Slashdot Mirror


Moving Beyond Passwords For Security

Naturalist writes with an excerpt from a New York Times story about the need for a more secure method for identification than the password-based system almost everyone currently uses. The article also discusses the weaknesses of the OpenID initiative to simplify the process. "The solution urged by the experts is to abandon passwords -- and to move to a fundamentally different model, one in which humans play little or no part in logging on. Instead, machines have a cryptographically encoded conversation to establish both parties' authenticity, using digital keys that we, as users, have no need to see. ...OpenID offers, at best, a little convenience, and ignores the security vulnerability inherent in the process of typing a password into someone else's Web site. Nevertheless, every few months another brand-name company announces that it has become the newest OpenID signatory."

9 of 235 comments (clear)

  1. How could it blame OpenID? by sam0737 · · Score: 3, Interesting

    OpenID does not required the use of password as the way for human to authentication oneself to the system.

    It's just up to the OpenID signatory to use whatever technology to authenticate someone. This human interface is decoupled with the underlying authentication.

    Although most public signatory currently use username+password, but it could be change. Say you could implement your own, using PKI to recognize your own certificate stored on removable media. If you gone crazy enough, nothing stop you from implementing One-time password + Biometric + whatever-you-can-think-of to authenticate yourself to your own signatory.

  2. Re:OpenID by CTachyon · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Also, many OpenID providers like MyOpenID let you generate a browser-side SSL certificate and forbid password logins entirely on your account. At that point, you can't be tricked into entering your password because you simply don't have a password.

    --
    Range Voting: preference intensity matters
  3. Re:Convenience vs security vs stupidity ... by Saishu_Heiki · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Security versus convienience has been a large issue here at the hospital where I work in the IS department. Because all of the pharmacy orders are done in our clinical application, the state pharmacology board mandated that another layer of security be added beyond the physician's username/password. The result is a list of 60 person questions (hometown, number of brothers, country of birth, etc) that is drawn from randomly to ensure the person ordering the drugs is the one who is logged in and authorized. The problem was, doctors were answering "1" to all 60 questions so they would not have to remember the answers or be bothered actually reading the questions. If they had to use their ID badges instead, it would be an even bigger nightmare. They want speed and ease of use, but are reckless because data security is "my concern". Sometimes it is hard to stop the person with the gun to their head from killing themselves, regardless of whose responsibility it is.

  4. Kerberos did that years ago. by khasim · · Score: 5, Interesting

    With Kerberos, your password never leaves your machine.

    The machine you're trying to log on to sends you a random string that is encrypted with your password.

    Your machine uses the password you typed in to decrypt that string. Which also contains instructions on how to continue the connection.

    Your password never goes across the wire.

  5. What about digitags? by nicc777 · · Score: 3, Interesting
    My bank uses a combination of Digitag and SMS notification as added layers of security.

    In South Africa, everyone with a bank account by law has to undergo a KYC process (know your client). This basically means that you as a client have to verify your ID at a branch (in person) with ID documents and some of your monthly bills. Your cellphone number is then captured to which all notifications of activity on your accounts are sent.

    The Digitag is used during online authentication. As a further backup, a one time pin (OTP) is send to your cellphone. This OTP is required for certain transactions like once off payments.

    Granted the system is not perfect (there is still human stupidity), but I would like to hear your comments on these tpye of systems, as they are becoming more and more part of our lives.

    --
    Need an ISP in South Africa?
  6. Re:Yes, we know. by jd · · Score: 5, Interesting

    The US Government uses this method, except via smart cards. This started with the NMCI initiative. I was not keen on NMCI, as it used Citrix and centralized application serving. This creates a single point of failure (which quite often failed at the beginning) and a single, all-powerful account on a system (there's no other way of having a central system responsible for all privileges otherwise) on an operating system that probably isn't going to be in the Trusted class (ie: it ran Windows - and I am using the Trusted class in the Orange Book sense, not in any "popular" sense of whether people actually trust it).

    PKI is a very sensible approach, but should not be used in isolation. This was discussed only a short time ago on Slashdot regarding "secure locks" - there should always be multiple layers of security, a reliance on a single layer is always going to be a disaster waiting to happen.

    Passwords as a "bootstrapping" mechanism to enable the rest of the security sounds fine. It's something we already do with regards GnuPG/PGP keys, Kerberos, etc. They're weak, but bootstraps don't need to be that strong if you're using them in a multi-layer system. They're supposed to make it hard for anyone to tell if they've broken the other layers. That is sufficient.

    There is, however, almost nothing else you can use. Biometrics are not safe (Slashdot has covered the breaking of many such systems) and not guaranteed to work (Slashdot has covered chimeras and other biological weirdness in the past). Two physical electronic keys won't give you significantly more security than one with twice the quality of encryption and just give you more you can lose. Call-back mechanisms are vulnerable to social engineering (if involving people) or replay attacks (if automated) since such methods have to use extremely primitive security as they are prior to authentication.

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    It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
  7. Graphical Pattern Method by BPPG · · Score: 3, Interesting

    At my university, they were trying an experimental password alternative that comp-sci students could opt-in for.

    Basically, we were presented with an image; this particular image was a bunch of cars in a parking lot, with people walking or standing around. I think it was a 400 by 400 pixel image. To set your pattern, you had to click and memorize five or six arbitrary points in the image, and also memorize the order you click them in. The idea was that it was supposed to be a lot easier to remember than an equally powerful password. Some people liked the new system, while others had a lot of trouble remembering the exact position of each of their clicks. I fell into the latter group.

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    What's the value of information that you don't know?
  8. Re:Yes, we know. by JFitzsimmons · · Score: 3, Interesting

    And you can do that with openid. I got bored and made myself a GPG based openid provider. It isn't complete by any means since it lacks key revocation and such, but it is working and public.

    http://id.l3ib.org/

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    Beware he who would deny you access to information, for in his heart he dreams himself your master. -Anonymous
  9. Re:totally safe authentication method! by elFarto+the+2nd · · Score: 3, Interesting

    IIRC, Data has used Picard's credentials, and he was impersonating his voice, so that would support your theory.

    Regards
    elFarto