Slashdot Mirror
Secure File Storage Over Non-Trusted FTP?
hmckee writes "Does any software exist that enables me to store/backup/sync files from my local computer to a non-trusted FTP site? To accomplish this, I'm using a script to check timestamps, encrypt and sign the files individually, then copy each file to an offsite FTP directory. I've looked over many different tools (Duplicity, Amanda, Bacula, WinSCP, FileZilla) but none of them seem to do exactly what I want: (1) multi-platform (Windows and Linux), stand-alone client (can be run from a portable drive). (2) Secure backup (encrypted and signed) to non-trusted FTP site. (3) Sync individual files without saving to a giant tar file. (4) Securely store timestamps and file names on the FTP server. Any help or info on alternative solutions appreciated."
This guy was always complaining about headaches. He would constantly be pounding his head into his fist and whimper to me that he felt like his head would split open. He took pain killers all the time, and for a long duration was addicted to a certain prescription pain medication. But none of that helped because as soon as the medication started to wear off, the pain would come right back again.
Finally, I had had enough of his complaining. I told him to stop pounding his head with his fist. Whaddayano! His headaches went away in a day.
Moral of the story: Don't try to find workarounds for your problem. Fix the problem.
"secure" and "untrusted" don't go hand in hand. If you want security, don't put things in untrusted spaces. Period.
Are you sure about that? I consider my SSH connections secure even tho' they traverse untrusted links. Same goes for my encrypted mails, https connections to my bank, etc.
Anyway, to the submitter - is areca close to what you want?
There are shills on slashdot. Apparently, I'm one of them.
"secure" and "untrusted" don't go hand in hand. If you want security, don't put things in untrusted spaces. Period.
I disagree. Everywhere you can store your files should be considered "untrusted". And "securing" the files is what we do to mitigate that reality.
If you want security, don't put things in untrusted spaces. Period.
Completely, utterly incorrect. It's a sad comment on the ambient understanding of data security that this got modded insightful.
Trust is seldom a good approach to security. Good security is when you can trust nobody and still sleep at night. That means strong encryption. That is exactly the approach implied by the article and it is exactly the right thing to do.
I think it is very unwise to ever assume any level of trust in the storage of backups, certainly offsite backups. The whole idea of backups is that you keep them around for a long time, in several copies and several locations. The more valuable your data, paradoxically, the more copies you need and the more widely dispersed they should be. This is antithetical to maintaining trust. The right way, indeed the only way out of this paradox is strong encryption.
Even if his userid/passwd are compromised, his data wouldn't.
So if someone used his userid/passwd to delete his archive or overwrite it, his data wouldn't be compromised?
Or has the data no value, so the archive can be deleted/corrupted without loss? Then what is the use of archiving it at all?
This may well mean that despite whatever you do, encypt etc, someone can sniff the password and then simply come in and delete all your files. i.e, whatever other steps you take, this is inherently worthless.
Then you should have put this as a requirement in your query. But I would ask WHY you want a gui? Backups should be set-and-forget! My USB sticks have multi-platform autorun scripts to execute my backup. I only need an interface if I choose to expand or shrink the backup set--I can edit a text file that has the list of what to exclude.
Python is pretty easy to put on a portable hard drive and there are multiple portable versions.
Access means they can decrypt them. Given enough cycles, encryption can be broken.
What are you talking about? Encryption that can be broken with any feasible level of computing power is worthless. If you're assuming that once the bad guys get your ciphertext they'll be able to decrypt it sooner or later, why encrypt your data at all?
Certainly I'd prefer to have my valuable data stored with both physical security and encryption. But if I had to choose one or the other, I'd definitely choose encryption. If you compare the cost of the security measure with the cost to circumvent it, strong encryption is many orders of magnitude better than physical security.
All encryption can be broken. The solution then, is to ensure that the encryption cannot be broken within a useful timeframe. I really don't care if you manage to decrypt my credit card number if the card has already expired. If I'm having a secret meeting this time tomorrow then the encryption only needs to last just over 24 hours, since by the time you work it out it will be too late.
I actually think you've got it backwards. Encrypt them strongly and you can put the data on a billboard in the centre of picadilly circus and no one will be able to work it out in a useful timeframe. Ever seen Kryptos? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kryptos The data is public, there are many thousands of people attempting to break it, and yet the hardest section remains unresolved. The acceptable risk is related to the minimum amount of time that you can allow for the code to be broken, which determines how strong you need your encryption.
This may well mean that despite whatever you do, encypt etc, someone can sniff the password and then simply come in and delete all your files.
i.e, whatever other steps you take, this is inherently worthless.
Hardly. As long as the data is encrypted well enough to stop people from stealing or modifying the data in ways that could have serious privacy and financial implications this is a net gain in data availability.
Even if the chance of someone doing this was as high as 5% over the period in question, it would still mean that there was 95% chance of you having a good off site backup. That is better than nothing as long as you realise that there is still a 5% risk and don't act like it is totally secure.
As a simplified example; if your PC at home is 95% sure of retaining all of its data in the period and your portable USB hard drive is 95% sure of retaining all of the data, the chance of you losing any data at all is 0.0125%. Even with exaggarated risk factors, this is not bad.
I think you've missed the point. If you're not allowing access to the files then encryption isn't particularly important now is it?
The whole point of encryption is that you could email it to your arch-nemesis and they would still be unable to decrypt it in a useful time-frame. Take AES with a 256 bit key. That would (on average) take all of the computers in the world millions of years to brute force. It's possible that someone could get lucky, but they'd have to dedicate years of processing time on the off-chance that you had encrypted something particularly juicy.