Slashdot Mirror
The New School of Information Security
Ben Rothke writes "It is 2008
and never has so much been spent in information security.
Year after year, more and more security hardware and software is
purchased, more and more security professionals are hired, and more security
is done; yet things are not getting better. Every
indicator, every pundit, everything points to more security breaches,
vulnerabilities and incidents. Large amounts of
proprietary data are compromised on a daily basis.
Obviously something is wrong, yet the entire industry goes along
thinking things are getting better and more secure.
Obviously something needs to change. And
that new change is what The New School of Information Security
attempts to conceive."
The New School of Information Security
author
Adam Shostack and Andrew Stewart
pages
288
publisher
Addison-Wesley
rating
9
reviewer
Ben Rothke
ISBN
978-0321502780
summary
Information security is highly broken; this book suggests a realistic fix.
Far too
much of the security industry has its roots in FUD.
Billions of dollars of information security
products have been sold, and for what? The
book asks why is information security so dysfunctional and why companies are
often wasting so much money on security.
So what is this thing called the new
school? The authors define it as neither a service
nor a product; rather it is a new approach that uses the scientific method and
objective data. This in turn gives an entirely new
perspective from diverse fields to make effective security
decisions. The authors
rightly believe that when objective data is used, it enables better
decision-making.
The New School of Information Security is a ground-breaking text in that it attempts to remove the reader from the hype of information security, and enables the reader to focus on the realities of security. The fact that such a book needs to be written in 2008 shows the sorry state of information security.
The book starts out with observations of why there are so many failures within information security. Anyone with experience in security can easily relate to these issues. One recurring theme throughout the book is that poor data, be it research or advertising negatively effects the state of security. The authors astutely note that security advertising often does a disservice to the security field because it glosses over complex problems and presents the illusions of a reality in which a security panacea exists. It makes the buyer believe they can reach that panacea by using their service or purchasing their product.
In creating their new school, the authors have no qualms in attacking the dogma of the current state of information security. From Gartner to the Executive Alliance and more, the authors show that these groups and more often suffer from issues such as bias, lack of a scientific method and more. The book notes that the search for objective data on information security is at the heart of the philosophy of the new school. Since there is a drought of objective data today, the book asks how can we know that the conventional wisdom is the right thing to do? The observation is that the current state of affairs is unsustainable for the commercial security industry and for security practitioners.
The title of chapter 5 gives away the theme of the book — Amateurs Study Cryptography — Professionals Study Economics. The idea is that information security must do a better job of embracing such diverse fields as economics, psychology, sociology and more, to make effective decisions.
In some ways, the authors are perhaps too aggressive in their desire for security statistics. One of the most scientific approaches to information security is from CERT (www.cert.org). Yet the authors are not satisfied with CERT's findings that the majority of incidents appear to be insider based. Given what data and statistics we have in 2008, the figures from CERT are certainly good enough. Yes, they could be better, and yes, breach data is not actuarial data, but given the data from CERT, combined with recent news and court cases (UBS, Société Générale,etc.) clearly show that insiders are the most insidious threat.
Also, while the current state of information security is indeed less than perfect, the authors are a bit too condescending of areas where security is formalized (ISO 27001, etc.), yet not perfect.
After years of countless 1,000+ page massive security books, The New School of Information Security succinctly spreads its message in a brief 160 pages. In those 160 pages, the author's detail at a high-level what needs to be done to create this new school. Therein lays the books only flaw, its brevity. The authors want to get the concept of the new school out there, but they do not detail enough of the necessary requirement to make it work. They show with clarity how things are broken, but don't do enough to show how to fix it. Let's hope the authors are at work on a follow-up writing those necessary additions.
Some Slashdot readers are likely to question how an author (Shostack) can write a book on security while being employed by Microsoft. Even with all its security issues, what many do not realize is that no software company has spent more on security in the past decade than Microsoft. Indeed they have a lot of catching up to do, but it is being done. Put another way, Microsoft has likely spent more on security than China has spent on democracy.
Too much of information security is clearly broke and The New School of Information Security is about fixing it. The author's pragmatic approach is a refreshing respite from years of security product based FUD and silver-bullet solutions. The approach of the new school is one that screams out to be put into place. It is the job of today's CISO's and CIO's to heed that call, take the initiative, and lead their organizations there. Either they graduate their staff from the new school, or we are faced with more decades of information security failures.
Let's hope The New School of Information Security is indeed a new start for information security. The book is practical and pragmatic, and one of the most important security books of the last few years. Those serious about information security should definitely read it, and encourage others to do the same.
Ben Rothke is a security consultant with BT and the author of Computer Security: 20 Things Every Employee Should Know.
You can purchase The New School of Information Security from amazon.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
The New School of Information Security is a ground-breaking text in that it attempts to remove the reader from the hype of information security, and enables the reader to focus on the realities of security. The fact that such a book needs to be written in 2008 shows the sorry state of information security.
The book starts out with observations of why there are so many failures within information security. Anyone with experience in security can easily relate to these issues. One recurring theme throughout the book is that poor data, be it research or advertising negatively effects the state of security. The authors astutely note that security advertising often does a disservice to the security field because it glosses over complex problems and presents the illusions of a reality in which a security panacea exists. It makes the buyer believe they can reach that panacea by using their service or purchasing their product.
In creating their new school, the authors have no qualms in attacking the dogma of the current state of information security. From Gartner to the Executive Alliance and more, the authors show that these groups and more often suffer from issues such as bias, lack of a scientific method and more. The book notes that the search for objective data on information security is at the heart of the philosophy of the new school. Since there is a drought of objective data today, the book asks how can we know that the conventional wisdom is the right thing to do? The observation is that the current state of affairs is unsustainable for the commercial security industry and for security practitioners.
The title of chapter 5 gives away the theme of the book — Amateurs Study Cryptography — Professionals Study Economics. The idea is that information security must do a better job of embracing such diverse fields as economics, psychology, sociology and more, to make effective decisions.
In some ways, the authors are perhaps too aggressive in their desire for security statistics. One of the most scientific approaches to information security is from CERT (www.cert.org). Yet the authors are not satisfied with CERT's findings that the majority of incidents appear to be insider based. Given what data and statistics we have in 2008, the figures from CERT are certainly good enough. Yes, they could be better, and yes, breach data is not actuarial data, but given the data from CERT, combined with recent news and court cases (UBS, Société Générale,etc.) clearly show that insiders are the most insidious threat.
Also, while the current state of information security is indeed less than perfect, the authors are a bit too condescending of areas where security is formalized (ISO 27001, etc.), yet not perfect.
After years of countless 1,000+ page massive security books, The New School of Information Security succinctly spreads its message in a brief 160 pages. In those 160 pages, the author's detail at a high-level what needs to be done to create this new school. Therein lays the books only flaw, its brevity. The authors want to get the concept of the new school out there, but they do not detail enough of the necessary requirement to make it work. They show with clarity how things are broken, but don't do enough to show how to fix it. Let's hope the authors are at work on a follow-up writing those necessary additions.
Some Slashdot readers are likely to question how an author (Shostack) can write a book on security while being employed by Microsoft. Even with all its security issues, what many do not realize is that no software company has spent more on security in the past decade than Microsoft. Indeed they have a lot of catching up to do, but it is being done. Put another way, Microsoft has likely spent more on security than China has spent on democracy.
Too much of information security is clearly broke and The New School of Information Security is about fixing it. The author's pragmatic approach is a refreshing respite from years of security product based FUD and silver-bullet solutions. The approach of the new school is one that screams out to be put into place. It is the job of today's CISO's and CIO's to heed that call, take the initiative, and lead their organizations there. Either they graduate their staff from the new school, or we are faced with more decades of information security failures.
Let's hope The New School of Information Security is indeed a new start for information security. The book is practical and pragmatic, and one of the most important security books of the last few years. Those serious about information security should definitely read it, and encourage others to do the same.
Ben Rothke is a security consultant with BT and the author of Computer Security: 20 Things Every Employee Should Know.
You can purchase The New School of Information Security from amazon.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
Throwing more "experts" at the problem doesn't make the problems go away. Just like making passwords more complex doesn't seem to increase security, especially when the average user doesn't seem to be getting any better (still writing password on post-its, etc)
Ask not what you can do for your country. Ask what your country did to you
One crippling problem with gathering hard numerical data about security is that so many incidents go unreported. A few make it into books, a few make it into the press, but most are solved internally.
If you have a fire, the fire department will write it down and it will go into national statistics that fire insurance companies can bet money on. If you have a security breach, would you even try involving law enforcement?
Another hassle is that so many of the costs are hard to quantify. Loss of revenue after a fire is something you can pin down. Loss of reputation or consumer confidence after a breach? The numbers will be uselessly fuzzy.
Compare and contrast these two quotes:
Year after year, more and more security hardware and software is purchased, more and more security professionals are hired, and more security is done; yet things are not getting better.
And:
Even with all its security issues, what many do not realize is that no software company has spent more on security in the past decade than Microsoft.
"Do as I say, not as I do?"
The authors astutely note that security advertising often does a disservice to the security field because it glosses over complex problems and presents the illusions of a reality in which a security panacea exists. It makes the buyer believe they can reach that panacea by using their service or purchasing their product.
MARKETING causes problems?!! I'd have never dreamed of such a concoction of lunacy! This guy wants to make us think we'd actually be safer without the Nortons and McAfees of the world. I tell you this buddy, you can pry my annual $50 subscription from my cold dead hands!! I say we hunt down this guy with torches and rope in hand!
No,I do not work for Norton. What a silly question. That thousand bucks the guy in Norton shirt just gave me is totally normal, so never you mind it. Anyways, lynch the heretic!
I got a catholic block.
The difference between the rich and the poor is greater than ever, and power over the unwilling must be maintained through security.
What... criminy... can you put down your Karl Marx for a second and look at the reality.
The solution is to re-engineer the economic system, to prevent people from having the capability of getting so rich that poor people feel they are better off attacking or exploiting the system than they are living within its boundaries.
There's always going to be jealousy and that jealousy is more the fault of the have-nots than the haves. Guess what? If you are stupid, you will not get rich.
I always love how socialists argue that we are too caught up in property while they, more than anyone else, continually keeps score on who has what.
This is my sig.
I think what's likely is that Schneier realized that availability of good crypto isn't the only link in the security chain, and it's probably been a while since it was a candidate for weakest link.
Hence the discussion about how security as a field is reaching out to other disciplines -- organizational behavior and sociology and economics are essential because you're looking at the problem of why business organizations don't do well at security, and it isn't just a technical matter.
Tweet, tweet.
I've been saying for years: More computer security is not better computer security!
Most security can sometimes even lead to less security! A system that is too hard to access because of it's security will eventually be bypassed by the normal users, leaving you with a bigger security hole is one example of this. Customers who put three different firewall programs on their computer, plus the one on their router is another example.
ttyl
Farrell
CAN-CON 2019 - Ottawa's only book oriented Science Fiction Convention! October 18-20, Sheraton Hotel, Ottawa, Canada h
"... Microsoft has likely spent more on security than China has spent on democracy"
Very creative. I can do that, too! My example: Women spend more money on makeup than children spend on trapping hedgehogs.
Microsoft makes more money when computers are less secure, because many people who have malware buy new computers: Corrupted PC's Find New Home in the Dumpster.
I don't think the parent is talking about standardizing his password across every service he uses. I think he's talking about standardizing what a password can consist of and what constitutes a standard length, and a *tiny* bit of sanity regarding human factors in memory and use.
I understand in practice that might allow people to collapse to a narrow set of passwords. But I think it's also possible that this kind of standardization could allow people's ideas about what constitutes a good password to coalesce around a few basic points, which might let them more readily create a few.
And the parent is absolutely right that rotating random strings of characters every three months presents a use problem. One type of security analyst might say "suck it up, there's a tradeoff between security and use," and if you can get the user to suck it up and that works in the context of the organization, that's great. But if not, this brings us to the point in the "Amateurs study crypto, pros study economics" phrase. If you really want a secure system, solve both problems. Provide the user with some security practice that isn't going to cost him cycles the operation of the organization is going to demand he use somewhere else.
Libertarianism is rich wolves and poor sheep playing gambler's ruin for dinner.
We will not make any headway on this, as a profession, until we stop making rudimentary mistakes such as the ones Ranum has identified, along with a few others that are worthy additions to that list. No initiatives, no certifications, no appliances, nothing will change that -- because none of those change the attitudes of the people who are building systems and networks. Until those people manage to step back from irrelevant details like "which iframe exploit is current today?" and look at larger questions like "why are iframe exploits even possible?" or "why are browser exploits even possible?", then they will continue to waste effort "solving" the wrong problems.
Sadly, after observing this situation close up for many, many years, I've concluded that some, possible many, people will never get that far. They simply Do Not Get It, and despite essays like Ranum's or books like this one or anything else, they're not going to get it. And they will continue to fail, and so the systems/networks they've built will continue to fail. I'd say that will make for a bleak future, but -- look around! -- we're living in a bleak present.