Cold Boot Attack Utilities Released At HOPE Conference
An anonymous reader writes "Jacob Appelbaum, one of the security researchers who worked on the cold boot attacks to recover encryption keys from memory even after reboot, has announced the release of the complete source code for the utilities at The Last HOPE in New York City. The hope (obligatory pun) is that the release of these tools will help to improve awareness of this attack vector and enable the development of countermeasures and mitigation techniques in both software and hardware. The full research paper (PDF) is also available."
The way I see this, you should simply not store keys in memory (that is have your encrypted file system mounted) when you not need access to the files. A correct program will overwrite the keys when the file system is dismounted.
The purpose of full disk encryption (or system encryption in TrueCrypt is), in my opinion, not meant as a "one password to protect everything". It's just an extra measure to secure temporary files, the swap file and other tracks the OS and applications may spread around. You should still encrypt your really secret files separately, and use basic precautions such as secure file erasure when you've used them.
That said, I still don't think this attack is so important. If you have the file system mounted, and an attacker gains access to your computer, the files are already there!
Here's the existing approach to this problem.