FBI Accidentally Received Unauthorized E-Mail Access
AmishElvis writes "The New York Times reports that 'glitch' gave the F.B.I. access to the e-mail messages from an entire computer network. A hundred or more accounts may have been accessed, rather than 'the lone e-mail address' that was approved by a secret intelligence court as part of a national security investigation. The episode was disclosed as part of a new batch of internal documents that the F.B.I. turned over to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, as part of a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit the group has brought."
Oh wait too late.
Better cover it up.
Oops, we botched that too.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
Can any kind government access be considered unauthorized anymore? There have been so many executive orders, bending of laws, etc. that just about every form of government access to information is authorized by something.
Anybody want my mod points?
So they "accidentally" gained access to more than what they where supposed to? Aren't we supposed to be able to TRUST them to stick to what they where authorized to access even if they "accidentally" gained greater access? If we can't trust the FBI, who can we trust?
If you want news from today, you have to come back tomorrow.
Seriously. What's the story here? Some sysadmin who apparently didn't know what he was doing put the wrong thing in his e-mail server configuration and inadvertently sent all e-mail for the entire domain instead of e-mail for one address.
Mistakes happen all the time. The appropriate thing to look for is whether the mistake was caught and corrected in a timely fashion. It seems that the mistake was caught and corrected in a timely fashion which basically makes this a story about an everyday occurrence.
This story might make a good one for some sysadmin journal reminding sysadmins to document policies that help ensure mistakes do not happen and if they do are caught by the company itself instead of by the FBI. For example, a simple procedure would be to check the appropriate logs after changing the configuration to make sure the configuration is doing what it was intended to do.
Whose "glitch"? What was the "apparent miscommunication, exactly? Did the FBI tell the ISP to give them the total access that the court hadn't authorized, or did the ISP make the mistake and give them total access when asked for only limited access? Maybe the FBI is citing that totally ambiguous blame, but what is the real story?
If the ISP screwed up, then it should get sued by the extra people whose mailboxes it turned over without authorization. If the FBI "screwed up", then it's just another example of why these courts cannot be secret if the government is to do its job protecting our rights - including protecting us from the government.
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make install -not war
When I read this, I wasn't wondering how that happened, or what the nature of the "glitch" was, or how many accounts were accessed. What I was wondering is WHY THE FUCK DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE A SECRET COURT OF ANY KIND?!?!. Yeah yeah, to protect the children, save the whales, stop the terrorists, keep you safe, "our intentions are pure and we're really a bunch of big-hearted individuals who care about your well-being" etc... I still don't know what is wrong with the assholes who actually believe this shit.
And hell, I want to believe we have a good, honest government. The fact is, we don't. I don't understand what being in this level of denial is supposed to do to remedy the situation. There is a very good reason why the founding fathers intended for most of our interaction with government to come from the local and state level. The only thing the federal government can do that the state & local governments cannot do is resolve disputes between states, conduct foreign policy, regulate interstate trade, oh and it can slowly become a dictatorship too. Speaking of remedies, I'm betting that nothing will happen either to the FBI as an organization or to the individuals who made this "mistake", that at most they will receive a slap-on-the-wrist.
It is a miracle that curiosity survives formal education. - Einstein
... when you let it continue to happen.
"But an intelligence official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because surveillance operations are classified, said: "It's inevitable that these things will happen. It's not weekly, but it's common."
This falls into the area of cheating in a manner that an excuse can be used to "get away with it". This sort of cheating had been labeled "Neo-cheating" and is a form of dishonesty that is easy to apply and safe from proof.. "Oh it was just an honest mistake." Technology should not be an escape goat for such obvious deceptions.
To give a simple example of a verification loop, when you sign up for a mailing list, messages boards, etc., in order to prevent spamming email accounts etc, there is a feedlack verification loop used. The point is, there are ways to prevent such spying "mistakes" from happening. And there should have already been such methods being applied as standard practice.
The "it's not weekly but its common" is nothing but evidence of intent to cheat and to continue it.
This "allowing deception" is similar electronic voting security failure vs. ATM financial security practices.
Computer technology is not an excuse, but a way for dishonest human intent to hide behind technology excuses.
Something is wrong here...I can't quite put my finger on it...
Wait a minute, that's it!
You're a spy! No self-respecting Slashdotter would willingly still have a Hotmail address! You're one of them!
I don't like Linux. This doesn't make me a troll.
whose e-mail network was it that was revealed? Was it the NYT's network, or simply another one that they are reporting on?
(TFAS is ambiguous, and TFA is behind a login screen.)
Thanks,
- RG>
Hey pal, this isn't a pleasantforest, so don't waste my time with pleasantries!
The writer of this article, Eric Lichtblau, won a shared Pulitzer Prize for his work in exposing the illegal warrantless wiretapping program, authorized by the government and championed by the White House after 9/11. In fact, it was in existence even before 9/11, but that's another story entirely.
This program supposedly expired just yesterday when congress let the clock run out on its dependent legislation. The problem here, clearly, is that it doesn't matter if this program is never renewed; overproduction of data under FISA will still happen all the time. That's the entire point of this article. There are no checks and balances. There is no accountability. There is NOTHING. Total secrecy and legal immunity are all but guaranteed for the perpetrators. Period.
"The illegal we can do right now; the unconstitutional will take a little longer." --Henry Kissinger
The truth is that FBI agents are actually very, very busy people. They are often working a bunch of cases at once and they don't have enough time to go on illegal fishing expeditions that wouldn't be admissible in court anyway. It is almost certain that the FBI agents not only didn't read the email they weren't looking for, but actively stopped the problem and got rid of the excess because sifting through a mountain of crap would only hinder their investigation. In either case, the FBI did report the issue to both the court AND their executive oversight (that would be 2 branches of government).
You can wear your tinfoil hat if you want, but it really seems to me that the FBI didn't ask for it, didn't want it, stopped it when they noticed it, and reported the issue to the proper oversight authorities. I'm just not seeing a scandal here.
The
...why do people still send sensitive email unencrypted?
I wonder how long before the government will require some sort of security clearance or background check on telecommunications workers and sysadmins on the basis that setting up these taps and email filters makes them privy to at least some of the details of who is being watched and why. What if any steps is the government taking to insure that the lowly sysadmin does not give the target of the investigation a heads up saying that they are being watched?
A cheap Linux box running Sendmail and an installation of OpenSSL to let Sendmail be able to run SMTPS.
On top of that use a POP3/IMAP server that can do POP3S/IMAPS and you can access your mail without the risk of an accidental peek.
If builders built buildings the way programmers wrote programs, then the first woodpecker would destroy civilization.