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Diebold Admits ATMs Are More Robust Than Voting Machines
An anonymous reader points out a story in the Huffington Post about the status of funding for election voting systems. It contains an interesting section in which Chris Riggall, a spokesman for Premier (formerly Diebold) acknowledged that less money is spent making an electronic voting machine than on a typical ATM. The ironically named Riggall also notes that security could indeed be improved, but at a higher price than most election administrators would care to pay. Also quoted in the article is Ed Felten, who has recently found some inconsistencies in New Jersey voting machines. From the Post:
"'An ATM is significantly a more expensive device than a voting terminal...' said Riggall. 'Were you to develop something that was as robust as an ATM, both in terms of the physical engineering of it and all aspects, clearly that would be something that the average jurisdiction cannot afford.' Perhaps cost has something to do with the fact that a couple of years ago, every single Diebold AccuVote TS could be opened with a standard key also used for some cabinets and mini-bars and available for purchase over the Internet."
I don't think they need to be as physically secure, there's always a voting official in the room in plain sight and several other people working there. It doesn't need to be built like an ATM that will be randomly placed in dark alleys.
A voting machine that prints off a paper ballot which the voter deposits in a lockbox still seems the best option to achieve this.
If construction was anything like programming, an incorrectly fitted lock would bring down the entire building...
Security depends both on the voting / counting process and on the technology (this is true for paper ballots as well). The problem is when the technology can easily be changed in a hidden way that is unverifiable by elections officials.
A simple machine, that has been tested and verify can be sealed with stickers with signatures of election officials.
A machine (think diabold) with all kinds of inputs (think keyboard plugs) and complexity (think OS, DB etc...) cannot be easily sealed and verified by election officials.
I found two interesting articles about India's EVM
The two things I found interesting:
1) EVM cost = $230 (hard to tamper with, and relies on election officials to keep secure)
2) Diebold cost = $3300 (easier to tamper with, and relies on election officials to keep secure)
This points out two things: voting systems don't have to be complicated or expensive to work well, and that security depends both on the machine and the voting process.
Just like with paper ballots the election officials need to ensure security of the voting and counting process.
In Canada we have some electronic voting at the municipal level in some cities (mostly optical scan machines).
A comparison of EVM and Diebold
http://techaos.blogspot.com/2004/05/indian-evm-compared-with-diebold.html
Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Voting_Machines
The issue is not about cost. The issue is crappy design, and politics in the selection of voting machine vendors.
----- "Profanity is the one language that all programmers understand."
The obvious solution. Banks reload their ATM software for voting on election day. The candidates can buy your votes all the more easily -- cash comes out of the slot.
Fiat Lux.
It doesn't surprise me that voting machines are not built as well as ATMs. ATMs are filled with thousands and even tens of thousands of dollars. It would be a rich target for all potential thieves. The voting machine electronics must be protected from all sorts of assaults. Voting machines only contain vote totals, so fewer people would be after them. After all, if you smash an ATM, you still get the money. You smash a voting machine, and you simply lose the votes.
The problem is we're stuck on machines vs. voting procedures. New York and New Jersey had voting machines that did not produce a paper trail for almost 100 years, and this was by design. The voting fraud problem in the Northeast was ballot stuffing. Voting machines, by eliminating paper ballots were designed to eliminate this type of voter fraud. The voting machines were designed around voting procedures. A voter had to register before hand. They had to sign in. Their signature was compared to their signature on their original application. The voter was handed a ticket. They handed that to a poll worker who would place the ticket in the voting machine, and pull a big lever which unlocked the machine. The voter would enter the machine, pull another lever to close the curtains and vote. When they finished, they pulled the lever to open the curtains. This cast the ballot and locked the machine. Poll watchers oversaw the whole process.
This machine/procedure combination eliminated ballot stuffing. The voter could only vote a single time before the machine locked up. The poll worker couldn't unlock the machine without the poll watchers noticing. Voter counts were taken from the machine totals, the tickets on the machines, and the sign in list. Since the voting machines were purely mechanical, they were trusted by all parties. All parties could watch the machines being setup and make sure there were no problems. Poll watchers would run tests before the polls opened to verify the machines. This didn't kill the political machines which simply switched tactics, and it didn't entirely eliminate voting fraud, but it certainly helped.
What we need to do is set a procedure up to ensure that elections are fair. Ballots must be secured and watched over by all parties. In Zimbabwe, they counted the votes locally at the polls and posted the results at each poll. This prevents the ruling party from manipulating the ballots. You could go from poll to poll, and add up the election results yourself. We also must ensure that each voter votes only once, and that each voter's vote is totaled as they intended. That was the issue in Florida with the punch card system.
So, we need to think beyond the "technology" aspect of the voting. It isn't paper ballots are simply better. It's about ensuring that we have confidence in the tabulation of the votes and whether it truly reflects the view of the populous. So, think of how you'd secure the paper ballots, how they would be counted. Who would oversee the procedure? How would the ballot boxes be protected from additional votes being added? How do we ensure that voters only vote once and not sneak in additional ballots? How do we verify the ballots? How can we ensure the entire procedure is fair?
The problem with the current Diabold style voting machines is that they are mystery boxes and we cannot tell if they tabulate the vote fairly. We would have to ensure the firmware, the software, and hardware has not been tampered with. A paper trail can help since paper is easier to verify. But, paper is easy to duplicate, toss, and manipulate which is why the Northeast went to the mechanical paperless machines to begin with.
Unless you think of the entire voting process, and ensure the voting process is easy to verify, it doesn't matter how voters cast their ballots.
You have hit the name on the head!
The problem I have with these electronic voting machines is that their internals are completely closed! Understand that the state of Nevada has more strigent controls over it's slot machines than it's voting machines...
Note, I'm taking this content from an awesome graphic I found on the internet... Thanks to whomever came up with it!!!
Software:
Slot Machine: State of Nevada has access to all software. Illegal to use software that is not on file
Voting Machine: Software is a trade secret.
Spot Checking:
Slot Machine: State gaming inspectors show up unannounced at casinos to compare computer chips with those on file. If there is a discrepancy, the machien is shut down and investigated.
Voting Machine: No checks are required. Election officals have no "known good" to compare against.
Background Security:
Slot Machine: Manufacturers subjected to backgroundchecks. Employees are investigated for criminal records.
Voting Machine: Citizens have no way of knowing, for example, whether programmers have been confvicted of fraud or have conflict of interest issues.
Equipment Certification:
Slot Machine: By a public agency at arm's length from manufacturers. Public questions invited.
Voting Machine: By for-profit commpanies chosen adn paid by the manufacturers. No public information on how the testing is done.
Dispute Handling:
Slot Machine: Casino must contact the Gaming Control Board, which has investigators on call around the clock. They can open up machines to inspect internal mechanisms and records of recent gambling outcomes.
Voting Machine: In most cases, a voter's only recourse is to call a number at the board of elections and lodge a complaint.
I do understand that a slot machine and an ATM works in a much more hostile environment where people are constantly working to break the system.
However, our Democracy is more important than some ATM and thus any system that's put in place that becomes an arbitrator of our Democracy's citizens to choose their elected officals should be held to even a higher standard.
Yes Francis, the world has gone crazy.