What Could You Do With a Bogus Root Name Server?
Barlaam notes a post from the Renesys Blog which follows up on news they discussed a couple weeks ago about the 'identity theft' of a root name server. To emphasize the issue of safeguarding such a system, they've now posted an explanation of exactly how the situation could be exploited.
"It shouldn't be too hard to see that you could end up answering every DNS query from an organization that came to you for an updated list of root name servers. Every one. And you might end up doing this for a very long time, especially if your answers were largely correct. An attack like this would have no resemblance to the YouTube hijack, where the entire planet gets a blank page and it's immediately apparent that something isn't right. Obvious events like this will continue to occur, and we'll continue to resolve them relatively quickly. But as this incident demonstrates, DNS hijacks are far less obvious and potentially far more harmful."
DNSSEC has gone through three (3) mutually incompatible specifications. The DNSSEC people are claiming that the last revision really really works, honest, gov, and that all that remains to be done is deploying it.
But they don't appear to be deploying it on their own servers.
I'm sick of following my dreams. I'm just going to ask where they're goin' and hook up with 'em later.
Exactly. If you think the problem is bad now, wait until we've fixed it. (Arthur Kasspe). This should be the motto engraved on every Government departmental seal.
Faster! Faster! Faster would be better!