RHN Bind Update Brings Down RHEL Named
alexs writes "Red Hat's response to update bind through RHN, patching the DNS hole, made a fatal error which will revert all name servers to caching only servers. This meant that anyone running their own DNS service promptly lost all of their DNS records for which they were acting as primary or secondary name servers. Expect quite a few services provided by servers running RHEL to, errr, die until their system administrators can restore their named.conf. Instead of installing etc/named.conf to etc/named.rpmnew, Red Hat moved the current etc/named.conf to etc/named.conf.rpmsave and replaced etc/named.conf with the default caching only configuration. The fix is easy enough, but this is a schoolboy error which I am surprised Red Hat made. Unfortunately we were hit and our servers went down overnight while RHN dropped its bomb and I am frankly surprised there has not been more of an uproar about this."
So, you didn't test the update on a non-production server? Just install any old patch and let it take your network down? Who do you work for again? I have to make sure not to do business with that.
What? And isn't it an error of similar proportion to upgrade your primary DNS servers without first testing the new install?
If it was a Microsoft product, we'd all be carrying pitchforks and torches....
Here's the bug details: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=453340
One of the bug comments says: "Latest caching-nameserver renamed my named.conf to named.conf.rpmsave in /var/named/chroot/etc" - so this should mean that you can still restore the lost conf file.
"I am frankly surprised there has not been more of an uproar about this"
That's because the entire Internets are now broken!
This article is absolutely wrong.
The user has misconfigured their DNS and has installed a package called, SURPRISE, caching-nameserver along with the other bind packages.
caching-nameserver IS just that, a caching-nameserver. It SHOULD NEVER BE installed on a DNS server that is used for Primary or Secondary DNS control. The bind packages do not in any way modify named.conf, but if you want a caching nameserver and if you have installed the caching-nameserver package, then you would EXPECT that it would replace the named.conf file.
The real question is, how does crap like this get posted as a feature article on slashdot.
Don't forget to check your named.conf on RHEL 5.x (and CentOS 5.x).
Make sure that any lines like
query-source port 53;
query-source-v6 port 53;
are commented out or deleted so that forwarded DNS queries come from random ports.
Restart BIND if necessary.
Yes, as an official red hat representative, I can say that we can. All you need to do at this time is respond posting your server addresses and login credentials. We will fix it from there.
Ok, the login name is root and I use the default password: password for all our production machines.
Oh, I almost forgot. Our IP is 207.46.19.254
Please let our CEO know that I was the one who gave you this information.
She made the willows dance
What kind of environment are you in where you don't first test your patches that are going out to live production machines? Regardless of the fact that it is linux and not windows, you should always test your patches before you roll them production.
Disclaimer: I test first.
You know, lot of people work in small shops that can't afford multiple redundant servers. I suspect that business with a single DNS/web/mailserver are a lot more common than Slashdotters this morning seem to thing. What are those admins supposed to do? They're receiving a critical security patch from a trusted vendor, and I imagine a lot of them feel pretty safe applying that to their sole production server. This doesn't make them stupid or incompetent.
I have the luxury of lots of hardware that can fill in for other gear in a pinch, but lots of people don't. They don't deserve scorn for it.
Dewey, what part of this looks like authorities should be involved?
This sounds like how RPM's behaved as long as I can remember. It looks at three versions of a config file: #1 the one from the old package, #2 the one currently on disk and #3 the one in the new package. If the config file hasn't been customized (1 and 2 are identical), it moves the old file to .rpmold (if 1 and 3 differ) and puts #3 into place. If the config file has been customized, it checks whether 1 and 3 differ. If they haven't then nothing's chanced, the customized config file's still valid and it drops #3 in with the .rpmnew extension. But if 1 and 3 differ, then something in the config file may have changed and the customized config file may no longer be valid. But it's got customizations in it that the admin may need to refer to. So it outputs a warning message about what it's doing, moves the customized config file to .rpmsave and installs #3, and the admin's expected to have seen the warning and to merge their customizations into the new config file. You do watch for warnings and errors during the update, right?
In this case RPM is right, old named.conf files aren't valid. If they're based off RH's old stock config files, they have the source port locked and that disables much of the security fix. So the admins do have to check and modify their customized files before the system's finally ready (or at least RPM has to assume they do, since it can't know exactly what their changes were). That's exacerbated by probably having caching-nameserver installed, but I think a stock BIND install has a similar named.conf until you add your own zones to it.
I'd chalk this one up to admins who a) don't understand an inherent limitation of package-management systems (namely, it doesn't know why you changed something, only that you changed it), b) didn't watch the update process for errors, and c) didn't check the systems for functionality after the update.