Slashdot Mirror
New Botnet Dwarfs Storm
ancientribe writes "Storm is no longer the world's largest botnet: Researchers at Damballa have discovered Kraken, a botnet of 400,000 zombies — twice the size of Storm. But even more disturbing is that it has infected machines at 50 of the Fortune 500, and is undetectable in over 80 percent of machines running antivirus software. Kraken appears to be evading detection by a combination of clever obfuscation techniques that hinder its detection and analysis by researchers."
How many of those zombies are Linux platforms?
Seven Days with Ubuntu Unity
With an "80%" miss rate by AV tools, It would be very helpful to know what software anti-virus programs do detect Storm and Kraken? So that responsible users can check their PC's.
There are still Fortune 500 companies that allow unimpeded outbound SMTP traffic from their general userbase?
"Tell me doctor, with all of your defenses, are there any provisions for an attack by killer bees?"
Does anyone else find it absolutely aggravating that these stories
1. Never tell you how you know if you're infected, and
2. Never tell you how to clean up your shit if you are.
However, they always give massively generalized statistics on how vulnerable you are!
Thanks, asshats.
Slashdot still doesnâ(TM)t support Unicode after it was added to the HTML standard in 1997.
Do you honestly think that if Windows were to vanish off the face of the earth tomorrow all these virus authors and botnet operators would suddenly throw their hands up and say "oh well, guess we'll have to find something else to do?"
Well done, you've managed to switch the argument from the factual to the hypothetical.
This is the standard debate tactic in this situation. Get everyone tangled in debating the possibility of potential but non-existant Mac and Linux malware, judging its likelihood against factual and vastly damaging Windows viruses, worms and botnets.
Just acquit Microsoft of all culpability for poor and short-sighted decisions, incurring costs in the billions, for millions of users, by saying, "eh, it was inevitable."
#define struct union
It's the difference between "this platform is inherently more secure" and "this platform is safer because it's not targeted as much." Apple's market share is rising--if it gets too high, it will likely become the target of malware authors.
You're not right. There's nothing preventing any user from setting up executables directly in his home directory; hell, back in my shell account days, I must have had the equivalent of a pretty good-sized unix system in ~/bin, ~/usr and ~/var.
Your solution simply does not address the dancing bunnies problem.
Perhaps you don't understand the implications of the article.
ZoneAlarm, AVG and Spybot are _incapable_ of detecting trojans like the aforementioned Kraken simply because they are polymorphic. Don't be ignorant, just because these programs say you haven't been infected, there's a non-trivial chance that you have been.
UAC isn't really a solution, either. All it does is to train the monkeys that you have to click an extra time in order to get the banana.
Education is what's needed. I no longer recommend antivirus to my family--I tell them to avoid running programs that they don't know about, not to trust any attachment that comes through the mail, and offer other suggestions for safe computing practices. Running without antivirus works to remove the perception of safe computing, making them actually think about the things that they're doing. This, incidentally, leads to actual safe computing.
All of your suggestions differ significantly from the default configuration. It's pretty easy to tell Windows to show the real file extension. It's easy to create a new user on your Windows box, and it's easy to only log in as that user. It's easy to install software in this way (right-click, run as.)
Only we're talking about normal users here. Users who aren't going to go to these lengths to protect themselves and their computers. Nor are they going to modify the default behavior of their Linux computers, if we were to set them in front of one. We're talking about users who don't even realize that these are good things to do, so why do you expect them to do them?
I think that the biggest problem is that people don't distinguish between "secure" and "safer." I alluded to this in my post.
The second biggest problem is that people don't define what "secure" really means. In the context of trojan horses, it mostly means that the rest of the system is safe, even if the user account is wholly compromised. This is important, because it will be much easier to clean up the infection from a super-user account if the trojan can't use rootkit-like behavior to hide itself. In short, anti-virus running as root will have an easier time finding malware that isn't running as root. In this specific context, an operating system which (by default) runs as administrator is going to be less secure; however this has more to do with configuration and less to do with architecture, which is where a lot of people try to define security.
There are other contexts that you can look at, though. In most distributions of Linux, software updates are handled somewhat automatically for all software on the system. While this could be a security concern, in most cases, it's a boon to security. Did someone find a bug in Firefox? Ubuntu's daily security check will find it and ask you to install the new version. Bug in libc? Same thing. Since most software on the system will be updated in this way, security updates are more likely to be applied, and the system will, in general, be less susceptible to exploits.
Of course, all of this assumes classical malware that expects to be run as administrator. There's no particular reason that malware couldn't be written to be hard to detect from the user-account, and which waits until it can sniff a password or execute privileged code within a password-less sudo context. Malware also can do a lot of damage without hiding itself, and before the user becomes aware of its existence. This applies to just about any platform (indeed, any platform where the user is allowed to execute arbitrary code.)
I find it easier to believe that that antivirus tools just suck.
I read the internet for the articles.
Microsoft's "hide extensions by default" has to be the worst security decision of all time. I know it's the first thing I turn off when I use a new machine, but still, most people leave it on and it's just asking for trouble.
I read the internet for the articles.
And _I_ consider the existence of antivirus tools to imply an OS that just sucks.
Let us not become the evil that we deplore.
The thing is, I hear this all the time.
.bash_profile (and a thousand other ones), and you can configure/fix them out of existence. But to get all of them pretty much means stopping someone from using their computer.
If someone says "Windows is insecure", I hear "Yeah, damn right. Stupid n00bs and its all Bill Gates fault, stupid people".
If someone says "Linux is insec.." I hear "lalalalalala. I can't hear you. lalalalalala".
The problem is about usage patterns of the OS. Put the same person in front of any OS and they will get infected the same way they always did. As someone mentioned, bots generally send spam or steal financial info - well, there's nothing stopping this from happening in any app. Either you restrict users from doing things they consider normal (like downloading gadgets and toys, and opening their own files) or you have to accept that they will get infected, no matter which OS they use.
Sure, there are technical, tricky issues with
The answer is to educate users about security, which would be an ongoing task forever (as new exploits are discovered, new attack vectors invented). Or to try and fix the damage an infected machine can do. Eg. why aren't the defaults for emailing set to only allow 1 per minute, or why doesn't the software pop a dialog every time an email is sent? If either of these were implemented at a point closer to the network (rather than the user application) then we'd get significantly less spam from infected PCs.
Of course, its tricky to do. A firewall could do it, but they tend to be focussed on on-demand access - ie, it'll pop a message everytime an app wants to use the network, and you end up with people turning the messages off.
Hiding the file extension - meaningless from a security viewpoint. Users still download SmileyCentral icon packs and explicitly install them.
Nothing will happen; the OS will stop it. How? By the trivial means of not allowing downloaded files to be executed unless I explicitly edit their permissions to turn on the execute bit.
Yes, this really would help. Mere double-clicking can be done reflexively. But more complex instructions like "save this to your filesystem, then open a terminal window and type 'chmod +x free_porn.sh', and then double-click it for free porn!" gives your victim just that little bit longer to realise that they're being conned. Is it 100% secure? No, of course it isn't. Is it more secure than an OS that will blindly execute anything that has a filename ending