Students Learn To Write Viruses

snocrossgjd writes "In a windowless underground computer lab in California, young men are busy cooking up viruses, spam and other plagues of the computer age. Grant Joy runs a program that surreptitiously records every keystroke on his machine, including user names, passwords, and credit-card numbers. Thomas Fynan floods a bulletin board with huge messages from fake users. Yet Joy and Fynan aren't hackers — they're students in a computer-security class at Sonoma State University. Their professor, George Ledin, has showed them how to penetrate even the best antivirus software."

Comments

Good

[Safiire Arrowny]

Sounds like these students might actually learn something about computer security from this class.

So what?

[x_MeRLiN_x]

I was under the impression that all security courses worth their salt taught skills that could potentially be used maliciously. How does one learn how to be a penetration tester? What makes this case different?

Polymorphism is at least an option in most Computer Science courses. Does one really need to sit down and be taught "how to write viruses" specifically? Or can a huge amount of people who write code use their initiative and learn how to write any kind of application?

Managers at some computer-security companies have even vowed not to hire Ledin's students.

What companies? Would they want to work there anyway?

Re:So what?

[Opportunist]

Uh... ethics?

I know a few people, amongst them me, who could come up with malware that no AV kit can easily defeat, mostly because we know how AV kits work. We write them.

But there is a reason why you don't hear about AV writers making malware (despite the rumors. Let me put something straight: WE DO NOT NEED TO WRITE IT! Why bother doing something for your job security if it's done for you?). The AV biz is a very geeky one. I don't know a single person who's in it because of the money (well, we of course don't hate the money, but you could make a shitload more by switching sides...). We're here because we like what we do. We like the 'net. And despite not really liking the idiots who click on every crap they get sent, we want to protect. No, not them. The net FROM them.

More and more malware is actually an attack on the 'net in general rather than a specific person. And as stated above, we like our net clean. If you, as a researcher, become known as someone who actually writes the crap, you're done for. Nobody will talk with you anymore. Worse, the whole industry will want your head. You piss in our pool, you better get out before we give you the wedgy of doom.

This is mostly why nobody with the skills writes malware. That it's illegal to distribute a malicious program in most countries is just a minor annoyance compared with that.

Re:Penetrate even the best antivirus software?

[SoapBox17]

In case that wasn't a rhetorical question, the answer is:
Because it is a computer class (probably part of a CompSci degree), not sociology/psychology. While targeting the user is a perfectly good way to go about breaking in to something, that topic area isn't very practical for computer science. I think the point of TFA is that the class teaches a lot more than "this is how to kill McAfee, now go run amok!" It is a good opportunity to think outside the box, and targeting the user is very much inside the box, and very low tech.

I'd be kind of pissed if I took a computer security class and it was all about social engineering.

Re:Weak sauce.

[bluefoxlucid]

Because breaking into things and creating stealthy shit is the greatest problem solving skill you will ever find.

By nature, to break into a computer, you have to force it to do something it (software, sometimes hardware i.e. Intel errata) was specifically not designed to do. Usually this amounts to something not obvious to 100% of the rest of the world for some strange reason being obvious to you. The more experience you have warping completely tame and working interfaces in perverse ways due to minor quirks, the easier this becomes.

Load modules and shared objects aren't designed to be altered like that; and in this case you have a system designed specifically to catch and prevent you from doing what you're doing. This is, again, forcing something into a position it's not designed to operate in to achieve a predictable result.

Carmack's Reverse, Duff's Device, and even Edison's light bulb worked from these same principles; remember, by its very nature you cannot have light without fire.

Re:Penetrate even the best antivirus software?

[Beryllium Sphere(tm)]

In the old days, the author of a high-speed worm would have wanted to avoid user interaction, because human beings slow things down. Slammer doubled the number of infections every 8.5 seconds when it took off: hard to do that when you have to wait for a user to figure out how to turn off their antivirus software.

Someone who is targeting corporate systems today, for espionage or to recruit well-connected botnet hosts, is attacking an environment where the users may not be able to turn off their antivirus software.

A pure social engineering attack, with no code obfuscation, would have to work in two stages. The actual payload would have to be delivered after the antivirus got turned off, not before, so there would have to be a first stage containing the UI to persuade the user to disable anti-virus. Hardly impossible, but a nuisance.

Those are a few of the reasons, though your point stands unchallenged: humans are the weakest link, and security people who develop tunnel vision about technical protections and countermeasures are crippling themselves.

Re:"We've Changed this Game"

[Opportunist]

You become better, we become better. It's a race, nothing more, nothing less. And I think both sides know that neither side will eventually win.

The question today isn't whether AV kits can catch every virus out there. The question today is, can we make development of malware so expensive that it doesn't pay anymore? Malware development isn't the pastime of some pimple-faced teen with too much time and no girlfriend on his hands. Malware is, simply and plainly, a business. And like every business, it aims at profit.

The goal of AV kits today is just to minimize that profit the malware distributors can gain. We know that we can't find every virus some teen hacks out to prove that we can't find his trojan. Ok, we can't. Mission accomplished. But your trojan doesn't bother us or anyone, unless it becomes the next Sasser. You are no threat. What does your trojan do? Hijack your friend's WoW password? Get offa my lawn and come back when you've become more than an annoyance.

Today, malware has to be "important" to be hunted by AV companies. I.e. it has to cost more than a handful of people money. It has to spread wide, has to hijack EBay and PayPal accounts (and bank accounts if possible), be a spambot or something else that actually has some impact. And those packages are invariably developed and employed by organisations who aim at making money.

So the goal today has changed, from protecting you to stifling their income (which also serves to protect you, in a way). Yes, we're trying to keep back the ocean that comes with a tsunami with a broom. Our back is against the wall. The best we can do today is to limit their income in an attempt to show them it's more profitable to go back to good ol' burglary.

When you, as a private person, write some malware and release it into the world, you'll eventually be detected, too. But you're not important. The damage you do, the footprint you leave on the international detection grid, is so insignificant that, sorry if I'm so blunt, you don't count.