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FBI Says Military Had Counterfeit Cisco Routers
There are new developments in the case of the counterfeit Cisco routers, which we have been discussing for some time. The NYTimes updates the story after an FBI PowerPoint presentation made its way onto the Web. It seems that experts at Cisco have examined some of the counterfeit routers in detail and proclaimed that they contain no back doors. Others don't believe we can be so sure. "Last month, [DARPA] began distributing chips with hidden Trojan horse circuitry to military contractors who are participating in the agency's Trusted Integrated Circuits program. The goal is to test forensic techniques for finding hidden electronic trap doors, which can be maddeningly elusive... The threat was demonstrated in April when a team of computer scientists from the University of Illinois presented a paper at a technical conference in San Francisco detailing how they had modified a Sun Microsystems SPARC microprocessor... The researchers were able to create a stealth system that would allow them to automatically log in to a computer and steal passwords."
Verification of the producer is essential here - and this is perhaps the moment where outsourcing will bite us in the ass. While you can only buy american made cisco routers, there is no doubt some chipsets made in it are manafactured overseas.
From what I understand, the counterfeit routers are made in the same factories by the same people who make the real routers; they just keep the assembly line running past the hours that Cisco is paying them for.
In this case, if Cisco is comparing the counterfeit routers to their legit ones, they should always be the same.
The question this doesn't answer is this: does the LEGIT Cisco equipment contain back doors? How can Cisco be sure it doesn't? Most of the components are manufactured offshore and the assembly is done offshore. Have they examined each part with an electron microscope to verify it doesn't do anything more than what the spec says it should do?
They can't just watch for network activity; these routers might be filtering and caching data waiting for the eventual physical removal of the router in the next upgrade cycle -- or, they might all have a kill switch built in, so someone can remotely take out ALL routers. There are an infinite number of possibilities to look for, and since Cisco doesn't manufacture everything in-house, they really don't have much hope of detecting that none of the infinite possible modifications have been made.
I work for a company that sells used electronics on eBay. We'll occasionally buy cheap gear over eBay too, then resell it at a profit. For many months now we've had a huge problem with counterfeit Cisco cards. It's amazing how detailed the counterfeiters are. My boss wrote up a detailed guide on how to spot fakes. Google "counterfeit cisco wic".
Anne McCaffrey wrote a book called PartnerShip with a plot very similar to this situation. The villian provides chips to the Galaxy, including the military. When nearly everyone has upgraded, it turns out that he can remotely control every device, including military hardware, controlled by the chips. That's enough of a spoiler. How can such a grand and well planned scheme be defeated? You'll have to read to find out...
Be afraid. Be very afraid. Vote for those that seek to protect you.
This seems like a scare tactic to "warn" people about the dangers of fake hardware/software. Expect a big push around these types of "stories" as more bills like PRO-IP go through congress and as the creation of the IP & Copyright Czar in the Whitehouse gets a big push.
It's a concern but seems to point more to incompetence rather than some difficult-to-spot threat. Why are government agencies not buying directly from Cisco? Seems they should have some sort of corporate connection.
"We must protect our precious bodily fluids."
So that's why my crappy Linksys wifi access points have to be rebooted every week or so. Damn commies!!!
CIA slipped bugs to Soviets
Beauty is in the eye of the beerholder.
That said, it's pretty low on the list of likely threats. Pretty hard to know exactly what gear will be placed where and what it will give you access to. Plus even with a back door, places with sensitive data are more likely to be monitoring the traffic which is harder to hide.
For those of you who are interested, you can find more technical details of how we designed and implemented malicious hardware from here
-- computer scientists from University of Illinois
if your new rack mount routers and switches say "crisco" on the front you may have a problem.
actually I am happy to see you, however that is in fact a banana in my pocket.
Items with high capital costs don't work well as "open source;" basically, the manufacturing plants costs so many billions of dollars that no one who isn't doing proprietary work could afford it. Even if you could open source chip design (a dicey proposition, since there are many fewer EE Phds that want to donate time than there are CS Phds,) there are still difficulties with the actual manufacturing, and we would still need to guarantee the physical chips, which are individual, and cannot be "re-compiled;" if you think there may be an issue with a batch, you can't start over without paying for new chips.
Maybe, however, I am missing something about the procedure you are proposing; what parts would be open source?
I'm a concientious
The question is not whether Cisco routers have back doors. That has to be assumed. If I was running NSA over the last several decades, I would have my people deep inside every communication equipment manufacturer. The manufacturers management might not even know about it.
The NSA surely has arranged to have one or more back doors designed into virtually every kind of communications switch. The only Cisco employees who would know about them would be the NSA people who work inside Cisco, and some regular Cisco employees who have been cleared. If this has not been done, the NSA senior managers should be fired or jailed.
The real questions are: How many back doors are there? and who has the keys? The (assumed) NSA back door might not be the only one. There is a possibility that the Chinese or Indian chip-fab or software contractors have also installed back doors for their own governments.
With billion-gate machines, a few thousand extra gates would be hard to see. If the extra logic looks like instruction-cache, but just has a little extra code, it would be almost impossible.