Mozilla SSL Policy Considered Bad For the Web
Chandon Seldon writes "The issue of digital certificates for SSL and the policies surrounding them comes up repeatedly. I've written an article criticizing the behavior in Firefox 3, which includes a serious comparison of the current Mozilla policy — restricting encrypted HTTP to paying customers — to a violation of net neutrality."
In four mouse clicks I've added that site to my exceptions list. It warned me, I read and understood the warning, I acted. I saw the https page and the web site owner didn't have to pay for a certificate.
So, the article is wrong:
"Mozilla Firefox 3 limits usable encrypted (SSL) web sites to those who are willing to pay money to one of their approved digital certificate vendors"
please add 'or click four times to add the site to an exception list'.
But there's one problem you understand what the error message says and means.
My parents couldn't get past that message even after I explained it. I had to downgrade FF because they would freak out when they saw that message.
From a usability point of view its terrible.
As mentioned on the Firehose comments page about this article (http://tech.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=634651&cid=24461415):
If the purpose of the Firehose is to vet articles, it's not doing a good job.
As the article says. SSL does both. FF3 in particular makes the first completely unusable for no good reason. The web would unquestionably be more secure if all http servers switched to using self-signed SSL certificates in place of unencrypted connections.
The $10 certificates have essentially no value over a self-signed certificate. The only reason they even exist is that browsers make it so hard to use self-signed certificates.
The correct behavior is to allow self-signed certificates with no warning at all, but not display the yellow bar/padlock that CA verified SSL certificates do. Then they should drop support for all signing authorities that have only an automated check for domain ownership, since they are of next to no value. Warnings should still be generated for expired certificates and probably those signed by unknown CAs.
The FF3 behaviour will make most normal users just think, "Oh, the website is broken. I guess I can't go there." They won't even read the error message: they'll just see that there is one, and give up.
That's good. I'm fine with that. "Secure by default".
Or, depending on IE's behaviour (which I do not know in this particular case), they'll see, "Oh, I can't get to this website in Firefox.
http://projectdream.org/~lb/ie7-unknownca.jpg
IE7's error message and behaviour are slightly different - first, accessing the site anyway is a single click. However, that click will be necessary each time you try to access the site. When you want to make the trust permanent, much more convoluted steps are necessary (around 10 clicks through a variety of property dialog boxes, and even more complicated on Vista).
Just because I want to have the possibility of encrypted traffic for visitors to my website
Encrypted traffic doesn't mean much when everyone can go inbetween you and them. MITM attacks against self signed certificates are easy to do.
Most hobbyists websites do not require SSL - if you host a discussion group or anything similar to that, SSL is not required. MITM attacks are still easy, so you haven't lost or gained anything.
Or perhaps you can enlighten me with a use case for a hobbyist website that requires SSL.
No the author has a grip. If you haven't added the root for OpenCA go to www.openca.org with your firefox 3 and look at what you are presented with.
If you try to go forward it presents you with a HELP GET ME OUT OF HERE button an option to add an exception, then on that exception adding window it blatantly says that no legitimate website would require you to do this. In other words, it blatantly accuses all self-signed sites of being a scam.
Sigh. You don't disclose your private key to a third party when you request a certificate. You provide the public key, and the third party signs that with the private key corresponding to a CA certificate. Neither party reveals a private key to the other, or to anyone else.
WHat annoys about this is that FF doesn't support CACert, which is an 'Open' certificate outfit.
http://www.cacert.org/
I can buy a BS certificate from Godaddy.com for $10 and that's OK but a verified cert from CA Cert is no good. Go figure.
I run a small sideline business, and my whole yearly income would barely pay for a cert from someone like MS and the like. So I explain to my clients to click through the certificate BS. I'm after the in-route encryption; my clients know who they're connecting to.