Court Refuses To Rule On ECPA Warrantless E-mail Searches

utkalum writes "After Steven Warshak's indictment and conviction on charges of mail and wire fraud, money laundering and other federal charges, he learned that key evidence in the case was obtained by the government under a 1986 law permitting no-warrant searches of email communications stored for longer than 180 days. He also learned that, despite the Electronic Communication Privacy Act's requirement that such searches be disclosed to the suspect no more than 90 days after they were commenced, the Government simply couldn't be bothered to comply. Now, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has refused (9-5) to hear Warshak's constitutional challenge to the Act (PDF), claiming that the question raised is 'not yet ripe' for adjudication. It's worth noting that the court also vacated an earlier injunction against using that act to read the e-mail of other people in Warshak's district. Read on for an excerpt from the ruling. 'Not only do "we have no idea whether or when" such a search will occur but we also "have no idea" what e-mail accounts, or what types of e-mail accounts, the government might investigate ... That uncertainty looms large in a debate about the expectations of privacy in e-mail accounts. The underlying merits issue in the case is this: In permitting the government to search e-mails based on "reasonable grounds," is 2703(d) consistent with the Fourth Amendment, which generally requires "probable cause" and a warrant in the context of searches of individuals, homes and, perhaps most analogously, posted mail? The answer to that question will turn in part on the expectations of privacy that computer users have in their e-mails — an inquiry that may well shift over time, that assuredly shifts from internet-service agreement to internet-service agreement and that requires considerable knowledge about everevolving technologies.'

Comments

'ripeness' is valid

[Red Flayer]

Now, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has refused (9-5) to hear Warshak's constitutional challenge to the Act (PDF), claiming that the question raised is 'not yet ripe' for adjudication.

Anyone who is going to tartly respond to this inflammatory statement would do well to read the link contained in the statement... 'ripeness' is an important legal concept, and it is clear that the matter is, as yet, unripe.

In order for the 'ripeness' qualification to be met, decision on the claim must affect the outcome. It's clear from reading the link that the outcome would not be affected, since the government is unlikely to perform another ex parte search; and even if they did, it wouldn't matter, since the guy who was indicted knows full well that he is under indictment, and would be even more of a fool to leave any more emails hanging around for the government to search.

As for the other issues, I'll not comment, since I don't think my words would bear the fruit.

Re:'ripeness' is valid

[Londovir]

In the same spirit of respect, I have to disagree with what you posted.

If you read the entire opinion, the following was mentioned:

- The government sought permission twice from a magistrate judge to gain access to the guy's email records. (So it's not a warrant, but it WAS an official court order)
- The government had to demonstrate to the magistrate that the records they sought contained information "relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation" (So it wasn't a blind or frivolous fishing expedition)
- The government was ordered by the magistrate to delay giving notice since the judge felt there was a credible chance of the guy tampering with evidence
- The judge sealed the court orders related to the searches

My point is, unlike other abuses of government warrantless work, at least this one had some measure of judicial review involved. That makes this case different, IMHO, than other warrantless wiretapping and such, and care should be taken to not draw conclusions about either with a broad stroke here.

The court also felt that not only was the case "not ripe" for ruling (which has a very clear and painstakingly discussed meaning in the opinion), but that the guy partially argued on the wrong grounds. They almost suggest he MIGHT have had a shot of having his case heard if he'd argued 1st Amendment rather than 4th Amendment (since he alluded to the idea of a "chilling effect" when it comes to emails) - but he didn't, he argued 4th Amendment.

In fact, from reading the opinion, it seems as though this guy completely "screwed up" his entire arguments. It sounds as though he sued on the grounds of future, potential searches, rather than on particular admissability of the emails that were gained during the prior 2 searches. It definitely was an issue that the guy sought to overturn ALL of 2703(d), for everyone, rather than just his particular case. The court makes great pains to state how they refuse to make a potential constitutional ruling for a general class situation where each person's particulars may be widely different.

I'd say the court did a reasonable thing with this decision, all things considered. The guy clearly should have known from his Yahoo TOS that his emails weren't going to be fully private in the first case - and in fact it was pointed out in his own TOS that "emails will be provided to the government upon request." (That argues, possibly, that the government may have been able to get the emails from Yahoo without any court involvement at all - depending on how Yahoo wants to proceed)

All in all, seems like nothing more to see here to me. Let's focus on FISA, where the real problems are, not on this non-case.

Re:Contact the court here:

[mitch.swampman]

Disregard my mangled post :(
Should read:
Court of Appeals
540 Potter Stewart U.S. Courthouse
100 East Fifth Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
Phone: 513-564-7000