Slashdot Mirror
Would a National Biometric Authentication Scheme Work?
Ian Lamont writes "The chair of Yale's CS department and Connecticut's former consumer protection commissioner are calling for the creation of a robust biometric authentication system on a national scale. They say the system would safeguard privacy and people's personal data far more effectively than paper-based IDs. They also reference the troubled Real ID program, saying that the debate has centered around forms of ID rather than the central issue of authentication. The authors further suggest that the debate has led to confusion between anonymity and privacy: 'Outside our homes, we have always lived in a public space where our open acts are no longer private. Anonymity has not changed that, but has provided an illusion of privacy and security. ... In public space, we engage in open acts where we have no expectation of privacy, as well as private acts that cannot take place within our homes and therefore require authenticating identity to carve a sphere of privacy.' The authors do not provide any suggestions for specific biometric technologies, nor do they discuss the role of the government in such a system. What do you think of a national or international biometrics-based authentication scheme? Is it feasible? How would it work? What safeguards need to be put in place?"
. . . if there's a biometric "authentication" method that hasn't been cracked in the real world in ways that would be easy for the average clever crook to duplicate for a trivial amount of money. Fingerprint scanners are trivial - Mythbusters fooled a brand new, state of the art door lock with a xerox of a fingerprint, by licking it. Retina scanners have been cracked, facial recognition software is a joke with no punch line. What else is there?
And once a system has been cracked, it is totally useless, since you can't change your "password" on biometric stuff.
If history has taught us anything over the past few years, it's that putting guys from Yale in charge of things is always a great idea.
So let's let this wise man create a national biometric identification system. It sounds like a bad idea to me, but I'm just part of the rabble. I haven't had the benefit of his education and experience. I've never even been to a regatta!
Yes of course it would work!
Everyone knows that bad people are entirely willing to be completely honest, so obviously a system like this would mean we would know everything about them, and could stop all evil in the world.
It sounds interesting, but I am not for governmental control or involvement. Most here believe less government is better government. Why would we want to involve an entity that can't even balance a checkbook get its hands on something this complicated. I'm sorry but I don't see George W, Hilary Clinton, Barack Obama, or John McCain doing an adequate job at all except to hose it up and force regulation and compliance. Our current issues will not be solved with this. They will only take on a new twist.
I eat Karma for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. That's why I don't have any.
Biometrics is inherently flawed as an authentication system, because biometrics is a password you can't change. Once someone gets your password, or at least the numerical representation of it such as could be lifted from a compromised reader or database, you are toast. How are you going to change your retina scan to something new?
And never mind the demonstrated hackability of all but the premium readers.
Biometrics sound great at first blush, and to the common voter they seem foolproof, so this fad will get worse before it will get better. In fact, the authentication issue may have achieved the level of complexity as the net-neutrality issue, such that Joe Registered Voter cannot possibly understand it (even if he is the rare sort to spend an hour googling it before forming an opinion).
Meanwhile, text passwords plus certificates (where 'certificate' could be a smart card, or your cellphone's IMEI, or whatever) is still the answer for security. It's awful, to be sure, but it's much less awful than biometrics.
FATMOUSE + YOU = FATMOUSE
Perhaps not technically 100%, but you can expect a reasonable level of privacy/anonymity in public.
This could destroy that.
---- Booth was a patriot ----
Even the courts have found that anonymity is important component of freedom of speech. (Along with freedom of association.).
Why does all this scare me? Is it because I could be classified a 'problem individual' based on my political leanings? Is it because the Executive Branch reserves the right to pull American citizenship at will? Is it because even the Russians know the best way to deal with a recalicrant individual, no matter what his power base, is to tar him as a sex offender?
My other question is of course, if I'm out and about, living my life in a lawful manner, why should the government care about me?. Police aren't there to arrest the lawful, they're there to arrest the criminals after commission of a crime. Where is the mandate to surveil everybody in sight waiting for them to commit a crime?
Understanding the scope of the problem is the first step on the path to true panic.
That turned out well, didn't it?
Understanding the scope of the problem is the first step on the path to true panic.
The summary talks about a common misconception, and manages to create another.
Authentication is when you identify(as in Identity) yourself, when you want to(say, to enter your home), or to get that 5% rebate at that place you like to eat at.
Anonymity is when someone else wants you to identify yourself, and you refuse.
Imputability is when someone's done something and 1) you want to Identify them properly, and 2) do something about some of the people you identify(presumably because something they did was wrong)
Anonymity is something private citizens like, in part because they don't much like imputability. That is when they do something, and it's not tied to their Identity.
Forcing someone to authenticate themselves is something the police, for one, likes, because
1) It prevents them from being blamed for mis-identifying someone
2) If they catch you doing something, and impute it once you authenticated yourself, they're fairly sure they impute it in such a way, it will follow you for a long long time(if they can impute your "identity" more on that later.
However, it has its drawbacks
1) If you authenticate yourself with falsified credentials, you get someone else blamed for your acts
2) It doesn't deal with the fact that you may be unable(damaged or lost credentials)/unwilling to identify yourself/automated systems may mis-indentify you
It doesn't solve the question of "Identity" itself either. Like when the no-fly list(falling under imputability) lists names(which can be the same for two people), leading to the same result as a falsified authentication.
Just a quick summary:
Identity: Who you are
Authentication: Proving who you are
Anonymity: Not having to say who you are
Imputability: Blaming who you are
The four are interlinked, but often confused, as in the article.
People interested in laws like RealID need to pay a lot more attention to distinctions between all four. Until the authentication part can be more more foolproof, the imputability is scary(you can be blamed for stuff you haven't done), the anonymity, well it's scary to those who'd rather deal with people they can identify(and therefore impute, think contracts to keep it in the white hat sphere). And the Identity, well that's the real problem. If you have a single, centralized database, any single mistaken Identity becomes life-altering, if not actually life-threatening(correcting someone's id with falsified credentials in order to make their lives a living hell? Yes, it can do that).
Does that bother you a little? I know it does me.
It doesn't matter how strong your security system is, it will fail. What happens when it does? I can't get a new $BodyPart if some fraudster spoofs it.
How dare you be so modest!! You conceited bastard!!
Who is to be trusted with by biometric data? Who would have access? How would the software/authentication work? Who will write the software? Is it going to be proprietary? Will it be enabled in voting machines? Why should I trust the government agency/subcontractor to do all this correctly? It seems that whoever controls this biometric data would have A LOT of power, especially if its integrated into every little device out there. Consider the potential lack of transparency in, say, an election. Could some government employee, maybe just above the average capabilities of a TSA employee, tamper with election results? Also, if my biometric info is linked to my credit card, how hard would it for that person to go on a shopping spree. How could I prove it wasn't me? The whole thing wreaks...
The premise of the article - or at least the blurb - is wrong. It makes the claim we "have no expectation of privacy in the public space." But we do. Ever want to take a road trip to some town where no one knows you, just to get away, do some shopping, have dinner, watch a show, without having to deal with people who know you? Ever enjoy the feeling of being out, alone, in an unfamiliar city?
How's that going to sit when the desk clerk looks you in the eye as you walk up and says, "How you doing, Mr. LeParanoid, and how's that appendectomy scar healing up? Wife happy about that diamond necklace you bought last week?"
Or gives you a steely look because you're on The Sex Offender List (because you had the temerity to have sex with someone 3 days over some arbitrary line, or perhaps you pissed in a bush somewhere) and proceeds to treat you like a criminal as soon as your RF-enabled ID gets in range of his LittleDictatorsConsole(tm)? Sure, you can add biometrics to it so he's sure you're a sex offender or other malcontent antisocial. That'd all be real good, wouldn't it? After all, in this society, onece you're a criminal, you're permanently low class, you can't make up for it.
This whole ID mania needs to go away. It is a sign of a pervasive sickness among the rulers of this society. It is not a solution, or a potential solution, to terrorism, or any other problem we face.
I've fallen off your lawn, and I can't get up.
Yep, Dick Cheney with a few drinks in him and a shotgun in his hand will certainly wipe that smile (and a layer of skin) off your face real quick.
Authentication does not necessarily mean that those around me know who I am. Take a credit card transaction as an example -- the credit card company wants to know that I'm an authorized user of the card I hold. The merchant wants to know that my credit card company will pay them on my behalf. But the merchant doesn't have any fundamental interest* in knowing who I am -- only the credit card company does. So if I authenticate to the credit card company, and the credit card company authenticates to the merchant, we can all feel safe, and I can remain anonymous with respect to the merchant.
It's certainly possible to design the system to provide strong authentication for a variety of purposes without compromising privacy or even anonymity. Whether or not anyone will bother to do that/allow that to happen is debatable, but you shouldn't necessarily relate the ability to authenticate with an inability to provide privacy.
*I know they might like to know who I am for marketing purposes and whatnot, but they have no interest with respect to conducting a safe and reliable financial transaction.
No. You fundamentally misunderstand privacy. Privacy is not "being alone."
Privacy is the existence of social boundaries that we (generally) agree not to cross.
Examples: I invade a lady's privacy when I look up her skirts without her permission. I invade your privacy if I open your mail without your permission. I invade your privacy if I read your medical records without your permission. All of this can happen with you, me and the issue in question all out in the public space.
These are things we can do, but we agree not to do, because we recognize the fundamental right to privacy as existing in open society, not just in the home or when we are alone. Private means that you retain control by social convention over information which relates to your existence, and in turn, were I to obtain access by any means without your permission, I would have crossed the social boundary for that issue. That is the very core of "violating someone's privacy."
Anonymity is another social boundary. We have -- in the past -- recognized that others have the right to proceed about their day without having to inform others who they are and what they are doing. This boundary, like any other social boundary, can be crossed (violated, more like) by simple, easy actions on the part of invaders of privacy. But anonymity is not a thing unto itself, it is simply another facet of privacy.
The following should help you develop a better understanding of what privacy actually is: More on privacy.
I've fallen off your lawn, and I can't get up.