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DNS Attack Writer a Victim of His Own Creation

BobB writes "HD Moore has been owned. Moore, the creator of the popular Metasploit hacking toolkit, has become the victim of a computer attack. It happened on Tuesday morning, when Moore's company, BreakingPoint, had some of its Internet traffic redirected to a fake Google page that was being run by a scammer. According to Moore, the hacker was able to do this by launching what's known as a cache poisoning attack on a DNS server on AT&T's network that was serving the Austin, Texas, area. One of BreakingPoint's servers was forwarding DNS (Domain Name System) traffic to the AT&T server, so when it was compromised, so was HD Moore's company."

5 of 196 comments (clear)

  1. Re:Did he take it well? by capt.Hij · · Score: 5, Informative

    According to the article (you know the one that is linked above) he said this:

    Now he's one of the first victims of such an attack. "It's funny," he said. "I got owned."

  2. Correction to the article published by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

    The reporter has published a correction, which is also reflected on the Metasploit Blog.

  3. Re:Good by rfunk · · Score: 5, Informative

    Er, this isn't the same guy who discovered the DNS flaw.

  4. Re:DNS cache poisoning in the wild by Phroggy · · Score: 5, Informative

    As I understand it, this kind of attack would be noticeable when attempting to use a secure (HTTPS) web connection, because the browser should throw up a certificate error. Is this true?

    Yes, this is true. HTTPS connections require an SSL certificate which must be signed by a Certificate Authority (CA) that your browser trusts. Your browser ships with a database of CA certificates, and you can manually add your own if you want; any SSL cert signed by one of those CAs will be trusted, but any SSL cert signed by anybody else will display a warning message before allowing you to access the web site.

    Unfortunately, there are legitimate HTTPS sites out there using self-signed SSL certificates. Chances are, you've probably seen one at some point, and you went ahead and accepted it anyway, because you figured the company is legitimate and they just skimped on getting an SSL cert signed by a real CA. I know I have. If DNS cache poisoning (or other techniques) can get your browser to think it's talking to a particular host when it really isn't, AND you accept an invalid SSL certificate, you're screwed.

    Note that SSL serves two purposes: it encrypts data while it's being sent over the wire so nobody* can eavesdrop on the connection between your browser and the server, and it also provides authentication so you can be sure that your browser is really talking to the server it thinks it's talking to. Using a self-signed certificate (or a certificate signed by an untrusted CA) renders the second of these useless, but the data is still encrypted.

    * And of course when I said "nobody"... There is a way to intercept SSL connections, but it requires that you install a special CA cert in your browser, which will make your browser trust whoever is intercepting the SSL connections. This makes it possible to set up a caching proxy server that can inspect and cache data being sent over HTTPS. This is crazy stuff you shouldn't think about.

    --
    $x='S24;r)>63/* h@<5+oZ)32"5cz';$me='phroggy'x$];
    $x=~y+ -xz+\0-Tx+;print$_^chop$me for split'',$x;