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Estimating the Time-To-Own of an Unpatched Windows PC
An anonymous reader notes a recent post on the SANS Institute's Internet Storm Center site estimating the time to infection of an unpatched Windows machine on the Internet — currently about 4 minutes. The researcher stipulated that the sub-5-minute estimate was valid for an unpatched machine in an ISP netblock with no NAT or firewall. The researcher, Lorna Hutcheson, called for others to post data on time-to-infection, and honeypot researchers in Germany did so the same day. They found longer times to infection, an average of 16 hours. Concludes the ISC's Hutchinson: "While the survival time varies quite a bit across methods used, pretty much all agree that placing an unpatched Windows computer directly onto the Internet in the hope that it downloads the patches faster than it gets exploited are odds that you wouldn't bet on in Vegas."
I've heard similar statistics in the past already. How is this statistic measured? Is it the time after you connected your ethernet cable or modem and doing nothing at all but wait, or is it the time after you opened a browser and let an "average" user surf the internet and open things? Is it a problem if you need 4 minutes to install all windows patches and updates?
Back in '04 the time to live was (claimed to be) around 20 minutes. I wonder what the time is for an unpatched Vista (the figures in the article are for XP). Heh - I bet '98SE survives forever (nobody would want to exploit that).
Andy
That makes a lot of sense - because that is exactly what happens. Tons of bots around trying to get into "known and patched for years" exploits. They jsut scan IP Address ranges for computer to come online. So, really - no browsing required. No user action required. They happily come to you. This is why a simple firewall like the one you have now on Windows (allow only outgoing connections by default) or simple NAT ALREADY raises quite a bar in security - there ARE, HAVE BEEN and WILL BE exploits that do not require any user interaction.
No, this type of infection is sent to random computers all over the Internet.
If one computer on the same IP range as you if infected, it will try to infect all computers on the same IP range and continue to try until someone either turns off the PC or formats the harddrive.
Try installing a firewall, connecting a computer directly to the Internet (don't -do- anything, just connect it) and then Wireshark to look at your Network Interface.
You'll be surprised at the stuff you get without asking.
"I was in love with a beautiful blonde once, dear. She drove me to drink. It's the one thing I am indebted to her for."
Would be interesting to compare with Vista.
They tried. They ran into some obscure bug with Vista that prevents it from accessing the internet while the machine is powered on.
I keep hearing on /. about how slow Windows is. Now it turns out that Windows is very fast.
Fools, don't you know that all you have to do is make sure you scan any flopp
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I never patch my windows unless its a service pack and I run just fine... Always have my Antivirus running and Windows defender with a router with built-in firewall... No complaints for the 7 years since I built my pc....
Indeed, your computer is a valued member of our botnet.
At risk of sounding like I'm supporting something Microsoft has done, the feature they added with Server 2003 SP2 (and I believe also XP SP2) was quite a good move considering these facts.
When a SP2 system is first brought up, after running through Mini-Setup or the OOBE, it will open a "Post-Setup Security Update" wizard. Until the user clicks the "Finish" button on the wizard, the firewall blocks all incoming traffic. The wizard also has links to Microsoft Update, etc. This gives the user a chance to download all the patches before opening up the firewall.
In Vista/2008, the firewall is on by default and fairly locked down, only allowing certain traffic through. In Server 2008, the firewall rules are also grouped into categories to make it easier to configure so the user doesn't get frustrated and just turn it off completely (and if a user tries this by just stopping the firewall service, they lose their 'net connection completely... one must instead set a firewall policy to allow all traffic, which then shows the firewall status as "off").
Haha, no problem for me with my Linux dis
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I'm going to jump in, because I don't think anyone explained this.
Windows runs lots of services (server programs) by default, some of which have vulnerabilities. Some of which can't be turned off, because of the way MS programmed them. If you wonder why they are there, this is how things like filesharing works: it has a server program which will reply when someone else on the lan broadcasts asking for other shares. If someone creates specially formed packets, they can break into those vulnerable services, and you are rooted.
There could also be vulnerablilities in the kernel (main system), but they are rare. You could also be infected if you opened up a shared folder, and someone / a program uploads a hostile program to it, and you run that program.
This is in addition to getting infected by visiting a hostile site with an insecure browser.
I may not have explained this very well, but hopefully you get the idea.
You should be perfectly safe, as a dumb NAT firewall won't be sending your PC any traffic that it didn't originate. The only possible vectors would be: a) if its connection tracking code gets confused and lets in traffic which it thinks is associated with another connection but really isn't, b) bugs in the NAT firewall device (pretty much the same thing), or c) an attacker gets very lucky with spoofing connections that happen to be in the NAT table (tremendously unlikely).
All up, the chances of anything getting through are pretty much negligible.
The caveat is that stuff on your PC may be making connections without your knowing; and in particular, some programs may use UPnP to open a listening port for incoming traffic. This shouldn't be an issue with an out-of-the-box install.
This is of course assuming the common NAT device setup, where you have your modem/router which gets a public IP address and then NATs all outbound traffic. Inbound traffic will hit the router and not go any further unless the user has explicitly set up forwarding rules on it.
Pretty much everyone with broadband in Australia will be behind such a device, as this is the kind of device most every ISP recommends or sells. Not sure what the norm is elsewhere in the world.
I actually forgot my car keys in my car overnight once and nothing happened. Well, this isn't LA downtown. I live in one of the cities with the least crime overall.
The problem is, with the internet space means nothing. You essentially automatically live in all the worst cities at once, they're all right in front of your doorstep.
That's what most people forget when they deal with the internet, especially if they live in a sheltered community where it's safe to walk the streets at night. They're not used to pondering being mugged any second. But that's exactly what happens on the internet, you live in the worst kind of neighborhood, anyone out there who wants to do something bad to you is camping right in front of your door.
Don't feel special, though. They camp in front of every else's door at the same time.
We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
Which is exactly my point. We know those machines get pwned quickly, so why is this news?
Because it's about Windows and in the current trend, you don't have to bother on /. with little annoyances like facts and the truth if it's to do with Microsoft - any old shite will do if it is trying to make Microsoft look bad.
Yet you'll notice that the /. crowd isn't bleating on about the 33 year old Unix bug that's only just been fixed this week.
I only please one person per day. Today is not your day. Tomorrow isn't looking good either. - Scott Adams
If this is Windows XP, why isn't there an article on the time-to-own for an unpatched RedHat 8 install?
Can you still buy Redhat 8?
Can you still buy Windows XP?
Lock the wife and the dog in the boot of the car.
Return one hour later.
Who's happy to see you?
Exactly. Saying an unpatched OS is vulnerable to attack is like saying an unlocked Car is liable to be stolen.
I'm not even sure what it is they're trying to prove - that Microsoft can't bend time and space and retroactively patch ALL XP disks every time they release an update?
This actually got me thinking, even Linux has it's vulnerabilities from time to time, but I could argue it's MORE vulnerable because of all those Ubuntu Live CD's people have lying around. I've known a few people that have resorted to one of these Live CD's in times of dire need (i.e. when windows has decided to break) and one guy even used one for a few months because his HDD died on him - but how do you patch THOSE?
Luckily, Linux is pretty good at not getting owned so it's a bit of a non-issue at the moment, but I dare say it's only a matter of time before someone starts targeting them as well.
+1 IDisagreeSoHeMustBeATrollOrAnAstroturferOrAShill
Funny thing is that Zone Alarm has had some serious remote exploit vulnerabilities where if you hadn't installed a 3rd party FW in to your Windows XP computer, you'd be safe. Here's an example of one http://secunia.com/advisories/10921/. Windows XP, Vista, Server 2003 and 2008 Firewall has been rock solid and secure. You're simply talking out of your ass and you're giving the typical knee jerk reaction against Microsoft products. You do not have a single example of where Windows XP SP2 firewall is vulnerable to a remote exploit and there isn't a single example of hackers getting through it if all ports are closed.
Not true at all. It's a common misconception that NAT protects anything at all. Why so?
NAT uses translation routing based upon multiple inside computers to one outside address. The key here is the NAT device does NOT reconstruct packets if they are heavily fragmented. Even upper end Ciscos and Junipers are vulnerable to fragment based attacks.
The key is you construct a IP-IP tunnel to target victim, try to guess the internal IP addressing scheme, and then use a program called Fragrouter to properly "make mal-fragmented packets". Once you do this, it will hop over damn near every router.
I think there's a setting in IPF that forces reconstruction before passing packets. That's the only defense, along with a proactive filtering in both directions.