DNS Flaw Hits More Than Just the Web
gringer writes "Dan Kaminsky presented at the Black Hat conference in Las Vegas on Wednesday, and said that the DNS vulnerability he discovered is much more dangerous than most have appreciated.
Besides hijacking web browsers, hackers might attack email services and spam filters, FTP, Rsync, BitTorrent, Telnet, SSH, as well as SSL services. Ultimately it's not a question of which systems can be attacked by exploiting the flaw, but rather which ones cannot. Then again, it could just be hype.
For more information, see Kaminsky's power point presentation." Update: 08/07 19:48 GMT by T : There's also an animation of the progress of the patch.
SSH will raise the key changed warning if you've connected before.
SSL will raise a certificate error unless they have some way of getting a fake cert.
You mean all the services that use DNS are at risk?!?!?!
Say it isn't so...!
Here all this time I thought the Internet WAS the Web...
its almost like every service that uses hostnames might be affected.
And they called me a fool when I refused to learn website names WHO'S LAUGHING NOW!!
If you are reading this on Slashdot, and you are just now realizing that DNS exploits affect more than just the web, then get the hell out of here. Shoo. Leave your card at the door.
Dewey, what part of this looks like authorities should be involved?
This is why I've maintained a comprehensive /etc/hosts file since 1996. Every now and then it gets to be a bit large, so I periodically print it out and cache it to a shelf full of 3-ring binders.
Virtually all bittorrent clients support a distributed hash table, and inter-client peer exchange protocol, which means that as long as you have the .torrent metafile you can bootstrap yourself into the torrent (neither DHT nor peer exchange uses DNS at all in fact, except perhaps when the client is first installed to bootstrap). The only impact would be on obtaining said .torrent file, which is explicitly out of bittorrent's problem domain.
The three of us who still use Gopher are scared to death!
Even those who arrange and design shrubberies are under considerable economic stress at this period in history.
Kaminsky makes a point about how this bug can be used to spoof Certification Authorities who issue SSL certificates. For the cheap "domain control only validated" certificates, ownership of the domain is validated by sending an e-mail to the domain. If you can spoof DNS from the viewpoint of a CA, you can buy a valid SSL cert for a domain you don't own. Now you can spoof some banking site, and the spoofed site will properly display an SSL cert.
He also makes the point that DNS cache poisoning can be used to fake MX records in DNS, which will result in e-mail being diverted to the attacker, who can then look at it. If the attacker creates a high-priority MX record, they can read the mail, then disconnect without acknowledging receipt. The originating mailer will then resend to the next-priority MX record, the real one. So the mail reaches its destination without anything in the headers to indicate it was snooped.