UK Banking Law Blames Customers For Insecure OS
twitter writes "If you use an insecure OS in the UK and someone drains your bank account, the banks say it's your fault. The Register reports: 'The Banking Code produced by the British Bankers' Association (BBA), and followed by most banks, makes it clear that banks will not be responsible for losses on online bank accounts if consumers do not have up to date anti-virus, anti-spyware, and firewall software installed on their machines.'" twitter went on to note that the majority of consumer PCs use an operating system with a history of security issues. Should end users be ultimately responsible for the state of their systems?
But I think there's an ulterior motive here. As a part of Chip-and-PIN, the UK is testing a brilliant two-factor authentication system this year for cards that will cryptographically render browser, PC, and merchant security moot. It's possible this is being used as a "warning shot" to frighten consumers into picking up the tab for the high cost (approximately $70) of the handheld security module.
They have the technology to keep it safe now. I think they're just too cheap to fund it themselves. (And I really wish we'd start seeing that kind of security technology available here in America. I'd switch banks and pay the $70 myself in a heartbeat.)
John
So, to summarize:
bankers: "You better use a secure OS, or you'll be liable for any fraudulent transactions with your account."
customers: "Okay. What if we use Firefox on Linux?"
bankers: "That'll work."
customers: "Hey, we can't access your site using Firefox!"
bankers: [British equivalent of "hah! Sucks to be you!"]
Apology to Ubuntu forum.
Suppose one is running a hardened version of OpenBSD on some PA-RISC machine. Suppose then that this person's bank account is drained out and that said draining has NOTHING to do with their computer or OS. Suppose it's drained by someone who prints checks with a random bank account number on them and it just so happens to be this OpenBSD user's bank account. Again, the theft has NOTHING to do with their computer, OS, computing practices, or hair color. What will happen? Will the bank file a discovery motion to check if the person has anti-virus software on their hardened machine? What? No anti-virus software? Never mind that there is no virus to check for. This is scary as it gives the bank a way to weasel out of its own responsibilities.
McCain/Palin '08. Now THAT's hope and change!
In the US, a friend of mine (a lawyer) basically described the state of banking laws as "the bank is always right, if the bank is wrong the bank is still right". This was based on 1930's banking laws when the banks went to the gov't looking for a bail out and convinced enough people to severly restrict their liability.
If there is a lawyer in the house can they confirm this?
Not sure what the state of the laws are elsewhere, but knowing what a bunch of whining snivelers the banking industry is it's probably the same. The bank is always right and the depositors and the taxpayer pick up the bill.
putting the 'B' in LGBTQ+
Should end users be ultimately responsible for the state of their systems?
The Microsoft Windows OS is not the property of the consumer using it. It is the property of Microsoft used under a license from Microsoft. If the usage of the OS complies with the license then surely any inadvertent behavior on the part of the OS is the responsibility of the owner (Microsoft) and not the license holder (the end user).
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I'm pretty freaking tired of all this "advice" that you need this protection for Windows machines.
Why should I have a firewall? I have a NAT router (hardware firewall).
Why should I have antispyware? I know what I'm downloading.
Why should I have antivirus?
- I don't download cracks. When I DO need to use a crack I upload it to virustotal and then run it in a virtual machine.
- I run IE7 and Firefox. Although neither are perfectly secure I don't make it a habit to go to Russian warez sites.
Dear god, SOMEONE explain to me why any reasonable user should need this resource-hogging crap?
Someone finds a security hole in IE7 or Firefox. At the same time, they find a security hole in IIS or Apache. Using both these holes, they attack some well known and trusted site, maybe a newspaper, and use it to do drive-by attacks on visitors.
Yes, this does happen.
client rings up the bank, 'i have been stolen from',
bank rep asks: whats your operating system:
client says: mac osx
rep says: im sorry sir that means your liable for the losses
client asks: why
rep says: you dont run norton antivirus, only norton antivirus protected computers are safe. Thank you for banking with us, can i help you with anything else?
I wholeheartedly agree. It's only logical. Banks are responsible for the security within their own networks and their web servers which are on the edges. That is Just Fine.
I (The Bank Customer) am 100% responsible for the security of my own systems that I use to access the banking website. How could I POSSIBLY expect the bank to be liable for rootkits, malware, spyware, etc. I can't. That's just not reasonable.
The only thing I can think of that might go either way would be DNS type hacks since that would depend on how it was done and just exactly what point in the communication it was affecting.
Now with that being said.........
It would be the BANKS'S RESPONSIBILITY to TELL the consumer THE BAD NEWS. I can't wait. That's a "shitstorm" waiting to happen.
So basically, the vast majority of PC's are hopelessly insecure. We could talk forever about Microsoft this and Microsoft that, and "what about Safari?", blah blah blah blah. The situation is still the same. The Bank Customer's computer is just not secure enough in most cases and it could only be a matter of time before you are the "lucky" one and get nailed. Kind of like a lottery, except you get bent over.
In the end the only thing that will happen is that people will stop using online banking. I know plenty of people now that outright refuse to use it for the perceived security risks NOW. If the bank's outright say that they will not be responsible for the security on your computer, that will only make the situation worse (for them).
I'm pretty good at securing my systems, but even I know it would only take one determined person to get me. If the bank will not at least insure my losses, I can't take the risk of online banking. That simple.
If this really does go down, that will be a pretty big statement about PC security in general. Regardless of who is responsible, if a bank says it will no longer trust the end user's security that is a bad omen for the rest of e-commerce. What about the credit card companies? How will they react to the bank's position?
My old bank closed my online banking account without warning, and without bothering to tell me they had. I called them and they said it was because "I had a virus". This, despite the fact that I run a secure operating system (with no known viruses) and have an up-to-date virus scanner. Couldn't they just suspend my account until I "fixed" the problem? No, I had to open a whole new one.
I did. At another bank.
... from physical cheque books and credit cards. If I leave my wallet in a place where cards, etc. might be stolen, I'm responsible for any loses that occur - shouldn't the same be true if I leave my electronic 'wallet' open? I really think that, within limits, people need to be held responsible for their actions/inactions - too much 'I never realised/knew/expected/thought that might happen' in the world. The banks should have similar guidelines to those used for stolen physical banking paraphernalia - if you suspect your PC might have been compromised, report it to the bank within a given time fame and they thereafter accept responsibility for subsequent losses.
I am bald
So give every customer a Live CD of a really locked down Linux and a special purpose browser pointed to the bank.
next you will be suggesting that the US gvernment should arrest the people doing the phishing, or the companies selling stuff through spam.
This will never happen - they are far to busy figthing the war on drugs and the war on terror to actually olve real life problems.
Spam could be stopped overnight if the US owned credit card companies (ie all credit card companies) were threatened with the same sanctions for processing payments for spam-promoted products that thwere threatened for internet gambling.
The "follow the money" approach ahs been proven to work, and lack of applying it is wholely due to lack of interest by the UK and US governments.
Sent from my ASR33 using ASCII
Not to say the other method isn't better, but it isn't quite that bad. I used to work in the debit processor industry, essentially our computers were the ones that the PIN was sent along to.
It actually works like this: PIN entry -> Unique encryption in keypad (light sensitive PRAM typically) -> Debit machine processing -> VPN or dial-up direct to processor -> decryption based on id of machine and uniquely assigned encryption keys -> somehow (varying) communicated to bank ->back up the line with approval/denial.
It is supposed to be using hardware that never stores the encryption keys (triple DES mandated) anywhere that is accessible from the machinery that processes the transaction and they're tamper resistant (not quite proof, but difficult) with the encryption key knowledge being split between (at least) two people. The keys are unknown to the people who handle them until the time of entry and only stored in the end machine and in the processing machine (identified by serial number or machine ID.)
It is possible for the systems to be compromised in several ways, but paranoid safeguards are in place to make it difficult. Getting card numbers is no terrific feat, as evidenced by all the news stories about exactly that, but mechanically getting PINs usable for debit transactions is tremendously more difficult. That isn't to say it can't be done, but it does raise the barrier much higher than just sending your PIN along.
On the other side though, the decision on whether to approve or deny a transaction is typically just a matter of an unencrypted 0 or 1 along with the mirror of the transaction. If a transaction is denied, but the machine gets a 1 where it should have received a 0, then the merchant has no immediate indication that the cash or goods weren't paid for. Machines using debug or emulation modes occasionally get into service and approve everyone without even validating the transaction, but as you can imagine that gets pretty prompt attention.
B) Eliminate all the stupid users. This is frowned upon by society.