requirements interfacing with their suppliers. Did GE fudge the numbers on how parts of the engine would perform to get the contract? How much did their air sensor supplier fudge how safe it was? How much did Boeing 'magic wand' testing and requirements to meet delivery dates?
Was it only tested around seattle? Did they do some extreme climate testing in their time frame? Or did they "eh, it's close enough to the last one we don't have to recert".
The end result is a software fix to not pitch the thing into the ground, but there were a lot of other physical design shortcuts that occurred to get to this point.
I just want to know how many people are lawyering up right now. Audi's down fall was an engineer with an e-mail in a safe. In the mean term I'm really weary of parts of flying.
As someone that has worked in both functional safety and off-highway vehicles.
How the fuck did this ever make it into production. Why is a 'second sensor' an upsell?
When given the option to completely update the cockpit to the latest and greatest with digital displays.
They chose to replicate the old mechanical dials so the pilots couldn't be retrained.
The entire thing from start to finish was rushed. Mechanical design comes first. There is no 'try and develop software in parallel'. A clean software design depends on a good mechanical design.
The plane should have been a white board redesign, it should have been balanced such that a pilot could fly it stable with no avionics. This isn't a jet fighter.
But it was rushed because Europe invested in R&D and beat them to economy routes. How much money did Boeing C-suites make before 2011? During the 2009 crash there was a hiring spree by some companies because the market was flooded with cheap, good engineers that just got laid off. Companies invested in talent. Did Boeing?
People died because... Boeing sat on R&D from post WWII while making a ton of money so when Airbus released a good plane they scrambled to retrofit an old design by putting huge engines on an airframe causing it to pitch up but to appease its clients it added software to mimic the old plane behavior and tested it themselves and told the FAA they promise they did it right.
More or less.
As someone that has worked in both functional safety and off-highway vehicles.
How the fuck did this ever make it into production. Why is a 'second sensor' an upsell?
When given the option to completely update the cockpit to the latest and greatest with digital displays.
They chose to replicate the old mechanical dials so the pilots couldn't be retrained.
The entire thing from start to finish was rushed. Mechanical design comes first. There is no 'try and develop software in parallel'. A clean software design depends on a good mechanical design.
The plane should have been a white board redesign, it should have been balanced such that a pilot could fly it stable with no avionics. This isn't a jet fighter.
But it was rushed because Europe invested in R&D and beat them to economy routes. How much money did Boeing C-suites make before 2011? During the 2009 crash there was a hiring spree by some companies because the market was flooded with cheap, good engineers that just got laid off. Companies invested in talent. Did Boeing?
People died because... Boeing sat on R&D from post WWII while making a ton of money so when Airbus released a good plane they scrambled to retrofit an old design by putting huge engines on an airframe causing it to pitch up but to appease its clients it added software to mimic the old plane behavior and tested it themselves and told the FAA they promise they did it right.
More or less.
I guess when a company runs out of good ideas (or their idea cash cow dies) this is the next best way to limp along.
This was a shark jumping presentation, pretty much "Well, we're out of Software and Hardware ideas so... here's services?".
Same with IRC. I listened to an interview with the founder of Slack and everything he said I just nodded along with "yeah, that's how we developed software over IRC."
I guess I'm going to record myself being VERY interested for 15 seconds and just perfectly loop it.
You want antibiotic resistant citrus greening? This is how you get antibiotic resistant citrus greening.
The rise of super bugs is an issue for everyone.
Shakes fist.
In 4th grade (early 90s) I got in trouble for something and had to write out something 20 times.
I convinced my teacher that typing was a useful skill. I failed to mention how copy and paste worked. So I said I typed it out 40 times to practice and got a congratulations for that.
Since then my whole career has been slight of hands with managers and code in the background.
That 4 hours invested will 'break even' after 24 times. Maybe it takes a year or two, but after that you're working on 'free' time.
Add in a few more scripts here and there and those 10 minutes add up into real productivity gains after a decade in industry.
That's not what they're talking about. They're talking about automating *something* with code.
Even the slowest BLAS libraries are faster than a human at doing matrix multiplication. Having humans do math was inefficient and slow until some coders came up with a way to do it 'automatically'. Then the world moved on.
Right now I'm Jenkins-ing everything at work. Even trivial stuff that takes time. I just put it in a batch job and let it run.
v4e (or eV4 in some documents): Enhanced version of the v4, launched in 2000. Adds optional MMU, FPU, and enhanced MAC unit to the architecture.
Just like Apple, industry moved on to the PPC. The Coldfire was still a 'last gen' embedded chip where it was a catch all between microcontroller/microprocessor. For example NXP has the MPC5744P that has an Arduino compatible $40 devboard. It is ASIL-D certified (SIL-B IEC-61508;DO-178/254 DAL-B) chips. It has a lockstep processor and ECC RAM. It's used in stuff like your brakes and powertrain.
It's in the same family of chips as the PowerPC G4 and RAD750 (which is running around on Mars and outerspace) implementing Power ISA v.2.03.
Why are they using cameras instead of an IMU and do dead reckoning? Or does it have some sort of Kalman filter that integrates with the cameras?
Of course, the favorable licensing terms of LLVM didn't hurt, either (I think it's MIT or BSD?).
It was originally: University of Illinois/NCSA Open Source License: http://releases.llvm.org/2.8/L...
But have been migrating to Apache 2.0 with "LLVM Exception": https://llvm.org/LICENSE.txt
There's being conservative and there's being lazy. At this point it's just laziness. Automotive (ISO26262) and Industrial (IEC61508) are getting close to Aerospace's requirements tracking (DO-178C).
Part of that progress has been getting Functional Safety (FuSa) certified chips. The NXP MPC574xP is ASIL-D certified (SIL-B IEC-61508;DO-178/254 DAL-B) chips. It has a lockstep processor and ECC RAM.
It's more or less an embedded PowerPC G4 (Power ISA v.2.03). For the more general purpose computing, the [RAD750](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAD750) is off this world. The embedded e200 cores are likely out running around the JSF, in another custom core configuration. I *think* it's a tri-core embedded MPC56xx series.
It's also what every GM vehicle and Caterpillar engine has been running since Mid 2000s.
It's safe. The 68k decision was made by someone retiring in 4 years as a 'fuck you'. It's the only thing he knows. They literally have no one lined up to replace him. But because he's in charge until D-day, they picked a 68k. An *uncertified* chip (but had been in a previous certified system), where they draw the boundary diagram of "won't fail" gets political.
ARM is getting certified or recently got certified. Dig through NXP's "automotive" chip website and see what's available. From Drivetrain through ADAS (self driving) to Infotainment, the chipsets exist for functional safety.
The smoking gun for this incident isn't going to be what the final report says. It'll be on some notes by some engineer when this project started saying everything above. There isn't a way that this project made it this far without some intelligent engineers speaking up and getting over ruled by management.
I lasted exactly 45 days in Aerospace and it was terrifying, they picked a "COTS" architecture that hasn't been "COTS" since the Macintosh moved away from 68k. I was told to 'deal with it'. Other people quipped that "this wasn't the worst design decision he's seen". The schedule was everything because customers had already bought what we were working on.
But everything HAD to move forward according to THIS timeline because someone already bought it. In those 45 days I had to work on trial versions of everything, they couldn't figure out how to get us licensed in to their network. Everyone else on the project had always been in aerospace, so this was 'par for the course'. I came from automotive where we actually did put safety first (at least where I worked).
I want to see the MIL/SIL/HIL reports. This should have been caught in the plant model long before it came to market. There should be a high-fidelity model that shows this exact scenario and how it plays out. It was buried for some reason or another. If there isn't then they didn't test as comprehensively as they should have (because of rushing to market).
There are a lot of people, that have been coming to similar conclusions about the MAX8. It's an 'unstable pendulum' that they thought they could just 'fix it in software'. Good hardware design is crucial to a good controllable system.
Someone spoke up, either they have an e-mail in a safe (like Audi's Dieselgate) or they're no longer with Boeing (or one of their subcontractors like GE, or GE's subcontractors) because they did speak up and were told they were 'toxic to the project'.
This is the boring un-sexy parts of engineering. But 'Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)s' are important. We literally sit down and go "What happens if this fails" and then write out a full plan in software. Plus a full test plan.
dSpace makes aerospace hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) test benches. They make them for automotive and off highway too. We literally 'drive' around a vehicle for thousands of hours for software releases.
I don't have a doubt this was caught by someone somewhere. Management got involved and now this is going to be another Challenger O-Ring example for freshmen engineers.
Is ignoring a plugged sensor a bad idea? Absolutely. Should the failure mode be plowing into the ground an full tilt after fighting the pilots? No.
Boeing intentionally [re]worded parts of how the system behaves so that the "FAA" (themselves) wouldn't have to recertify.
Aerospace has a huge recycling problem where once something is certified they'll just reuse it as "COTS" (commercial off the shelf) so that they don't have to recert.
It also leads to incredibly stupid decisions that are more political than engineering.
I just ditched a gig at a Tier1 vendor because they picked a Coldfire (68k) processor because it was "in production". They had no dev boards. They can't find dev boards. But the whole project was stuck with the decision because of politics that happened far away from where I was.
Look at the quotes from his speech yesterday. He was off script and sounded exactly like Trump.
Seth Meyer even read his transcript in Trump's voice: https://youtu.be/CuXlBSuQbMo?t...
The smoking gun for this incident isn't going to be what the final report says. It'll be on some notes by some engineer when this project started saying everything above. There isn't a way that this project made it this far without some intelligent engineers speaking up and getting over ruled by management.
I lasted exactly 45 days in Aerospace. It was terrifying, they picked a "COTS" architecture that hasn't been "COTS" since the Macintosh moved away from 68k. I was told to 'deal with it'. Other people quipped that "this wasn't the worst design decision he's seen". The schedule was everything.
But everything HAD to move forward according to THIS timeline because someone already bought it. In those 45 days I had to work on trial versions of everything, they couldn't figure out how to get us licensed in to their network. Everyone else on the project had always been in aerospace, so this was 'par for the course'. I came from automotive where we actually did put safety first (at least where I worked).
I want to see the MIL/SIL/HIL reports. This should have been caught in the plant model long before it came to market. There should be a high-fidelity model that shows this exact scenario and how it plays out. It was buried for some reason or another. If there isn't then they didn't test as comprehensively as they should have (because of rushing to market).
There are a lot of people, like the poster above, that come to the same conclusions. It's an 'unstable pendulum' that they thought they could just 'fix it in software'. Good hardware design is crucial to a good controllable system.
Someone spoke up, either they have an e-mail in a safe (like Audi's Dieselgate) or they're no longer with Boeing (or one of their subcontractors like GE, or GE's subcontractors) because they did speak up and were told they were 'toxic to the project'.