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Gaining System-Level Access To Vista

An anonymous reader writes "This video shows a method by which a user can use a Linux distro called BackTrack to gain system access to Windows Vista without logging into Windows or knowing the username or password for any accounts. To accomplish this, the user renames cmd.exe to Utilman.exe — this is the program that brings up the Accessibility options for users without sight or with limited vision. The attack takes advantage of the fact that the Utility Manager can be invoked before the user logs into the system. The user gains System access, which is a level higher than Administrator. The person who discovered this security hole claims that XP, 2000, 2003 and NT are not vulnerable to it; only Windows Vista is."

19 of 412 comments (clear)

  1. physical access == game over by bersl2 · · Score: 5, Insightful

    How is this news?

    1. Re:physical access == game over by zonky · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Does it bypass the bitlocker/full drive encyption options in vista? Physical access is not always game over....

    2. Re:physical access == game over by weicco · · Score: 5, Insightful

      The interesting thing is that the utility for helping impaired people is run as SYSTEM when it really doesn't have to be.

      My hunch would be that the utility has to insert some system level hooks into Windows in order to read text from every widget (window, control, or whatever you call them) in the system. This is why it needs elevated privileges.

      But the whole article is stupid. I "hacked" into my coworker's Win2000 installation almost decade ago. He was on holiday and we needed something from his PC. I downloaded nice little program from the internet, copied it to disk, booted it and changed admin password. Then we just log on to his system using the new password. Wow! Maybe I should post an article to Slashdot about this!

      --
      You don't know what you don't know.
    3. Re:physical access == game over by SynapseLapse · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Why so negative? It's interesting because it's a pretty egregious oversight on Microsoft's part and it's a pretty funny workaround. The joy of computers is finding intersting and clever hacks. Exactly how many articles have you posted on /.? How many Vista (A supposedly secure system) loopholes have you discovered?

    4. Re:physical access == game over by Niten · · Score: 4, Insightful

      That is called defence in depth. The attacker should not be able to simply boot and change system files.

      But you still don't seem to understand. Surely you should see the folly in trying to protect the integrity of the contents of a disk, by performing verification using software stored on the same disk? It is a fool's errand, a fundamentally losing proposition.

      I thought Vista is touting 'full disk encryption' as a great security feature! If it can be broken so easily, it is an anti-feature.

      It is a great security feature for keeping your data from being read by others if your laptop is confiscated or stolen. It is not a great security feature for keeping someone else from manipulating disk contents without special hardware support -- because in order for the computer to even boot there must be some amount of unencrypted code in the boot sector, and if you can modify that then there always exists a vector for attack.

      These are two different types of security you're talking about; you can't just lump it all together.

    5. Re:physical access == game over by WWWWolf · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Secondly, which moron in Microsoft would allow 'root' level programs to run 'before' the user has logged in as root? Pretty dumb, it seems to me. Maybe they did it on purpose?

      A bit of a chicken-and-an-egg problem here: How do you propose you authenticate users without a) running the authenticating program as root, having privileges to say "okay, you're user X, let me shift the control over to you", or b) being just as exploitable by giving limited user Y the privilege of saying "okay, you're user X, let me shift the control over to you"?

      Linux isn't any better, you know...

      # ps axu | grep getty
      root 4825 [...] /sbin/getty 38400 tty3
      root 4826 [...] /sbin/getty 38400 tty4
      [...]
      # ps axu | grep gdm
      root 10691 [...] /usr/sbin/gdm
      root 23736 [...] /usr/sbin/gdm

      A better question would be to ask, "why is the login application executing random programs anyway?" or, like you said, "why isn't the login application making sure that, when it executes a random program, it actually executes the program it was supposed to execute?" but I suppose the answer to these questions is simple: "sometimes the flexibility is warranted" and "this is getting way too elaborate, giving minimal gains in actual real security" - in short, if you want to make sure utilman.exe isn't messed around with before the boot, the more feasible and elegant solution is to use full-drive encryption (which solves far more problems at one single swat), not mess around with micro-granular annoyances.

    6. Re:physical access == game over by dhalgren · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Secondly, which moron in Microsoft would allow 'root' level programs to run 'before' the user has logged in as root? Pretty dumb, it seems to me. Maybe they did it on purpose?



      ts7000:~$ ps aux
      USER PID %CPU %MEM VSZ RSS TTY STAT START TIME COMMAND
      root 1 0.0 1.7 1368 508 ? S May25 0:05 init [2]

    7. Re:physical access == game over by Richard+W.M.+Jones · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Physical access is not always game over....

      With physical access you can reflash the firmware in either the BIOS or (eg) an ethernet NIC. The modified firmware will have full access to the system RAM, disks, and just about anything else (because it can DMA to/from memory and any device). So the next time the system is booted and the full-disk-encryption password is entered it is indeed game over.

      Rich.

    8. Re:physical access == game over by dotancohen · · Score: 4, Insightful

      I use a 26 char password on a laptop that locks every 5 minutes.

      Once you get used to it, it's not too annoying at all. I'm sure that a cellmate love affair would not be too annoying at all after you get used to it, but there are some pleasures that I just do not want to get used to.
      --
      It is dangerous to be right when the government is wrong.
  2. Physical Security by hardburn · · Score: 4, Insightful

    This demonstrates that it's almost impossible to secure a machine when an attacker has unrestricted physical access. Any OS is vulnerable somehow. There are a few things that can be done (like encrypting the entire system partition), but mostly solutions are limited to restricting who has physical access.

    --
    Not a typewriter
  3. PANIC by Profane+MuthaFucka · · Score: 5, Insightful

    The BIOS lets you run anything! Even a whole new operating system! Unrestricted access OMG!

    --
    Fascism trolls keeping me up every night. When I starts a preachin', he HITS ME WITH HIS REICH!
  4. If you can write the raw disk... by Animats · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Really. If you have enough access to the machine to boot your own OS and rewrite the disk, of course you can take over the machine.

    Now if someone manages to do this from the outside, that's news.

  5. Re:WTF? by fabs64 · · Score: 5, Insightful
    You mean like init? gdm? Xorg? sshd?

    Wow, if I boot a *nix machine with a rescue disk (assuming /sbin isn't encrypted) I can replace all sorts of apps that run as root with my own!

    danger will robinson.

    Seriously, as many problems as I have with Microsoft's past security practices, this does not look like anything.

  6. Re:WTF? by icebike · · Score: 5, Insightful

    > While this does require physical access, running
    > something as root before login is still incredibly
    > stupid.

    Every Unix/Linux system runs "something as root" before login. You should look at "top" some time and see what pid number 1 is and who ran it.

    --
    Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
  7. Disk access? by shird · · Score: 4, Insightful

    If they have sufficient access to rename a file, why bother rebooting into windows? Just read/write whatever you want when you have the initial disk access. Hell, modify ntoskrnl etc if you really want to.

    --
    I.O.U One Sig.
  8. This isn't a real security hole. by kiwioddBall · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Reason : You need access to the system to rename the system files in the first place. To rename system files you need Admin permission.

    Definition of a security hole : A security hole allows you to gain system access when you don't have system access in the first place.

  9. Re:Is this how it was planned? by totally+bogus+dude · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Not really, the kernel is just a file or two. If you insist, then rename init to something else (e.g. a shell) and you'll get a similar effect on Linux. Or modify the inittab to run a logged-in root shell on one of the vty's. If you really think this is some special OMG VISTA IS SO INSECURE COMPARED TO EVERYTHING ELSE flaw, then you don't understand the "problem" at all.

    However I have to wonder: once you have access to the filesystem, why exactly would you bother booting into Vista and getting yourself a privileged cmd.exe? Why not just access whatever data you want from the other OS? Or does "unencrypted hard drives can be read and modified using other computers" not make a good enough headline?

    This whole thing is so completely and utterly pointless it's probably created a black hole.

  10. This could be useful by WizzardX · · Score: 5, Insightful

    I think this is a useful hack. iirc, unlike most other OS's, Vista doesn't give you "real" system level admin if you login as administrator. It reserves the highest privilege level for itself. This could be useful for disabling services, updating system files and so on, that Vista won't let you do normally.

  11. Re:Multi-step process by gazbo · · Score: 5, Insightful
    No. In order to rename the file remotely you already need root. And even ignoring that, you would still need physical access to use the newly exploited shell.

    Your comment is akin to saying "Ah, but what if someone finds a way to remotely append init=/bin/bash to Grub?" There's no weakness in Linux there, as you'd need to have root on the box in order to do such a thing, and then after the shutdown -r you'd be fucked anyway as it sat at a shell 1000 miles away waiting for someone to type into the console.